Unexplained Drone Sightings Over Afghanistan and the Ongoing Geopolitical Intrigue
Last Updated: January 01, 2026
Recent developments in Afghanistan have once again brought the country's complex geopolitical situation into focus. Throughout October 2025, numerous reports have emerged from Afghan residents about unidentified drones flying over various provinces, raising concerns among analysts about regional security and international power struggles.
In particular, residents of Panjshir province reported sightings of mysterious aircraft patrolling the skies. According to local sources, these drones began their patrols on the morning of October 23, 2025, and continued into the afternoon. The aircraft were observed flying at very high altitudes, with their sounds barely audible, making identification difficult. The origin and purpose of these drones remain unclear, with no official statement from Taliban authorities, who control the region. Notably, the Taliban regime has been accused of turning Panjshir into a training ground for al-Qaeda and a safe haven for terrorist activities, further complicating the security landscape.
(Example
photo of a military drone)
In another
incident, local sources reported an unidentified drone patrolling the skies of
Kapisa, Parwan, and Panjshir provinces. Eyewitnesses stated that the drone
entered Kapisa on Sunday, December 7, 2025, at around 9:40 a.m. local time, flying over
the districts of Hesa Awal and Hesa Doum Kohistan and parts of Sayed Khel
district. The aircraft then moved over the village of Faraj in Panjshir and,
after a few minutes, headed east and left the area. The identity of the drone
and its country of manufacture have not been determined. Previously, residents
of Kabul had also reported similar unmanned aircraft patrolling the city’s
skies.
Culmination of escalations
On December 8, 2025, at approximately 7:40 p.m. local time, explosions were reported in Dara district of Panjshir, marking the latest escalation. Local sources stated that the first blast struck a Taliban headquarters in Manjinsto village in the Abdullah Khel area. A second explosion reportedly occurred shortly afterward, as Taliban fighters were gathering the bodies and injured from the initial strike.
Two additional witnesses confirmed hearing the explosions but could not provide details on casualties. No group immediately claimed responsibility. The Taliban often dismiss reports of attacks on their bases and restrict media access, making independent verification difficult.
Two additional witnesses confirmed the blasts but could not provide details on casualties. No group immediately claimed responsibility. The Taliban frequently dismiss reports of attacks on their bases and restrict media access, making verification difficult.
On December 9, 2025, The National Resistance Front (NRF) confirmed the operation, stating that their forces carried out a targeted strike on a key Taliban base in Dara district, resulting in 17 Taliban fighters killed, including the battalion leader, and five others wounded. The operation was conducted in two stages: first a mine detonation, followed by rocket attacks, causing heavy damage to the base while ensuring no harm came to NRF forces or civilians.
According to the NRF, the Manjinsto base had been a central Taliban hub from which militias regularly harassed civilians. Its destruction represents a significant blow to the group’s presence in the area. The NRF emphasized that such operations are part of ongoing efforts to liberate the Afghan people from the Taliban’s “illegitimate rule.”
This strike represents one of the most notable actions by the NRF in recent months, highlighting ongoing resistance activity in Panjshir despite the Taliban’s control over much of the country.
Taliban
Start Getting Nervous as
Despite strengthening ties with powerful states such as India, Russia, and China, the Taliban increasingly show signs of nervousness at home. Local witnesses in Kunar reported that, in December 2025, the Taliban apprehended ten senior students at their graduation event because they had displayed the Afghan tricolor flag on their clothing.
(The modern
black-red-green tricolour, symbolizing Afghanistan’s past, the blood of
independence, and hope for the future, has remained the nation’s most
recognized flag, even after the Taliban reinstated their white Emirate flag in
2021.)Individuals present confirmed that the students had decorated their uniforms after receiving their certificates, a long-standing tradition in eastern Afghanistan. Taliban forces entered the venue, stopped the celebration, and detained them. Their whereabouts remained unknown.
As enemies of Afghanistan’s national symbols, the Taliban have banned all displays of the tricolor. Similar incidents have occurred repeatedly. In 2024, more than 25 students in Asadabad were arrested for the same reason. Since returning to power, the Taliban have replaced the republic’s black-red-green flag with their white Emirate flag, and over the past four years have repeatedly detained citizens for displaying the old national emblem.
In another incident in Herat, four young men from the Jibraeel area were detained by Taliban authorities for wearing outfits inspired by the British historical crime drama Peaky Blinders, which follows the Shelby family led by Thomas Shelby. Taliban officials accused them of promoting foreign cultural influences, declaring the clothing in violation of Sharia law. Photos of the group—shared widely on social media under the nickname “Jibraeel’s Shelbys”—showed the young men walking through the neighborhood in Western-style attire. Shortly before their arrest, the group had appeared in a YouTube interview, explaining that they admired the fashion of the show’s characters and wanted to showcase Afghanistan’s cultural diversity through modern forms of self-expression.
