Taliban's Main Allies
Last Updated: August 12, 2025
Several countries are actively seeking to establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban, each motivated by different factors.
However, a notable group of nations has developed particularly strong ties with the Taliban, viewing them as genuine allies.
Among these countries are:
Both Germany and Pakistan lack significant natural resources, such as oil, gas, and rare earth minerals, which renders them more susceptible to external pressures, compelling them to engage with potentially controversial groups. In contrast, Qatar pursues specific objectives, primarily focusing on expanding its influence among Sunni populations in various regions around the globe. Further details regarding the involvement of these three countries will be discussed below.
Similarities between Taliban in Afghanistan and HTS in SyriaAs these countries seek to strengthen their ties with the Taliban, it is
crucial to grasp the motivations driving their diplomatic efforts.
Whether their actions are fueled by economic incentives, geopolitical
ambitions, or a desire for greater regional influence, the strategies
employed by these nations will significantly shape the future of
Afghanistan and its standing within the international community. The
evolving dynamics of these relationships could also have broader
implications for regional stability and international relations,
necessitating close observation and analysis.
While Pakistan has been the main enemy of Afghanistan for decades and has trained the most extreme groups in Pakistan, the other two have become Taliban's allies later. Qatar was not an influential country before and has risen to power just recently. But together with its ally Turkey, Qatar strove to control the Islamic world. While Turkey and Pakistan coordinate Jihadist Salafist fighters, Qatar, through its gas revenues, sponsors the money needed for the training and establishing of terrorist cells in the world. Through its popular media channel Al Jazeera and other media channels, which are mainly in Arabic and English, Qatar also spreads terrorist propaganda even into Western countries.
Qatar does it mainly because it is interested in sectarian violence to control the Islamic world in coordination with Turkey, which is a NATO member. Qatar is the main backer of many terrorist groups, i.e. Ahmad al-Sharaa's (former al-Jolani's) HTS terrorist group in Syria. HTS is the abbreviation for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. The terrorist group was formed out of former ISIS and al-Qaeda's al-Zarqawi branch members. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was an extremist terrorist who chopped off the heads of Shiite civilians in Iraq from 2003 till 2006. In September 2005, he declared "all-out war" on Shiites in Iraq, after the Iraqi government offensive on insurgents in the Sunni town of Tal Afar. Al-Zarqawi was killed in a targeted killing on June 7, 2006 by the USA. Only the killing of this Jordanian Salafist beast weakened sectarianism and reduced bloodshed in Iraq. Ahmed al-Sharaa, known by his terrorist name al-Julani, was a main ally of al-Zarqawi and likely chopped off heads of Shiite captives following al-Zarqawi's orders, before he did the same in Syria under the command of Abu Bakr Baghdadi. Al-Julani later founded the HTS, another terrorist Salafist organisation.
In any case those terrorist organizations only emerged after Arab Salafist Jihadist returned from Afghanistan. While Qatar monitored the financing of Jihadist groups, Erdogan turned Turkey into a pivot for Jihadists around the world and coordinated various extremist Sunni groups, like the al-Qaeda offshoot HTS. Turkey played the similar role to neighboring Syria, as Pakistan played to neighboring Afghanistan, namely the destabilizing role.
It was not
surprising when the henchmen of Syria's new terrorist ruler, al-Julani,
committed massacres against the Alawite population in March 2025, resulting in
the deaths of hundreds, if not thousands, of civilians. Reports from Western
media indicated that entire Alawite families, including many women and
children, were obliterated by al-Julani's terrorist gangs, known as Hay’at
Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
What makes
these atrocities particularly noteworthy is that even Western media reported on
them. This is significant given that the West—led by then U.S. Secretary of
State Antony Blinken and supported by the European
Union—emboldened these new rulers by lifting sanctions against the terrorists. These
groups were composed of both Syrian and foreign fighters, in stark contrast to
the “rebels” or “freedom fighters” label often used in Western narratives.
Again,
experts were not astonished at all, when leaders of the Taliban, which is
another major global terrorist organisation, were the first rulers of any state
to congratulate HTS, their terrorist counterparts in
Syria, by name.
There are
many similarities between the two groups:
-Both countries have experienced long-standing conflicts that have deeply affected their societies. Syria’s current crisis originates from the 1980s, primarily exacerbated by the 2011 Arab Spring, while Afghanistan has faced continuous turmoil since the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, leading to various conflicts, including the recent Taliban takeover.
-The rise of new governing entities (HTS in Syria and the Taliban in Afghanistan) reflects complex ideological backgrounds and affiliations, although rooted in different Islamic traditions. Both groups have connections to historical factions involved in prior conflicts.
-Both regimes have powerful supporters in Arab Sunni countries and the West.
-Many countries and powers compete in those countries against each other for influence.
-Both regimes face internal challenges in establishing governance systems and international acceptance, with significant issues regarding constitutional frameworks and political inclusivity.
A Short History of Pakistan's Support for Taliban
Pakistan and Arab Gulf countries have historically been involved in creating and supporting the Taliban and other terrorist groups. Arab Gulf countries provide financial support to the Taliban, while Pakistan is responsible for their education through religious schools known as madrasas. Many Taliban leaders, especially from the Haqqani network, studied at Darul Uloom Haqqania in northwestern Pakistan. Western countries provide funding to Pakistan. Today, the Taliban act as proxies for Pakistan and Arab Gulf countries.
How Pakistani Oligarchs/Elites Benefit from the Taliban's Presence in Afghanistan*
Pakistan's oligarchs are believed to be working in favor of the Taliban in Afghanistan for several reasons:
- They influence the Taliban to adopt laws that serve their interests. These restrictive laws have led to the emigration of millions of Afghans, enabling Pakistan to pursue its plans without interference—such as exploiting Afghanistan’s resources, importing terrorists, and engaging in drug trafficking and other crimes.
- Pakistan aims to keep Afghanistan underdeveloped by enforcing laws that limit education and opportunities. With women barred from working or attending college, the population remains low in both numbers and skills, and poverty worsens, preventing the growth of a skilled workforce.
- They also suppress the educated population by forcing out educated Afghans and discouraging those who remain from pursuing education—either because women are restricted or because people are forced into poverty and work instead of learning.
- The Pashtun ethnic group is favored by Pakistani elites for controlling Afghanistan. Pakistan has a larger Pashtun population than Afghanistan, and Pashtun elites often follow the orders of their Pakistani counterparts.
- Pakistan may seek aid from the US for its so-called war on terror, but much of that aid is kept by Pakistani oligarchs for their own benefit.
And so on.
To gain a better understanding of this issue, there is a short online video about Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban. The following content is part of that video titled "Taliban - Pakistan's Proxies in Afghanistan - History Of Taliban Terrorism (English)". The video provides a concise summary of Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan on behalf of the Taliban.
Content of the Video
Pakistan’s Interest in Afghanistan (0:00)
Pakistan is a poverty-stricken and densely populated country in South Asia. It has strategic interests in controlling neighboring Afghanistan to serve its own goals. Pakistani politicians are eager to exploit Afghanistan's natural resources. Additionally, they aim to connect Pakistan with wealthy Central Asian nations by dominating Afghan geopolitics. Some experts claim, without verification, that Pakistan's ultimate goal is to subjugate Afghanistan by establishing a Taliban government there.
Pakistan’s School of Terrorism – Darul Uloom Haqqania in northwestern Pakistan (0:29)
To achieve these objectives, the Darul Uloom Haqqania, located in northwestern Pakistan about 60 miles from the Afghan border, was established. This madrasa is often called the University of Terrorism and is accused of fueling violence across the region for decades. Today, many former students of this madrasa hold key government positions in Afghanistan.
The Haqqani Network and its Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan (0:51)
The notorious Haqqani network, known for complex suicide attacks and targeted assassinations, is named after the madrasa. Taliban Interior Minister Sirajuddin Haqqani is an alumnus of this madrasa and carried a $5 million bounty from the U.S. government for his alleged involvement in the 2008 attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul and for his ties to al-Qaeda.
Mass protests have been held in Afghanistan protesting Pakistan's suspected involvement in several deadly terrorist attacks carried out by the Taliban.
Afghan Protests Against Pakistan’s Support for Taliban (Kabul, January 2017)
Protesters in Afghanistan shout:
“Marg bar ISI (Death to ISI).
Marg bar Taliban (Death to Taliban).“
ISI Chief in Afghanistan (2:41)
Shortly after Kabul fell, the Pakistani ISI chief Faiz Hamid visited Kabul on September 4, 2021, supposedly to unite different Taliban factions.
Journalist asking the (then) ISI chief Faiz Hamid: “You’ll be meeting senior people in the Taliban?”
ISI chief Faiz Hamid (surrounded by ISI agents): No, I'm not entirely sure. (He might be a victor./not understandable)
Journalist asking Faiz Hamid: “What do you hope will come out of this? What do hope is going to happen now in Afghanistan? What's your best hope?”
Faiz Hamid: “I have just landed. We are working towards peace and stability in Afghanistan. Don't worry, everything will be okay.”
Despite widespread protests by Afghans against the Taliban, Pakistani leaders pushed forward with plans to install a Taliban puppet government in Kabul recklessly.
Pashtun Taliban’s Terrorist Regime oppresses Women and non-Pashtun Ethnic Groups in Afghanistan (3:19)
After taking control of Kabul, the Taliban quickly began establishing a harsh and inhumane regime. Most Taliban leaders and fighters belong to the Pashtun ethnic group. They systematically oppress non-Pashtun groups in Afghanistan, such as the Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek communities. Human rights activists compare Taliban rule to apartheid in South Africa. Regarding women's rights, the Taliban have enforced some of the strictest laws in the world, depriving women of education, employment, and social participation. Women's interaction with their environment has been severely restricted. The Taliban govern Afghanistan with an iron fist, persecuting and killing former government officials, while also intimidating, imprisoning, and torturing critics and protesters.
Video of Women’s protest against Taliban’s discriminatory laws (Kabul, August 13, 2022), shouting the following slogans:
-Memanem, mesazem (we stay, and we build (Afghanistan))
-Nan, kar, azadi (Bread, work, freedom)
Taliban relocate Pakistani Pashtuns to Northern Afghanistan (5:17)
In their latest move, the Taliban have begun relocating Pashtuns from Pakistan to northern provinces in Afghanistan. Anti-Taliban activists see this as a step to reduce the non-Pashtun populations there. The Taliban have confirmed that, through an agreement with Pakistan, members of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) will be transferred and resettled in various regions across central, southern, and northern Afghanistan. On June 12, 2023, Taliban spokesman Zabiullah Mujahed announced that, for increased control, some Waziristan immigrants living near the border with Pakistan would be transferred elsewhere. According to local sources, by mid-June 2023, at least 320 armed TTP members had been relocated to Dasht Qala district in Takhar province in northeastern Afghanistan.
Zabiullah Mujahid: “A part of the migrants who were close to Durand Line will be transferred to some other provinces, like to the central, southern and northern provinces, to be under control.”
Massoud’s Political Movement against Taliban (6:26)
Ahmad Massoud is the leader of the anti-Taliban resistance and the son of the late Ahmad Shah Massoud. From April 25 to April 27, 2023, Massoud held a political meeting in Vienna, Austria, to discuss his views with other Afghan anti-Taliban activists. He also gave several interviews during this time. In a press conference on April 26, 2023, Massoud described the Taliban's psychological warfare as follows: “I tell this to our dear people to pay attention to this: one of the (psychological) tactics of the Taliban is to always belittle the opponent.”
Pakistan and Taliban's Supreme Leader
Taliban’s supreme leader under the Taliban regime is Mullah Hibatullah Akhundzada, born on October 19, 1967. Also spelled Haibatullah Akhunzada, he has led the Taliban since 2016 and came to power following the Taliban's victory over U.S.-backed forces during the 2001–2021 war. A highly reclusive figure, Akhundzada has almost no digital footprint, with only an unverified photograph and several audio recordings of speeches publicly known. Since the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August 2021, no Afghan has seen him in person. The only known photograph of him is reportedly from his 1990 passport, according to Taliban sources. Every published speech of him contains this photograph:
In that video, he is referred to as Sheikh al-Quran wa-l-Hadith (Scholar of the Quran and Hadith), Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada. RTA Pashto is a channel associated with the Taliban that promotes Taliban propaganda. Notably, the video received only about 33,000 views by August 2025. In contrast, other Taliban videos often garner several million views from viewers worldwide, particularly from countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. According to RTA Pashto’s channel, the user location associated with the channel is in Germany:
Germany has
a sizable Pashtun community, which exerts pressure on the German government to
eventually recognize the Taliban regime. We will discuss Germany’s role
in this matter later.
Unlike his
predecessor, Mullah Omar, who governed about 75% of Afghanistan from 1996 to
2001 and referred to himself as Amir al-Mu’minen, Akhundzada is hesitant to
adopt such titles. However, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda,
supported Akhundzada as the Amir al-Mu'minin. This endorsement enhanced
Akhundzada's reputation as a jihadist among the Taliban's allies.
Akhundzada
is primarily known for his fatwas on Taliban matters. He lacked direct combat experience, although one of his sons was a
suicide bomber. Under his leadership, the Taliban launched a military offensive
in 2021, which resulted in their victory against the Afghan government while
the U.S. withdrawal was still underway. Following this, Akhundzada became
Afghanistan’s de facto ruler, imposing a strict, totalitarian Islamist
government.
It is
unlikely that Akhundzada could have organized such a well-planned coup without
outside help. Intelligence agencies from other countries probably knew where to
strike and where Afghan government forces or anti-Taliban fighters remained.
Such precise knowledge is difficult for a guerrilla group without advanced
intelligence tools. After taking control, Akhundzada also managed to attack and take over Panjshir, the last stronghold of anti-Taliban resistance.