Their detention sparked widespread online reactions, with Afghan youth and social media activists voicing support for the group and calling for their release. These cases exemplify the Taliban’s ongoing crackdown on personal freedoms: since returning to power, the authorities have imposed strict dress codes, restricted women’s education and public participation, and controlled how young men present themselves in public. Critics argue these measures reflect the movement’s opposition to modern lifestyles and cultural plurality that many Afghans—especially younger generations—seek to embrace.
What was once a common cultural gesture has quietly become an act of resistance.
A Region of Competing Powers
These incidents unfold as Afghanistan becomes a chessboard for global and regional powers—China, Russia, the U.S., Pakistan, India, and others—all vying for influence. Dubbed the “heart of Asia,” the country remains a strategic crossroads for energy, trade routes, intelligence operations, and proxy conflicts.
The Role of Turkey and Qatar
Additionally,
the geopolitical landscape also involves regional players such as Qatar and Turkey. Under President Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey appears to provide
discreet support to the Taliban, similar to its backing of other Sunni
extremist groups worldwide. Erdoğan has increasingly aligned with Sunni
Islamist factions and taken part in international platforms that often counter
Shiite influence in the region. Despite his public portrayal of moderation,
Turkey’s political posture reflects a consistent sympathy toward Sunni
extremist movements, including the Taliban. At the same time, many Afghan
politicians opposed to the Taliban reside in Turkey, though their activities
remain restricted due to concerns about potential extradition and political
repression.
Qatar, on the other hand, maintains strong economic ties and is believed to be involved in various international activities, including smuggling and other illicit operations, which bolster Turkey’s economy. Without Qatar’s support and clandestine activities and networks, Turkey’s economy would face significant hardships.
Drones and the Shadow War
The recent surge in drone sightings adds a new layer to Afghanistan’s already fragile security landscape. Their presence highlights the opacity of the country’s power dynamics, where no party claims responsibility and every movement fuels speculation.
Some analysts suspect the aircraft belong to regional intelligence agencies tracking Taliban activity, while others see them as part of ongoing counterterrorism operations by foreign powers. Without clear information, Afghanistan’s skies have once again turned into a stage of suspicion and intrigue.
Taliban–Pakistan Talks in Istanbul
Adding to regional tensions, a second round of three-day talks between the Taliban and Pakistan began on Saturday, October 25, in Istanbul, Turkey. Informed sources indicate that discussions will continue for an additional two days. Pakistani media reported that Pakistan’s delegation presented a “clear and firm position” regarding the threat posed by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The main focus of the talks includes enhancing security coordination, improving border cooperation, and developing a joint strategy to promote regional peace and stability. The Express Tribune, citing sources close to the negotiations, stated that the goal is to establish mechanisms that can reduce border security challenges and prevent terrorist activities.
(The
2,640-kilometer-long Durand Line, which divides the Pashtun population, was
established by the British in 1893.)
Sources in Kabul revealed that a six-member Taliban delegation, led by Deputy Interior Minister Rahmatullah Najib and including officials such as Suhail Shaheen, Anas Haqqani, Noor Ahmad Noor, Noor-ur-Rehman Nusrat, and Abdul Qahar Balkhi, participated in the discussions. On the Pakistani side, a seven-member delegation comprising diplomats and intelligence officials attended the closed-door talks at the Conrad Istanbul Hotel. Turkish police enforced strict security measures at the venue, but neither side nor the Turkish government has disclosed details of the agenda.
These negotiations follow a previous meeting between Taliban and Pakistani defense ministers in Qatar, which resulted in an agreement on a ceasefire. However, the specifics of this deal remain confidential. Pakistan has described the agreement as “confidential,” while the Taliban claim that the deal is not yet finalized and is not classified.
Saudi
Arabia Steps In: Taliban–Pakistan Negotiations Continue
Tensions between the Taliban and Pakistan remain high. Reports from December 7, 2025, indicated that a Saudi delegation was preparing to travel to Islamabad and Kabul to mediate between the two sides. During recent face-to-face discussions in Riyadh, both parties pledged to maintain the fragile ceasefire established in earlier talks in Doha and Istanbul.
Although no
formal agreement was reached, the Saudi delegation was expected to visit
Pakistan first, then Afghanistan, to sustain momentum and lay the groundwork
for the next round of negotiations. This makes Saudi Arabia the third country,
after Qatar and Turkey, to directly mediate between the Taliban and Pakistan,
with Iran also reportedly offering mediation last week.