Many people ask, “Who is Hibatullah Akhundzada?” He issues orders but rarely appears publicly (although no one has seen him at all, so far). Are his fatwas (religious edicts) orders from a single person, or are they coordinated by a group or organization? It seems that these directives are not issued by one individual alone, as they can't be. Instead, they likely come from a foreign intelligence agency, such as the CIA, Mossad, or Pakistan’s ISI. Among these, the Pakistani ISI appears to be the most probable organization behind Akhundzada, possibly acting as the leader or head of the Taliban. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that he issues fatwas that align with Pakistan’s interests in Afghanistan, such as banning Afghan women from education and work.
Other
Taliban members, particularly within the leadership, may be aware that
Akhundzada is a fictional figure. In 2019, Akhundzada appointed Abdul Ghani
Baradar, the Acting First Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs of the
Taliban regime, to lead peace negotiations with the U.S., culminating in the
2020 Doha Agreement that paved the way for the full withdrawal of U.S. troops
from Afghanistan. Hasan Akhund serves as the acting prime minister of the
Taliban regime. How could he possibly be unaware that Akhundzada is fictional?
Pakistan's Influence on the Taliban in 2025
From 2022 to 2025, several key events have highlighted Pakistan’s apparent support for the Taliban.
Foursignificant developments in 2025 include:
On March 5, 2025, Pakistani intelligence officials claimed to have assisted the United States capture a high-ranking ISIS terrorist, allegedly an Afghan, who was involved in planning the August 26, 2021, Abbey Gate
bombing in Kabul. Pakistan handed him over to U.S. authorities, and
he was taken into American custody.
Media reports from April 2025 also indicated that Pakistan expelled tens of thousands of Afghans:
Experts suggest these were more like resettlement moves rather than genuine deportations. Many of those expelled were Kuchis (Pashtun nomads) who don't recognize borders and live on both sides, or they were naturalized or Pakistani Pashtuns. Both BBC and The New York Times have confirmed these concerns. BBC quoted a man saying, “Our children have never seen Afghanistan and even I don't know what it looks like anymore. It might take us a year or more to settle in and find work. We feel helpless.” The New York Times reported that “Families are split as Pakistan deports thousands of Afghan refugees,” noting that many undocumented Afghan migrants have Pakistani spouses and have lived in Pakistan for years, yet the government insists they must leave.
The strong ties between Pakistan and the U.S. are further reflected in the warm reception given to Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal Asim Munir, by President Donald Trump at the White House on June 19, 2025.
Although the specifics of such meetings are typically kept confidential, analysts widely believe that one of the main topics discussed was Pakistan’s involvement with the Taliban. Many suggest that Pakistan aims to persuade the U.S. to maintain or even increase its support for Pakistan’s engagement with the Taliban. Asim Munir has close connections with Taliban leaders, as shown during a visit of Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Rawalpindi, Pakistan:
Additionally, on July 18, 2025, the Taliban signed a framework agreement with Pakistan and Uzbekistan in Kabul to conduct a joint feasibility study. Representatives from Pakistan, Uzbekistan and the Taliban signed an agreement for the Naibabad-Kharlachi rail link, a key part of the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (UAP) Railway Corridor, during a ceremony in Kabul.
It is estimated that the U.S. left behind weapons valued at around $83 billion in Afghanistan. So far, the Trump administration has taken no action to recover these weapons, despite earlier promises. Pakistan and Qatar, both allies of the Taliban, like have prevented Trump from returning or destroying the weapons left by the U.S. army in Afghanistan, which the Taliban captured.
Instead, on July 31, 2025, the Trump administration announced a trade deal with Pakistan to develop oil reserves, even though Pakistan reportedly uses the Taliban as a proxy in Afghanistan.
Qatar's Influence on the Taliban
Because Qatar keeps a low profile on its support for global extremist Sunni organizations, there's only little information on how it organizes its coordination of its financial support for those groups and succeeds in toppling governments in Islamic countries, like Afghanistan and Syria, and control many more governments. Of course, Qatar won't give any insight into its methods of financing global terrorism. It is a wealthy country and can even suppress most articles describing its influence in global issues easily. To describe Qatar's impact on world politics is a very complicated matter indeed and shall not be discussed in this post.
Qatar’s influence on the Taliban, though, can be understood through the lens of its unique diplomatic role and financial engagements highlighted in two articles:
1) Qatar: Afghanistan's gateway to the West (Universidad de Navarra, 06 November 2021)
2) How the Taliban helped build the stadiums for the Qatar World Cup (The Telegraph, 25 November 2022)
According to the first article from November 2021, Qatar has positioned itself as a crucial intermediary between the Taliban and the international community, particularly the West. Since allowing the Taliban to establish a political office in Doha in 2013, Qatar has facilitated dialogue between the group and various state actors, including the United States and, more recently, European powers. This relationship has evolved in the context of a broader geopolitical strategy aimed at enhancing Qatar’s standing in the region, particularly in light of its historical dependence on Saudi Arabia.
The article notes that Qatar's engagement with the Taliban has drawn criticism for potentially legitimizing the group, which was further emphasized by Qatar's willingness to maintain relations even after the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan. The Qatari government has portrayed itself as an impartial mediator, striving to ensure stability in a region marked by turmoil. Western nations, recognizing Qatar's unique position, have begun to rely on it to establish channels of communication with the Taliban, indicating a shift in how international relations with the group are approached.
Financial Engagements
The second
article from November 2022 reveals a financial dimension to Qatar's
relationship with the Taliban, particularly in connection to the construction
activities linked to the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Allegedly, senior Taliban
officials, funded through stipends during peace negotiations, invested in
construction machinery which was then leased for World Cup preparations. This
relationship has reportedly resulted in millions flowing back to the Taliban,
highlighting a complex intertwining of diplomacy and economic interests.
The funding of the Taliban officials’ luxurious lifestyles during their stay in Qatar allowed them to engage in these financial transactions, further solidifying their hold and relevance within the international landscape while enriching the group. The Qatari government has asserted that these financial arrangements were monitored in coordination with the United States, underscoring the international dimensions of their engagement with the Taliban.
Broader Implications
Overall,
Qatar's dual role as a diplomatic mediator and a financial supporter of the
Taliban reflects its strategy of navigating a complex geopolitical landscape.
By fostering ties with the Taliban, Qatar not only seeks to enhance its own
regional influence and mitigate threats from neighboring countries but also
positions itself as a vital player in international efforts to address issues
related to Afghanistan. However, this engagement carries risks, as it may
alienate certain factions within the international community that remain wary
of legitimizing a group like the Taliban.
In summary, Qatar’s influence on the Taliban is multifaceted, encompassing diplomatic efforts to facilitate engagement with the West and economic measures that support the Taliban financially, all while aiming to secure its own geopolitical interests and maintain stability in the region.
Ideological bond between Qatar, the Taliban and other Jihadist groups
Additionally,
both articles overlook an ideological component that is crucial to
understanding Qatar’s actions. Qatar cleverly masks its true intentions, which
involve securing support from extremist Sunni groups through financial aid. It
is essential to recognize that Qatar's hidden agenda is to exert control over
the Sunni community and to promote radicalization as a means to expand its
geopolitical influence both within the Islamic world and beyond, particularly
in the West. This pursuit of power is driven by the pressing need for resources
and space due to the population explosion in many Islamic countries, including Sunni
Arab countries in the Persian Gulf. As Arab Sunnis and other Sunni populations
grow, these wealthy Muslim nations are compelled to seek geographic expansion,
as the increasing number of Arab Sunnis and Sunnis in general will require
additional land and resources to thrive.
Qatar has a structured road map in gaining more power:
-Step 1: Qatar's main goal is to marginalize non-Sunni Muslim minorities, particularly Shiites and Alawites, as a first step. A substantial portion of the Sunni masses has been influenced by Wahhabi/Salafist preaching through television and mosques for decades. The rise of online content and social media has further accelerated Wahhabi propaganda, making these individuals more susceptible to control by Qatar. They often label Shiites with all sorts of false accusations like Kafir (unbelievers), Mushrik (polytheists), Munafiq (hypocrites), Majoos (a derogatory term for Shiites) and accuse them of having a different version of Quran than Sunnis, whom they consider as the true Muslims (following the Sunna/traditions of Prophet Muhammad).
Alawites
face even harsher accusations, including beliefs in immanence (the notion that
the divine encompasses or manifests in the material world), an exaggerated
reverence for the twelve Shia Imams, beliefs in reincarnation, the
prophethood of Muhammad b. Nusayr, as well as the shared prophethood of Imam
Ali and the Prophet Muhammad, and the disregard for the Quran among other claims. Many of these allegations are
baseless and lack reliable sources and evidence.
This rhetoric aims to label Shiites and Alawites as heretics—or ex-Muslims who have left Islam—and to legitimize the shedding of their blood as Halal (lawful) and even obligatory. The average Sunni masses are often misinformed and gullible, readily believing the narratives promoted by preachers funded by Qatar and other countries. They offer them a convenient alternative to engaging directly with the Quran, where they would discover that such assertions are unfounded and that the Quranic verses do not exclude Shiites, Alawites or other minorities from Islam, nor do they categorize them as heretics.
These slurs
against Shiites and Alawites can effectively serve as death sentences when
those who use them attain political power and operate without restraint. This
has been evidenced in the past by attacks on Shiite communities by suicide
bombers in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. The most recent cases are the
massacres of Alawites in Syria in March 2025.
Shiites and
Alawites have historically coped with oppression in ways similar to those of
other oppressed communities, adapting to their circumstances as necessary. In
many countries with Sunni majorities, Shiite Muslims often resort to Taqiya,
which, in the context of Shia Islam, refers to the practice of concealing one's
beliefs or intentions to evade persecution. This concept can be critical for
individuals living in environments where expressing their religious identity
may lead to harm or discrimination.
Throughout history, various groups facing oppression—whether based on religion, ethnicity, or political beliefs—have employed similar strategies to protect themselves. This can include adopting the outward appearances or behaviors of the dominant group to mitigate risks. Such practices often reflect a deep survival instinct and the complexities of identity in situations of social or political strife. This phenomenon isn't limited to any single group; it's a broader reflection of human resilience and the lengths to which people will go to preserve their lives and communities in the face of adversity. However, it can also lead to challenging dynamics within these communities, as individuals navigate the fine line between preservation and authenticity. This practice is a form of intimidation and often force Shiites to hide their religion in dangerous areas. In areas where sectarian conflict is prevalent, Shiites may experience social ostracism, violence, or pressure to conceal their beliefs for safety. This kind of intimidation can lead to significant psychological and social stress for individuals and communities, forcing them to navigate their religious identities in secret or under duress.
-Step 2: Qatar pursues to control Muslim governments, as land means wealth and power (cp. Taliban, which sell Afghanistan's natural resources and thus get wealthier, while their Afghan opponents struggle).
-Step 3: Qatar extends its influence on Sunni populations in non-Muslim countries, i.e. Europe, USA etc. Once more, a large portion of Sunni masses have been brainwashed for decades; now they are ready to be controlled by Qatar. It does so by extortion and financing mosques, through third countries.
Regardless
of their ideological affiliations—be it the Deobandi/Hanafi sect, as seen with
the Afghan Taliban, or the more ideological Salafism, to which the Syrian HTS belong—Qatar was able to
unite them and successfully overthrow governments.
Qatar has
indeed played a significant role in various regional conflicts by
providing support to different Sunni factions, often depending on strategic
interests and political objectives. The following three points are
important themes regarding the interplay of ideology, external influence, and
the complexities of intra-Sunni relations in contemporary geopolitics:
-Sunni Unity
and Diversity: While Sunni groups may share a common religious affiliation,
they often have differing ideologies and priorities. For example, Deobandi and
Salafist interpretations of Islam can lead to very different approaches to
governance, society, and violence. The Afghan Taliban, rooted in Deobandi
thought, generally emphasizes a more traditional and localized interpretation
of Islam, while Salafist groups like HTS in Syria may focus on a more global
jihadist agenda.
-External
Influence: Qatar's involvement in various conflicts has included funding,
political support, and media outreach. By backing these groups, Qatar has
sometimes facilitated coalitions among Sunni factions, despite their
ideological differences. This has enabled certain factions to gain power or
influence in specific contexts, such as in Syria and Libya.
-Impact on Governance: The support given to these groups by external players can lead to significant shifts in governance and territorial control. This often results in the overthrow of existing regimes, which can create power vacuums and further conflict.
Qatar appears to exploit Sunni individuals as tools to enhance its own power and influence, rather than genuinely caring for their well-being. Terrorism experts suggest that Qatar may even fund the training of some of these individuals as suicide bombers, which raises serious questions about its intentions. Moreover, the country does not shoulder the financial responsibility of supporting these individuals; instead, European social systems cover their essential needs, such as food, health-care, clothing, and housing. In fact, the benefits that Sunni migrants receive in European nations significantly exceed what they could expect in Arab Gulf countries, Turkey (which itself has one of the highest numbers of asylum seekers in Germany), or other Islamist nations. Consequently, many Sunni migrants are able to save money and send remittances back to their families in non-European countries. This situation raises concerns about the use of taxpayer funds, which are allocated without the consent of a majority of the native population.
Qatar,
along with other Arab Gulf states and Turkey, has been employing Turkey as a crucial transit hub for the movement of predominantly Arab Sunni refugees seeking to reach Europe.
Additionally, it is speculated that Qatar may be financing certain (Western) politicians
to further its discreet expansionist agenda. This strategy highlights the geopolitical
maneuvering in the region and its implications for refugee movements.
Taliban and the International Community
In any case the Taliban are extorting a lot of countries to be recognized, the longer their rule endures in which not even their closest allies have yet recognized that terrorist regime. It is not fear that many shy at recognizing the Taliban regime. Many countries would love to recognize them but it's probably their reputation, which is at stake, by being the first country to recognize the Taliban regime as Afghanistan's government.
Taliban, with their foreign backers and lobbyists, have found their favorite country to pressure towards their recognition.