The Taliban
have long relied on financial support from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar,
giving Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha significant influence over the group’s
political and strategic decisions. This financial dependency often shapes the
Taliban’s willingness to participate in regional negotiations and uphold
ceasefires. The Taliban follow a mixture of strict orthodox Sunni Islam,
similar to that practiced in Qatar and Turkey, and Wahhabism, as promoted by
Saudi Arabia.
The US's Role in Afghanistan’s Ongoing Saga
The Taliban appear to be in deeper trouble than they are willing to acknowledge, caught in the midst of complex geopolitical maneuvering. Amid this turbulence, the United States continues to shape Afghanistan’s course through largely unofficial and opaque means. Notably, Zalmay Khalilzad — the chief negotiator of the Doha Agreement and former U.S. special representative for Afghanistan — has made his third known visit to Kabul since the fall of the Afghan republic and the withdrawal of U.S. forces four years ago. However, his return does not appear to be in an official diplomatic capacity, though it is believed to reflect behind-the-scenes coordination with Washington. Khalilzad is reportedly acting as an unofficial envoy, taking part in meetings on major energy projects, including the proposed TAPI pipeline, alongside influential regional partners such as the Saudi-based firm Delta International. Observers note that his engagements seem aligned with efforts to strengthen Pashtun and Sunni representation, groups with which both Khalilzad and the Taliban identify. Both the Taliban and Khalilzad are believed to adhere to the Wahhabi-influenced Deobandi branch of Sunni Islam.
His presence in Kabul, which took place around October 22, 2025, has sparked questions about the boundary between unofficial diplomacy, personal lobbying, and efforts to restore the legitimacy of a regime that remains unrecognized internationally. Official reports from the office of Taliban Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Abdul Ghani Baradar, indicate that Khalilzad attended a formal meeting on October 24 with Taliban officials and representatives of Delta International, discussing investments in Afghanistan’s oil and gas sectors. Despite his unofficial status, Khalilzad was received with protocol usually reserved for official representatives—a sign of his continued influence and access within Taliban circles.
Khalilzad’s involvement in energy projects traces back to the 1990s when he advised American oil companies like Unocal and played a key role in the CentGas consortium, aimed at transporting Turkmen gas through Afghanistan to Pakistan. Although those plans failed, recent developments suggest he is now engaged in similar regional energy negotiations, this time alongside the Taliban and Gulf states, in a geopolitical landscape that he helped shape decades ago.
Since the fall of Kabul in August 2021, Khalilzad has maintained contact with Taliban leaders, traveling to Kabul in 2022 and 2023, ostensibly to facilitate the release of American citizens and Afghan allies. His activities raise questions about whether he represents specific interests, operates with US government tacit approval, or is pursuing personal ambitions to revive the Doha Agreement’s legacy.
The Energy and Geopolitical Stakes: TAPI and Beyond
The Taliban’s return has revitalized interest in regional energy projects like the TAPI pipeline, which aims to transport Turkmen gas through Afghanistan to India. The Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) Gas Pipeline, also known as Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline, is a natural gas pipeline being developed by the Galkynysh – TAPI Pipeline Company Limited with participation of the Asian Development Bank. Launched in 2008, the project has faced numerous obstacles—security challenges, regional rivalries, and questions of legitimacy. The involvement of Khalilzad and regional stakeholders suggests a possible shift toward a new energy alliance that could bypass Western influence.
(Afghanistan’s
geopolitical significance is evident, often being referred to as the “heart of
Central Asia.”)However, the success of TAPI remains uncertain. The project requires security stability, political legitimacy, adherence to international standards, and regional cooperation—conditions that are largely absent in the current environment. Afghanistan’s internal instability, coupled with international rejection of the Taliban regime, complicates prospects for a breakthrough.
A Fragile Balance of Power
Afghanistan’s geography has long made it a prize for competing powers. Its position at the crossroads of Central and South Asia ensures that any shift in its internal dynamics has far-reaching consequences. The emerging alignment between Taliban officials, Gulf investors, and figures like Khalilzad could represent an attempt to build a new political-economic axis, one that bypasses traditional Western and Russian spheres of influence.
But the risks are substantial. Empowering the Taliban without political reform risks solidifying authoritarian control and undermining regional stability. Economic deals pursued in the shadows may offer short-term benefits while worsening Afghanistan’s long-term fragility.
The Roots of Afghanistan’s Collapse
Pakistan’s role in the Taliban’s resurgence is indisputable. Yet, responsibility for Afghanistan’s collapse also lies with segments of the Afghan elite — particularly among Pashtun figures in the diaspora who actively lobbied for the Taliban’s return to power. Among them, Zalmay Khalilzad stands out as both a key architect and a beneficiary of the current political reality.