There are many reasons why Germany is pushed to recognize the Taliban:
-Germany's government does not care about their reputation but more about money
-German politicians destroyed the German economy and does need money (donated by Taliban's Arab allies)
-Taliban can activate their terrorist cells in Germany any time they want
But of all of these reasons the first one is the most important one; its the carelessness of politicians that make terrorist organizations get bold and demand more power and influence. Those politicians are either naive or corrupt and in both cases inept to fulfill their duties towards the citizens of their countries, whom they should represent. They have the task to spend tax money in a wise manner and to be careful in their next political steps. Furthermore, they must bolster the security and freedom in their respective countries.
It is completely the opposite from of what German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock (the Greens) did:
-donating tax payers' money to groups affiliated with Taliban (2021 till 2025)
-deliberately relocating thousands of (mostly Sunni) Afghans from Pakistan to Germany, allegedly without even checking their true identities and nationalities (2021 till 2025)
-donating millions of Euros to terrorists under the leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Julani) in Syria, whom Baerbock elevated by her official visit (as a representative of the German government) on 3 January 2025, without consulting the German public (her visit came suddenly and was a surprise to Germans who were informed about that visit on that day of her visit).
German foreign minister promised the terrorist government another 300 million Euros (probably as a reward) according to German media reports (this comes after their massacres against Alawites!) from March 17, 2025:
Of course, Baerbock cannot be the mastermind behind funding the terrorists in Syria and she seems to be a tool in the hands of secret organizations who promise her safety, if she follows their orders. Baerbock is hardly able to speak two sentences without reading from a script or without making simple mistakes. How can she be the mastermind behind plots?
Germany is utilizing taxpayer funds to support terrorist groups, as previously outlined. The country also faces the highest non-wage labor costs worldwide, encompassing income taxes and social security contributions. Furthermore, the burden of these exorbitant taxes, coupled with rising energy costs, has negatively impacted the German economy, leading it into recession, which happens to be the longest economic crisis in its modern history:
This policy carries
serious financial and security implications for the native population,
exacerbating existing security concerns. Alarmingly, this expenditure of
taxpayers' money occurs without the consent of the majority of the native
populace.
Of course, Taliban leaders are dreaming of recognition when they see pictures of Baerbock sitting and talking with terrorists in black suits. They have seen how Germany publicly financed terrorists in Syria and believe that they can convince Germany's next government (to which Baerbock won't belong) to recognize them, too. Whenever Taliban is under pressure they ask their allies for help. It's probably their allies who have advised the Taliban to try to gradually build up pressure on the next German government likely led by chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) to recognize them. And once you lose your reputation then nothing remains sacred and there's nothing else to lose. At least this is what global terrorists and their backers begin to think of Germany now.
Another issue is the role of the media that plays in Germany - which often is to put governments under pressure. German media have begun to describe the Taliban as a group, with which it is possible to have diplomatic ties, despite its alliance with terrorist groups like al-Qaeda. Often it is even very unclear what motives those media or persons have who propagate for relations with a certain group, as the main motives are decided behind closed doors. But the readers, or consumers, should understand that no paper is save from corruption and that everyone can be bought. Money is a biggest incentive in writing and publicizing propaganda. Sometimes it is also ideological proximity which motivates people (journalists are humans) or papers (decision makers/chiefs of papers) to post or publish something. There might be other reasons as well, but these are basically the two main points.
In this
way, the Great Game between global and regional players will continue in both
Afghanistan and Syria. While meddling into the political affairs of those
countries can be effective in achieving immediate objectives for external
powers, they may also lead to fragmentation and infighting among various Sunni
factions in the long run. The lack of a cohesive ideology or overarching
leadership can result in challenges for governance and stability in the regions
affected. Understanding the dynamics in these conflicts is crucial for
analyzing ongoing conflicts and the potential for future cooperation or
conflict among various groups.
Germany under Chancellor Merz
Following
the German elections, there was a period of relative calm in Germany, during which the
German media suddenly almost completely ceased reporting on Afghan issues. This shift reflected a
diminished interest, as Afghans no longer seemed relevant to German policy
priorities at that time. However, after several months, Afghan matters once
again regained the attention of German politicians.
Germany,
under Chancellor Merz, appears to be continuing the appeasement policies
previously pursued by Merkel and Scholz toward the Taliban. The German
government is actively working to facilitate the transfer of more so-called
"Afghans"—many of whom have not undergone thorough verification of
their identities—from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and is also engaging in deals
with the Taliban to deport criminals back to Afghanistan. According to a report
on Zeit Online dated June 4, 2025, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadepuhl,
representing the ruling CDU, plans to bring approximately 2,500 at-risk Afghans
to Germany:
"It’s about 2,500 vulnerable Afghans – Foreign
Minister Wadepuhl wants to bring these people to Germany." (German original: "
To prevent public criticism of this policy, officials frame
these transfers as efforts to rescue Afghans in danger. However, it is widely
recognized that most Afghans in Pakistan seeking asylum in Germany are
Pashtuns, the same ethnic group as the Taliban leadership, while non-Pashtun
Afghans who have fled to Iran face significant obstacles in obtaining visas.
Additionally, German media outlets have reported that the previous government, under Chancellor Scholz, almost facilitated the entry of Taliban-affiliated individuals into Germany. On May 27, 2025, Welt, citing a report on Spiegel Online, revealed that NGOs have provided refugees with falsified or tailored documents and even encouraged false statements during visa applications. Reports indicate that the German Federal Police have been able to intercept men with ties to the Taliban attempting to fly to Germany, as some applicants submitted suspicious or dubious documentation, which was detected by officials. (However, it appears highly unlikely that the Federal Police have been able to prevent all such individuals from attempting to travel to Germany. Time will tell.)
Furthermore,
Schahina Gambir, a Green Party politician, has been actively advocating for
increased efforts to bring more Afghans from Pakistan into Germany. She has
exerted political pressure on the government to expand these initiatives.
Gambir, who identifies herself as Afghan, is likely of Pashtun
ethnicity—judging by her name and appearance—though she does not explicitly
specify her ethnicity. As a Pashtun woman, she probably
sees an opportunity to facilitate the migration of as many Pashtuns as possible
to Germany.
According to her profile on the Green Party’s official website, she was born in Kabul in 1991:
She completed her bachelor’s degree in political science and economics, followed by a master’s degree in gender studies. Although her academic background centers around politics and women’s rights, she has not publicly criticized or addressed the Taliban’s oppression of Afghan women in speeches or official statements, aside from a few notes on social media platforms such as Instagram and X. No such videos addressing the Taliban oppression can be found online.
But Germany's policy of appeasement extends beyond migration. Recent reports indicate that the German government is engaging in direct negotiations with Taliban leaders. According to a post of the so-called Afghan embassy in Qatar on X, Taliban ambassador Mohammad Suhail Shaheen met with Rolf Dieter Reinhard, the Chargé d’Affaires of the German Embassy in Afghanistan:
په دوحه کې د ا.ا.ا. سفير محمد سهیل شاهین د افغانستان لپاره د جرمني د سفارت له چارسمبالي، ښاغلي رولف دیټر راینهارډ سره وکتل. په دې کتنه کې دواړو لوریو د افغانستان او جرمني ترمنځ په دوهاړخیزو اړیکو، یوشمېر سیاسي مسایلو 1/2
Translation of the post: "In Doha, Ambassador Mohammad Suhail Shaheen met with the Chargé d’Affaires of the German Embassy in Afghanistan, Mr. Rolf Dieter Reinhard. During the meeting, the two sides discussed bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Germany, a number of political issues, and the prospects for cooperation between the two countries. 1/2"
This
indicates a de facto diplomatic engagement with the terrorist group, likely
motivated by financial incentives and third-party influence, especially from
Qatar, which maintains close ties with the Taliban.
This ongoing engagement suggests that the Taliban is being
encouraged—possibly through third-party channels—to deepen its interactions
with Germany, with financial motives potentially serving as the primary
incentive behind these diplomatic overtures.
Moreover, there are signs that these negotiations are making progress. For example, on June 11, 2025, Daniela Behrens, the Interior Minister of Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) from the SPD Party, announced her intention to increase deportation flights to Afghanistan:
This suggests a political willingness within Germany to facilitate the return of Afghan nationals, possibly through diplomatic channels that elevate the Taliban's status. However, these deportations could also serve as a strategic move—an initial step or pretext—to gradually elevate the Taliban to a more significant role as a strategic partner in German foreign policy.
A side note on France's role
France’s role in recent developments marks a significant departure from its former stance. Unlike the late 1990s and early 2000s, when France actively supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, it now appears to be leaning toward engagement with the Taliban. Despite multiple meetings between French President Emmanuel Macron and resistance leader Ahmad Massoud, there are indications that France may have been influenced—likely through incentives from Qatar—to establish diplomatic ties with the Taliban. This suggests that France has effectively relinquished its previous position of opposition. Supporting this, a post on X from the Afghan embassy in Doha reported that Ambassador Mohammad Sohail Shaheen met with Jean-Marin Schuh, the French chargé d’affaires for Afghanistan, indicating a possible diplomatic engagement with the Taliban’s representatives:
Moreover, the Taliban are not the only terrorist group to have received recognition from the European Union. For instance, Ahmad al-Sharaa, a known ISIS terrorist, was officially recognized by the EU and even visited France on May 7, 2025. Remarkably, this visit was no longer met with media criticism or controversy, reflecting a normalization of relations with designated terrorist figures.
The economic realities in Europe also influence these developments. Many EU member states lack substantial natural resources, and their industries and economies are gradually shrinking. Consequently, European countries may be more receptive to support or incentives from wealthy Sunni Arab states. For example, Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) football team is sponsored by Qatar Airways, which has reportedly invested over 2 billion euros into the club. This raises questions about how much Qatar visitors spend and the extent of political influence or “bribery” involved—since such financial support likely comes with expectations or repayment. In this context, external actors continue to exert pressure to promote recognition of the Taliban, often using financial incentives as leverage.
Finally, it is important to recognize that being labeled a terrorist no longer solely signifies ideological differences; it increasingly relates to financial backing and external assistance.
Europe, while attempting to influence U.S. policy through lobbying, recognizes that the United States holds the final authority. Due to their limited economic and military strength, European nations are often unable to pursue independent policies and instead seek to sway U.S. decisions in their favor. In this strategic environment, Qatar aims to achieve what Pakistan and the UAE couldn't accomplish, although they even recognized the previous Taliban regime between 1995 and 2021. Qatar seeks to buy international legitimacy through strategic financial and diplomatic means.
The
Campaign of the Israeli Mossad and Germany Against Afghan People*
As mentioned earlier, Germany under Chancellor Merz continues the policies of
previous administrations. It appears that they have initiated another operation
targeting individuals with Afghan backgrounds. Recently, the German government
ordered the arrest of a 53-year-old Danish man of Afghan descent by Danish
police, allegedly for spying for the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Germany.
You may also be curious as to why many terrorist attacks in the West carried out by Afghans appear to occur predominantly in Germany, whereas there is little to no detailed media coverage of similar crimes committed by Syrian Sunnis or Sunnis of other nationalities.
It is
noteworthy that this development coincided shortly after German Interior
Minister Alexander Dobrindt’s visit to Israel on June 29, 2025, where he met
with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
During his visit, Dobrindt discussed security issues with Netanyahu and emphasized the importance of digital defense against sabotage and espionage. Israel is ahead of Germany in cyber defense, claimed Alexander Dobrindt. It was also Dobrindt himself who announced the arrest of the Afghan-Danish man.
The Israeli intelligence agency Mossad is known for its active role in global conflicts, often beyond the direct interests of Israel. According to Victor Ostrovsky, a former Mossad officer, Israel has been involved in many international conflicts, even those not directly related to Israeli interests. Ostrovsky, who authored books such as By Way of Deception (1990) and The Other Side of Deception (1995), detailed Mossad’s methods and operations during his time serving the organization.
Ostrovsky describes one occasion in his book as follows: "They did in Sri Lanka, however. Amy Yaar made the connection, then tied the country in militarily by supplying it with substantial equipment, including PT boats for coastal patrol. At the same time, Yaar and company were supplying the warring Tamils with anti-PT boat equipment to use in fighting the government forces. The Israelis also trained elite forces for both sides, without either side knowing about the other, and helped Sri Lanka cheat the World Bank and other investors out of millions of dollars to pay for all the arms they were buying from them."
[Victor Ostrovsky, By Way of Deception, p.67 f., Ch. Freshmen]
It is likely that Mossad is currently operating in
Afghanistan, possibly having infiltrated the Taliban leadership, which suggests
that some members of the Taliban may be on Mossad’s payroll. Those familiar
with Mossad’s methods are well aware of the organization’s typical practices.
Most, if not all, of the Taliban leadership are believed to be influenced or controlled by foreign intelligence agencies, such as Pakistan’s ISI. In his 2023 book The Return of the Taliban, historian and scholar Hassan Abbas states that the Taliban leadership is clearly under the influence of foreign intelligence, especially the Pakistani ISI. Many other experts and historians concur with his assessment. Abbas also notes that Taliban family members are based in Pakistan, which allows the ISI to exert influence over them through blackmail.
Israel vs. Iran
Following Israel's twelve-day conflict with Iran from June 13 to June 24, 2025, tensions have intensified, prompting debates over the extent of espionage and sabotage within Iranian territory. Iranian authorities have released videos featuring Afghan men claiming to be Mossad agents, some alleging connections to German contacts. However, many experts argue that these claims are being exploited as a pretext for mass deportations of Afghan migrants. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that Iranian security agencies have been infiltrated—not by Afghan individuals, but by Iranian spies working for Israel and Mossad.
Many questions arise on how espionage against Iran was carried out, which resulted in the rapid assassination of many top Iranian generals at the start of Israel’s twelve-day war against Iran. While the possibility of Afghan spies cannot be entirely dismissed, it is evident that Afghan migrants do not have access to sensitive locations or data within Iran.