Afghanistan’s fall in August 2021 stemmed from a combination of interconnected failures:
- Pakistan long backed the Pashtun Taliban as a strategic proxy, thinking it could control them. Today, those same religious students have turned against the Pakistani state, leaving Islamabad struggling to rein them in.
(The Taliban seized Kabul, Afghanistan, on September 27, 1996, and again on August 15, 2021 ...)
(... coming directly from their madrasas in northwestern Pakistan, with support from Pakistani intelligence.)- Lobbying efforts by Pashtun diaspora elites sympathetic to the Taliban cause. Across the world, from Russia and India to Germany and Norway, several Pashtun networks have worked to legitimize the Taliban’s rule and influence international opinion in their favor.
- The incompetence and corruption of U.S.-backed Pashtun leaders, notably Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani. Both presided over weak, divided governments and, as some observers suggest, may have facilitated the Taliban’s return to power through deliberate inaction or political calculation.
- Financial and political backing from Arab Gulf states, especially Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, which provided crucial funding and diplomatic support that strengthened the Taliban’s position.
Together, these forces dismantled an already fragile republic, paving the way for the Taliban’s takeover. The result is a nation caught between foreign manipulation, internal repression, and an uncertain future.
Afghanistan Under Taliban Rule
The situation in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s totalitarian and extremist regime can best be captured by the few images that manage to emerge from the country:
(A
Taliban security officer stands guard as deported Afghan refugees arrive from
Pakistan at the Spin Boldak border crossing in Kandahar province.)
(The masked Taliban fighter patrols the streets of Afghanistan, moving among children and other civilians.)
(Armed
Taliban members have become a common sight across towns and cities, where
criminality and oppression are often carried out by the Taliban themselves.)
(Taliban
loyalists celebrate the fourth anniversary of their takeover of Afghanistan in
Massoud Square, Kabul — August 15, 2025.)
Yet, what is most striking is not what these images show, but what they conceal — the near-total disappearance of Afghan women from public life. The Taliban’s systematic and brutal repression of women is among the most severe in the world, stripping them of basic rights, education, and visibility.
In essence, the Taliban have turned Afghanistan into a landscape of suffering and despair. More than ten million Afghans have been forced to flee their homeland in search of safety, freedom, and dignity.
A new attack in Washington, a familiar pattern
On November 26, 2025, an Afghan Pashtun man named Rahmanullah
Lakanwal allegedly opened fire on two U.S. National Guard soldiers only blocks
from the White House.
One soldier, Sarah Beckstrom (20), later died of her injuries; the other, Andrew Wolfe (24), was critically wounded before security forces returned fire and apprehended the suspect. Lakanwal was taken into custody shortly after the attack. Media sources and U.S. authorities confirmed that he previously served as a member of a CIA-backed Afghan paramilitary unit — specifically one of the so-called “Zero Units” (Kandahar “Strike Force” / Unit 03).
In another incident Afghan Pashtun man Mohammad Dawood Alokozay was arrested in Texas for allegedly posting a video on TikTok in which he threatened to build a bomb targeting a building in the Fort Worth area.
Former President Donald Trump reacted forcefully, describing
Afghanistan as a “hellhole on Earth” — wording that reflected widespread
frustration in Washington over continuing security risks linked to
Afghanistan’s collapse under Taliban rule.
The Taliban, who took power again in August 2021, continue to preside over a deteriorating state, international isolation, and a shrinking economy. Yet Afghanistan’s internal failures also have external consequences. The apprehension of Lakanwal and Alokozay revived the debate on relations with the Taliban, known to provide haven for global terrorist groups. Notably, like the Taliban leadership itself, Lankawal, Alokozay and several other perpetrators share a Pashtun background.
The Mirror already warned in an article from September 12, 2024: "Another report says the camps train fighters and suicide bombers, and teach them how to slip out of Afghanistan to launch threats against Western targets. It is thought up to 21 terror networks are operating in Afghanistan, turning the country into the world’s biggest terror hot spot. The latest assessments say al-Qaeda is working with Islamic State, sparking growing fears of another 9/11-style attack on the West."
It also linked Taliban and al-Qaeda to ISIS: "It is believed too that al-Qaeda and ISK, the regional Islamic State franchise, are not just co-existing but actively collaborating, with inter-marriages among members."
Evidence suggests that the Taliban have established several terrorist camps
across Afghanistan, including in the provinces of Helmand and Panjshir.
Evidence suggests that the Taliban have established several militant training camps throughout Afghanistan, with notable activity in Helmand and Panjshir.