Among various theories, the most plausible one suggests the
following:
In July 2025 Mostafa Kavakebian, an Iranian reformist politician and former representative of Tehran in the Iranian Parliament (2016–2020), stated live on an Iranian TV channel that Catherine Perez-Shakdam, a purported Mossad agent, reportedly had sexual relations with approximately 120 influential Iranian men, likely referring to Iranian politicians and military leaders. This indicates that Iran faces a substantial espionage threat—not primarily from Afghans, but from within, as many Iranian generals and politicians may be either direct Mossad spies or unwilling informants.
Kavakebian later reiterated his statement, suggesting that Shakdam had indeed mentioned around 100 such relationships, with the actual number possibly higher. This could represent just the tip of the iceberg of an extensive espionage network, and she is likely not the only so-called Western convert who has infiltrated Iranian security forces.
Catherine Perez-Shakdam
But who is Catherine Perez-Shakdam and what's her agenda? In an extensive online essay published on July 26, 2023, Shakdam discusses her activities within the Iranian system. While she claims she is not an Israeli spy (which, of course, no agent openly admits), she explicitly references Iran as an enemy.
She even goes as far as demonizing the Shia branch of Islam as a whole: "While the Khoeis are not per se part of the regime, their connection to Grand Ayatollah Sistani in Iraq places them within Tehran’s sphere of influence. Many of the events the foundation hosts, for example, bring together many of the regime’s loyalists including the clerical class. The Khoeis exist within the Islamic Republic‘s ecosystem – and willingly or not remain instrumental in propagating its ideology."
Unlike the Iranian political system, neither the Khoei nor the Sistani religious schools, which are influential in Iraq and among Shiites in the West, interfere in politics, contrary to Shakdam's false claims intended to mislead public opinion. These claims by her and like-minded critics are not supported by any solid evidence.
She writes: "He spoke to me of Imam Mahdi and the responsibility he had, as his servant to precipitate his return. He told me of the End of Days and the foretold battle that would end with the fall of Christianity and the death of all Jews – how G-d would strike the infidels, humiliating them before the Believers for their acts of heresy."
Notably, she refers to “G-d” rather than “God” in her essay, which is unusual. It also appears that she is intentionally distorting facts to portray Shiites as murderers and terrorists, depicting them as monsters targeting Christians and Jews. She omits any mention of the Jewish concept of the Messiah, expected to appear at the End of Days and bring victory to the Jews, suggesting she is attempting to brainwash both the public and influential figures. In literature and videos, rabbis often refer to non-Jews as "goy" or "goyim," pejorative Hebrew terms for non-Jews (also called "gentiles" by Jews). Sometimes enemies are labeled with the biblical term "Amalek," with some radical rabbis and Israeli politicians advocating their immediate extermination.
She describes plans to strike Iran, using military language—"The Iranian regime’s most remarkable achievement has been its ability to constantly divert our attention away from its vulnerable spots, preventing us from striking where it truly hurts, and leaving us ill-prepared to defend ourselves against its relentless attacks or anticipate its next move."—raising questions about her credibility, especially considering that many individuals she purportedly had contact with (evidence of these encounters is included in her essay) were later killed. These include Iran’s former president Ebrahim Raisi (1960–2024), who granted her only one interview, as well as numerous Iranian generals during the Twelve-Day War (June 13–24, 2025) between Israel/USA and Iran.
She also claims to have had contacts with representatives of Ayatollah Sistani, but this appears dubious—she provides no photographs, and the single image she offers does not include any identifiable representatives of Sistani.
She wrote at least two books on Shiite Islam, likely to gain the trust of Shiite influential personalities:
Western, particularly German, politicians have responded to these reports with increased suspicion and restrictions against Shiite organizations, reflecting ongoing paranoia and concern—especially considering their support for global Wahhabi and Salafist groups.
Reactions to Deportations of Afghans
Afghan reactions, such as that of former Afghan Foreign Minister Rangin Dadfar Spanta, have expressed concern. On June 29, 2025, Spanta posted on X, criticizing Iran’s increased deportations since Israel’s attack on Iran: “Iran is facing numerous problems, and it is difficult for refugees to integrate into the labor market and social structure of this country. However, that is no justification for making accusations and creating enemies of them.”
ایران با مشکلات عدیدهای مواجه است و ادغام مهاجران در بازار کار
و ساختار اجتماعی این کشور دشوار است، اما این موضوع توجیهی برای اتهامزنی و دشمنتراشی
علیه آنها نیست
While Israel and Iran continue their fierce rivalry, it appears that once again, Afghan people are caught in the crossfire, exploited as tools in these conflicts. Many Afghans, impoverished and psychologically vulnerable due to decades of war and unrest, are easy targets. Additionally, it appears that Germany has imported hundreds of thousands of Afghans, possibly to recruit agents or for other strategic purposes. The reasons for allowing in many more Syrian Sunnis remain unclear.
July 7, 2025 - Germany, Karzai and the Taliban
Germany appears eager to establish relations with the Taliban, seemingly unconcerned about its international reputation.
German paper Tagesspiegel wrote on July 10, 2025: "The "Behördenspiegel" newspaper had already reported that two emissaries from the radical Islamist Taliban government were in Germany "to explore possibilities for cooperation." And according to "Bild," the government's negotiations behind the scenes are already in full swing. According to the report, former Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently met with former BND chief August Hanning at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin." (German original: "Der „Behördenspiegel“ hatte bereits berichtet, dass sich zwei Emissäre der Regierung der radikal-islamistischen Taliban in Deutschland befänden, „um Kooperationsmöglichkeiten auszuloten“. Und nach Angaben der „Bild“ laufen die Verhandlungen der Regierung hinter den Kulissen bereits auf Hochtouren. Dem Bericht zufolge traf der afghanische Ex-Präsident Hamid Karsai vor Kurzem Ex-BND-Chef August Hanning im Berliner Hotel Adlon.")
This revelation came just two days after the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for two top Taliban leaders—Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada and Chief Justice Abdul Hakim Haqqani—accusing them of persecuting women and girls in Afghanistan.
The first media outlet to report on the Taliban meeting in Germany was BILD, on July 10, 2025:
While BILD
maintains close ties with the German government, it appears that the federal
authorities are gradually leaking information to keep both the German public
and the Afghan community reassured, while monitoring reactions. The meeting was
reportedly related to the deportation of criminal Afghans, but given that the
German BND participated, it seems unlikely that this was the primary motive.
The BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) is Germany’s foreign intelligence service,
directly accountable to the Chancellor’s Office. Such meetings had already been
anticipated as early as 2023.
Immediately following the news, many commentators on German news platforms expressed sharp criticism of the meeting. At least one raised a justified question:
"Are
Mr. Karzai’s contacts with the Taliban recent, or have they existed since his
time as head of state?"
The question can be translated as: "Are Mr. Karzai’s contacts with the Taliban recent, or have they existed since his time as head of state?"
The answer
is well-known. Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun, was installed as Afghanistan’s
president through the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, following the defeat of
the Taliban by the Northern Alliance—primarily non-Pashtun—supported by
international coalition forces. It was Pashtun political figures like Karzai
and Ashraf Ghani who effectively sold Afghanistan to the highest bidder.
Karzai appears to lack integrity or principles, as he is now in Germany,
seemingly participating in efforts that humiliate and harm his fellow Afghans,
including aiding Germany’s mass deportations of Afghan nationals. The level of
corruption surrounding him is extraordinary, even by global standards. Karzai
bears significant responsibility for Afghanistan’s decline, welcomed by its enemies.
His family, led by Hamid Karzai, along with his brothers Ahmad Wali and Mahmud Karzai,
Later,
Hamid Karzai publicly referred to the Taliban as "brothers" and
criticized foreign efforts to target the group, which then harbored and continues
to harbor terrorist fighters from al-Qaeda and other organizations.
As for the
German government, it didn’t even bother to consult the Afghan anti-Taliban
opposition or representatives of the Afghan people before rushing into
diplomatic talks with the extremist group.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s stance remains unclear—either he endorses his Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt’s actions or is unable to control him. It’s unlikely Dobrindt acted without Merz’s knowledge, which highlights potential political weakness on Merz’s part.
July 18, 2025 - Second Deportation of Afghans from Germany to Kabul, Afghanistan
On July 18, 2025, Germany deported a second group of 81 Afghans directly to Kabul, Afghanistan. The flight was operated by Qatar Airways, which is not surprising given Qatar’s status as another major supporter of the Taliban (as mentioned earlier).
This move was symbolic, carried out by Germany’s new government under Friedrich
Merz. Germany’s Interior Minister, Alexander Dobrindt—who appears to be among
the most hardline members of the new cabinet—ordered the deportation.
Afterwards, Dobrindt made several statements about the deportation from
Germany’s highest peak, the Zugspitze, where he hosted top European diplomats.
Alexander Dobrindt with European ministers on the Zugspitze—July 18, 2025
To justify the deportations and minimize criticism, Germany’s Interior Ministry employed framing by immediately informing the German public that those being deported were criminals. If the deportation was just about removing Afghans, Dobrindt wouldn’t have emphasized the symbolism. It suggests there might be other motives behind it.
We mentioned Dobrindt earlier because he traveled to Israel on June 29, 2025, and since then has taken a stance against Afghans. It’s also worth noting that Dobrindt is from Bavaria, which hosts one of the few Afghan consulates in the world—recognized by the Taliban—where staff reportedly shows strong sympathies toward the Taliban regime.
It was only on July 21, 2025, that it was publicly disclosed that Germany had agreed to grant visas to two Taliban diplomats to serve in consular roles in Berlin and Bonn, according to diplomatic sources familiar with the arrangement.
Sayed Mustafa Hasehmi and Nabrasul Haq Aziz.
The German Foreign Ministry has not issued an official statement regarding this visa agreement. It appears they are feeling uncertain about this move, especially since Germany has become the first EU country to allow representatives of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime to send officials to Germany to assist with the deportation of Afghan nationals.
Notably, Germany has not yet deported any Syrians to Damascus, Syria, and deportations to other countries hardly attract public attention. The German government seems to be employing a
gradual, piecemeal approach—often called salami tactics**—to achieve its goals
without provoking widespread public opposition.
Friedrich
Merz tried to reassure the public, stating: “An official recognition of the
Taliban regime is not even being considered. Such a thing is simply not on the
table.” (German original quote:
Merz denied that his government aims to recognize the Taliban - July 18, 2025
Despite
Merz’s assurances that Germany, unlike Russia—which officially recognized the
Taliban government in Afghanistan on July 3, 2025, following Dobrindt’s
measures against Afghans—would not take such steps, Dobrindt did not reaffirm
his superior’s statement.
Russia officially recognized the Taliban regime - July 3, 2025
It appears that Dobrindt is reluctant to fully comply with his boss’s directives. Instead,
Dobrindt made some vague statements that seem to reveal his real intentions:
July 3, 2025:
Dobrindt said, “I envision that we could make direct agreements with
Afghanistan to facilitate returns.” He added that currently, third parties are
needed to conduct negotiations with Afghanistan, but this shouldn’t be a
permanent solution. (German original quote:
July 11, 2025:
He stated, “If the
Taliban (or) Afghans send representatives here who might then serve in Berlin,
then that can work even without diplomatic recognition. And I would have no
problem if we had a contact person here on site for problems we want to
solve." However, he said he has not yet established any contacts with Kabul. (German original quote: "»Wenn jetzt Taliban, Afghanen hier Vertreter
herschicken, die in Berlin möglicherweise dann einen Dienst tun, dann kann das
unterhalb auch einer diplomatischen Anerkennung funktionieren. Und ich hätte
kein Problem, wenn wir einen Ansprechpartner hier vor Ort haben für Probleme,
die wir lösen wollen.« Er habe aber noch keine Kontakte mit Kabul aufgenommen,
sagte der Innenminister.")
Of course,
when Dobrindt talks about Afghanistan, he’s actually referring to the Taliban.
While he hasn’t explicitly challenged or opposed Merz’s statements, he hasn’t
denied that he might be aiming for some form of recognition or a similar step.
On July 20,
2025, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul announced plans to transfer more
Afghans from Afghanistan to Germany.
Germany declares plans to admit more Afghans after deportations—July 20, 2025
It is widely understood that Germany, like many other countries with relations to the Taliban, shows little concern for women's rights or human rights. Fueled by the chaos instigated by foreign nations, the Taliban have resumed the arrest of Afghan women, according to recent reports.
According to independent Afghan news sites, the dress code violations used by the Taliban are just a pretext to arrest Afghan women. Amu TV writes: "The women were initially detained for allegedly failing to wear what the Taliban defines as “proper hijab,” despite some reportedly observing conservative Islamic dress at the time of arrest. Video footage obtained by Amu last week showed Taliban enforcers detaining women from clinics, restaurants and shopping centers without warning or explanation."
It further adds: "Family members of several detainees say Taliban officials demanded payments in exchange for the release of their daughters or sisters. Some of the women who resisted arrest were allegedly beaten during questioning."
It appears that Afghanistan remains a chessboard for global powers. And it remains to be seen how the USA, Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran, and others will act and respond in Afghanistan’s ongoing situation.
Footnotes:
*Some may ask for proof. In response, let's ask for evidence to the contrary. Those involved in these conspiracies are aware of all the details. Don't expect figures like Larry Fink to reveal this mafia-like network. This extensive organization works diligently to make its control seem complicated. Exposing this network openly is a challenge for ordinary people. For such highly sensitive topics, there is no definitive proof, but there are signs, indications, tendencies, and hints that point in a certain direction. Those willing and open to see them will recognize them.
**The term salami tactic refers to a strategy where a large task or goal is broken down into smaller, manageable steps, similar to how a salami is eaten slice by slice. This approach is often used to make overwhelming tasks less daunting and more achievable. It's also sometimes used in a negative context, describing a series of small actions or demands aimed at achieving a larger, potentially undesirable, outcome. In negotiations, a series of small concessions can be more palatable than a large, single demand, gradually moving towards a desired outcome. In political contexts, the salami tactic can involve incremental changes that, over time, lead to a significant shift in policy or power.
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