Historical dominance and unequal access to wealth
Afghanistan’s imbalances did not begin with the Taliban. For much of the 20th century, political power was concentrated in Pashtun-led ruling circles — from the monarchies of Nadir Shah and Zahir Shah, through early republics, and later within the U.S.-backed governments of 2001–2021.
Because these institutions were overwhelmingly controlled by
Pashtun political elites, the most influential state positions, patronage
networks, and economic opportunities tended to circulate within the same
families and tribal structures. Critics long argued that these networks favored
their own circles and marginalized Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other
communities in access to political power, development resources, and state
benefits.
Wealth and influence thus accumulated unevenly. Some elite
groups, including figures who later settled abroad, were repeatedly accused
of participating in the illegal extraction of natural resources, unregulated
mining, timber smuggling, and misuse of public funds. These activities were
tied not to Pashtun identity as a whole, but to specific politically connected
clans that benefited from state access, armed protection, or foreign support.
Meanwhile, ordinary Afghans across all ethnic backgrounds
remained in poverty, especially those from regions historically excluded from
political power.
Why some Afghans are wealthy abroad while Afghanistan stays
poor
The contrast between Afghanistan’s deep poverty and the
wealth of a handful of Afghan businessmen abroad, such as Mirwais Azizi in
Dubai or members of elite families like the Karzai or Alokozai networks, can
only be understood through Afghanistan’s long-standing political structure.
1. A state built around narrow elite networks
Across the 19th, 20th, and early 21st centuries, the
dominant share of Afghanistan’s political and economic power was held by
Pashtun-led ruling elites.
Because they controlled the state — the monarchy, major
ministries, military leadership, and later many important positions in the
post-2001 government — the majority of Afghanistan’s top political families,
wealthiest business networks, and patronage structures were indeed Pashtun.
2. What this produced
This concentration of power meant:
• Most
large landowning families belonged to Pashtun elite circles.
• The
wealthiest business and political dynasties emerged from these networks.
• Foreign
aid, state contracts, and investment were funneled through Pashtun-dominated
institutions.
• Tajiks,
Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others were routinely marginalized, with fewer
opportunities for economic mobility or political representation.
Thus, Pashtun elites disproportionately benefited,
historically and in the modern era.
3. What this does not mean
These patterns reflect political structures, not ethnic
characteristics.
• Most
Pashtuns in Afghanistan are also poor.
• The
wealthy families represent elite patronage networks, not the Pashtun population
as a whole.
• Other
ethnic groups also had wealthy individuals, but far fewer because they lacked
comparable institutional access.
4. The accurate structural reality
Because Pashtun-led ruling circles dominated Afghanistan’s state institutions for more than a century, the overwhelming majority of the country’s political elites and wealthiest families came from Pashtun backgrounds. As a result, Pashtun elite networks accumulated far more wealth and influence than communities such as Hazaras or Tajiks, who were historically marginalized and had fewer opportunities to gain economic power.
Afghanistan between Taliban rule and elite normalization
In recent months, a growing number of policy and media articles have suggested that the Taliban are gradually emerging from international isolation. Pieces such as “Why the Taliban Is Coming in from the Cold” (Financial Times, December 4, 2025) and “Why the Taliban Government Is Likely Here to Stay" (Geopolitical Monitor, December 19, 2025) portray the movement as an unavoidable political reality, one that foreign governments are urged to engage with pragmatically.
Critics, however, caution that this framing risks softening or normalizing the Taliban’s record of repression, violence, and systemic human-rights abuses. The narrative has gained traction as the Taliban enter their fifth year in power, despite continued international non-recognition. Notably, the group’s previous regime also lasted five years (1996–2001), a historical parallel that helps explain the Taliban’s growing nervousness and domestic crackdown to avoid being removed from power again.
Taliban crimes that Remain unaddressed
While calls for engagement increase, international legal and human-rights reporting paints a starkly different picture. In December 2025, an international tribunal in The Hague concluded that the Taliban’s systematic treatment of women amounts to crimes against humanity, citing widespread exclusion from education, employment, and public life .
Cultural destruction has continued alongside repression. In Kabul, the Taliban recently bulldozed the historic Ariana cinema—one of the last surviving symbols of the city’s cultural life—underscoring their hostility toward art, public memory, and urban heritage .
These developments raise questions about whether political “stability” under Taliban rule comes at the cost of fundamental human rights and cultural erasure.
Taliban rule and the technocrat question
Afghanistan’s predicament cannot be understood without examining the role of technocratic elites—both before and after 2021.
Before 2021, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan relied heavily on Western-backed technocrats to manage finances, development aid, and state institutions. Figures such as former President Ashraf Ghani embodied this model: internationally trained, closely tied to institutions like the World Bank, and favored by foreign donors. While intended to modernize governance, critics argued that this technocratic approach often failed to account for Afghanistan’s complex social structures, inadvertently reinforcing elite networks and corruption rather than dismantling them.
Since 2021, the Taliban—despite being an ideologically driven movement—have also relied on pragmatic and technocratically minded figures to keep basic state functions running. With much of Afghanistan’s professional class having fled, the movement has retained or cultivated administrators to manage the central bank, customs, energy, and trade. This has created a hybrid system: rigid ideological control combined with selective technocratic management aimed at economic survival.
As a result, Afghanistan today is neither a classical technocracy nor a purely revolutionary system, but a tightly controlled ideological regime that selectively employs technical expertise where necessary.
International engagement and controversial support for the Taliban
Engagement with the Taliban has also extended into financial and diplomatic domains. In the United States, reports that tens of millions of dollars were transferred to Taliban-controlled institutions under the Trump administration sparked bipartisan backlash, with critics warning that such funding risks legitimizing the group and entrenching its rule.
The most recent payment to Afghanistan was reported on Monday, December 8, 2025, by anti-Taliban Afghanistan Green Trend Chair Amrullah Saleh. According to Saleh, the funds were “freshly printed” and transported via chartered aircraft.
Former U.S. envoy Zalmay Khalilzad has remained a controversial figure in this context, with critics accusing him of continuing to lobby for engagement strategies that prioritize stability over accountability.
In a 1996 Washington Post op-ed, Zalmay Khalilzad argued that engaging a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan could serve U.S. interests. In November 2025, President Trump convened a C5+1 meeting with Central Asian leaders, signaling renewed focus on regional integration linked to Afghanistan’s stability. What often goes unmentioned: the same Pashtun technocrats—Khalilzad among them—have repeatedly pushed Washington toward re-engagement with the Taliban, despite the group’s ongoing abuses.
Almost 30 years after Khalilzad’s op-ed, the Washington Post addressed the long-term consequences of U.S. Afghanistan policy in an article titled “Trump wants Bagram back. Satellite images show how the Taliban are using it” (December 12, 2025).
The volume of U.S. military equipment left behind in Afghanistan included more than a quarter-million rifles, enough to arm the entire U.S. Marine Corps, and nearly 18,000 night-vision goggles, sufficient to equip the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, according to the report. Defense analyst O’Connor concluded that while such assets are of limited value against a nuclear-armed state with a large, modern military such as Pakistan, they are highly effective when used to suppress lightly armed insurgents (such as anti-Taliban resistance forces).
(According to defense analyst O’Connor, the Taliban’s helicopters and close-support aircraft would be “useful when facing a minimally armed insurgency or aggressor.”)This raises an uncomfortable but persistent question: was the scale and nature of the abandoned equipment merely the result of miscalculation and collapse, or did it also produce a strategic effect, intentional or otherwise, by ensuring that any future Afghan resistance would face overwhelming odds against the Taliban? In this context, it could reasonably be argued that Khalilzad’s long-standing engagement doctrine, combined with the manner of the U.S. withdrawal, may have functionally foreclosed the emergence of a viable anti-Taliban counterforce, even if such an outcome was never formally articulated as policy.
Allegations of External Networks and Security Risks
Taliban networks remain active beyond Afghanistan, though many incidents go unreported in the media. Several countries, including Afghanistan’s neighbors and states such as Russia, Iran, India, and Germany, have handed former Afghan embassies to Taliban-appointed representatives, effectively granting the movement diplomatic footholds abroad. Analysts and critics warn that these offices could serve not only diplomatic functions but also informal political or intelligence networks, though governments involved deny such claims.
In Germany, Taliban-linked representations reportedly operate in Grünwald near Munich and in Bonn, a development that has sparked debate within Afghan diaspora communities. These concerns deepened after the unresolved death of Dawood Siawash, whose body was found in the Pegnitz River in Fürth, Bavaria, on 20 September 2023, not far from the Afghan consulate in Grünwald. German authorities have not publicly linked the case to Taliban activity, and investigations remain ongoing. Dawood Siawash was the father of prominent Afghan journalist Yama Siawash, who was killed in a bomb blast in Kabul in November 2020.
At the same time, Germany has witnessed a series of knife attacks in recent years. Although investigations vary, some analysts argue that elements within Islamist and Taliban-adjacent networks may have contributed to radicalization pathways behind certain incidents
On December 24, 2025, General Ikramuddin Saree, former police chief of Takhar province under Afghanistan’s previous government, was assassinated in Tehran. A Tajik from Takhar, Saree had been an outspoken critic of the Taliban’s policies, including the killing and detention of former Afghan soldiers, actions that likely marked him for death.
Mohammad Amin Almas, a former Afghan army soldier, also died in the attack. This assassination, the first directly targeting a former Afghan official outside Afghanistan or Pakistan, highlights the risks faced by those opposing the Taliban abroad.
Earlier, in September 2025, Maruf Gholami, a figure close to jihadi commander Ismail Khan and a known Taliban opponent in western Afghanistan, was killed on Mofateh Street in Mashhad. No official explanation has been provided for his death. These events come amid intensified expulsions of Afghan refugees from Iran, including former soldiers and individuals who face serious life threats if returned to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
The dangers, however, are not limited to exile. Inside the country, targeted violence against former security personnel continues. Local sources in Faryab province report that on Friday, December 26, 2025, a former soldier named Juraqol was shot dead in public at the Kulian market in Bolcheragh district. Juraqol had recently returned to Afghanistan after being expelled from Iran.
(Juraqol (left) was shot by the Taliban on December 26, 2025 after being expelled from Iran.)According to the sources, the shooting was carried out in front of civilians by Tayeb, known as “Sadaqat,” the head of the Taliban’s 4th Border Battalion in Khamial district of Jawzjan province. The public nature of the killing points to a deliberate policy of intimidation.
These incidents reflect a wider pattern. Between 2023 and mid-2025, at least 110 former Afghan soldiers were killed despite the Taliban’s repeated claims of a “general amnesty.” Public executions and targeted killings continue to undermine security and discourage the return of refugees and former security forces.
Arbitrary detention remains a parallel concern. Sources say the Taliban detained a former security force member in Kabul after his return from Iran. The man, identified as Azimullah, son of Noor Mohammad, was arrested on December 20, 2025, in the Qambar Intersection area. Originally from Baba Ali village in Abshar district of Panjshir province, his whereabouts remain unknown.
In Iran, particularly in Mashhad and Tehran, Pashtun Taliban cells have also attempted attacks on other anti-Taliban activists, including a 2024 attempt to kidnap Qari Issa Mohammadi, who had traveled from Germany to Iran for a vacation. These incidents underscore the Taliban’s far-reaching influence and the ongoing threat of its networks, as well as Iran’s limited action against Taliban activity on its soil.
Fathullah Mansour, the Taliban’s deputy minister of transport and aviation and son of former Taliban leader Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, recently warned that “evil elements” in neighboring countries must be “neutralized.” The National Resistance Front and Afghan authorities abroad have held the Taliban responsible and called for independent investigations.
Iran’s silence has fueled suspicion among Afghans, with some accusing Tehran of quietly collaborating with the Taliban against anti-Taliban resistance groups.
Meanwhile, on December 23, 2025, Tajik authorities reported that two border guards and three suspected militants were killed in a clash near the Afghanistan–Tajikistan border after the group refused to surrender and opened fire.
Within Afghanistan, the Taliban continue to perpetrate abuses and target cultural heritage. A notable example is the demolition of a historic Kabul cinema, long cherished by residents, reflecting a pattern of cultural destruction reminiscent of the Taliban’s rule between 1996 and 2001.
(The New York Times reported on the the destruction a Vintage Kabul Cinema on December 24, 2025.)
Taliban against Afghan women and minorities
Together, these developments highlight a central tension: while parts of the international community increasingly treat the Taliban as a durable governing authority, their record, documented by courts, journalists, and human-rights organizations, continues to point to systematic repression, cultural destruction, and unresolved security risks. Most notably, the Permanent People’s Tribunal for Women of Afghanistan in The Hague ruled in December 2025 that the Taliban’s treatment of women constitutes crimes against humanity, citing widespread restrictions on education, employment, and public life, along with physical and psychological abuse. Such findings underscore the depth of gender-based persecution and the dangers of normalizing relations without accountability.
The human-cost dimension of Taliban policies is further reflected in global indices. According to the 2025 edition of the Women, Peace and Security Index, prepared by the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security in collaboration with PRIO, Afghanistan ranks last worldwide in women’s inclusion, access to justice, and personal security, falling even below Yemen, Sudan, and Syria.While Afghanistan has previously appeared at the bottom of this index, the 2025 edition highlights the speed and scope of escalating prohibitions against women, marking a shift from a primarily legal crisis to an existential threat for half the population. The report evaluates countries along three axes:
Participation: access to education, employment, property ownership, family decision-making, and presence in public life
Justice: legal protections, enforcement, and access to justice
Security: personal safety and freedom from violence
(The 2025 Women, Peace and Security Index places Afghanistan last worldwide for women’s rights.)From August 2021 to December 2024, the Taliban issued at least 470 official or quasi-official orders that are restrictive in nature. Of these, 79 decrees directly and explicitly targeted women and girls, including:
Ban on secondary school and university education (2022–2024)
Ban on working in international organizations, including the World Food Programme (WFP), UNICEF, and the World Health Organization (WHO), even in projects related to women and children (2023)
Ban on entering parks, lawns, and public baths (2024)
Ban on using women’s voices in media and radio programs (2023)
Requirement of full veiling (including black veils and eye veils) in public spaces, with criminal penalties for families who fail to comply
(The only schools that remain open for girls are Taliban-run religious schools, where male teachers closely supervise and control their movements.)According to an analysis by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), these decrees are not the implementation of Sharia but a structural gender policy designed to exclude women from all levels of public and private life—an action comparable only to gender-apartheid policies in contemporary history.
(Afghan women were intimidated and silenced by the Taliban following protests during the first year of the extremist group’s rule—with little response from the international community.)Afghanistan today appears trapped between the unrecognized Taliban regime and the push for elite-driven normalization, where alleged stability comes at the cost of oppression, human-rights abuses, and the suppression of justice. Any peace achieved under this framework would likely disadvantage large segments of the population, especially women, non-Pashtuns, non-Sunnis, and all Afghans who oppose the Taliban regime.
(Afghan women and minorities are forced to flee the Taliban to protect themselves and their future.)While Afghans suffer from Taliban's rule, the international community stays silent, with many top pilticians claiming that this was the will of the Afghan people. But this not the case, the Taliban came with force and terrorism.
While Afghans continue to suffer under the Taliban’s rule, much of the international community remains silent, with some top politicians claiming that this reflects the will of the Afghan people. In reality, this is not the case: the Taliban came to power mainly through force, terrorism, and support from external sponsors.
Conclusion: A fractured nation built on selective prosperity, discrimination and human rights abuses
The trajectory of Afghanistan’s crises, from political collapse to outward migration and even violent incidents abroad, cannot be understood without looking at how power and wealth were historically concentrated in narrow elite circles. For more than a century, Pashtun-led ruling networks sat at the center of the state, controlling ministries, security institutions, contracts, and access to land. This did not make Pashtuns collectively privileged, most remain poor, but it meant that the wealthiest families, the large political dynasties, and dominant business groups overwhelmingly came from Pashtun backgrounds. Their access to the state became a gateway to resources, patronage, and later international business expansion.
This unequal structure is what enabled figures like Mirwais Azizi, or influential networks linked to the Karzai and Alokozai clans, to build global business portfolios and real-estate empires in Dubai and beyond, while millions of Afghans at home continued to live in poverty. Hazaras and Tajiks, and many poor Pashtuns as well, never had comparable access to state power or economic opportunity. Afghanistan did not fail because one ethnicity is inherently dominant or inferior, but because power remained centralized, personalized, and extractive, benefiting a tiny circle instead of the nation.
Had Afghanistan’s political elites, especially those who controlled the state during key historical periods, invested in inclusive development rather than patronage, corruption and private enrichment, the country could look very different today. Neighbouring and regional societies offer a telling contrast. Iran, Pakistan, China and India, despite their own internal crises, have functioning governments that enable trade, education exchange, diplomatic relations, and legal migration.
Iran’s ability to withstand sanctions, as economists there have argued, stems from state institutions that continued to function, enabling regulated oil trade, domestic industry, and foreign currency markets—capacities Afghanistan lost entirely after 2021. A December 2, 2025 report by Iran International illustrates this institutional resilience, noting how Germany expanded visa processing for Iranian students and medical professionals by outsourcing services and shifting workloads to its Federal Office for Foreign Affairs, despite strained relations.
Since August 2021, over 36,000 Afghans have been flown to Germany from Pakistan under the Merkel and Scholz governments, with additional arrivals during the Merz era. Yet, not a single Afghan has been brought directly from Iran.
If
Afghanistan had remained stable with a legitimate government, Afghans could
have been recruited directly from Kabul, for work, study, or asylum, instead of
risking their lives crossing borders, paying bribes, or depending on the good
will of Islamabad. They would also not be so easily pushed into exploitative or
low-paid labor in neighboring states and beyond.
All of this leaves a sobering message:
Afghanistan was not destined to fail, nor was
prosperity out of reach. It simply remained concentrated in the hands of a few.
Final thought
Afghanistan’s greatest tragedy is not only war or the Taliban, but the long tradition of politics built on exclusion rather than development. A nation where a handful of families purchase towers in Dubai while ordinary Afghans queue for bread inevitably breeds frustration, ethnic tension and anger. The lesson from history is clear:
Only an inclusive state, one that serves all Afghans, not just its ruling elite, can transform despair into a future. Until that day comes, Afghanistan will continue exporting its most desperate people and importing the consequences of its own fractured past.
Comments
Post a Comment