Most Famous Political Lobbyists and Advocates of the Taliban in the West
Contents
Introduction
A) Political Lobbyists and Advocates of the Taliban in the West
Laili Helms
Zalmay Khalilzad
Hamid Karzai
Ashraf Ghani
Hamdullah Mohib
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Jamil Qaderi
Sayed Bilal Ahmed Fatimi
Diva Patang
Roshan M. Salih and Other Non-Afghan Sunni Islamists
B) Political Lobbyists and Advocates of the Taliban Outside the West
Zamir Kabulov
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the Taliban
Conclusion
Introduction
Since the Taliban’s return to power, a network of politicians, diplomats, media figures, activists, and former Afghan elites has worked to promote the movement’s international legitimacy. Some of these figures come from Afghanistan’s traditional Pashtun power networks, while others are foreign diplomats, Islamist activists, media personalities, or regional actors who support Taliban normalisation for ideological, political, economic, or strategic reasons. The following examples show how Taliban advocacy operates both inside Western countries and beyond them.
A) Political Lobbyists and Advocates of the Taliban in the West
Laili Helms
Laili Helms was one of the Taliban's most prominent advocates in the Western world before the attacks of 11 September 2001. Following the attacks, The New York Times described her as the Taliban's "unofficial liaison to the West."[1] Married to a nephew of former CIA director Richard Helms, she became a frequent media commentator defending engagement with the Taliban in American and international news outlets.
Born in Kabul, Helms came from one of Afghanistan's former political elite families during the Pashtun monarchy. She belonged to the broader Pashtun aristocratic and political elite associated with the monarchy of King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Several members of her extended family served as government officials, including ministers. She later described her family's background as part of Afghanistan's modernising political elite. After spending parts of her childhood in France and the United States, she studied psychology and communications at Fairleigh Dickinson University.
(Laili Helms is the woman on the right.)
During the 1980s, she became involved in humanitarian work supporting Afghan refugees and anti-Soviet resistance efforts, later moving to Peshawar, Pakistan. There, she worked at the U.S. consulate and developed contacts among Afghan political actors, aid networks, and resistance circles. These connections later contributed to her access to senior Taliban figures.
Helms' support for the Taliban developed after witnessing the civil war that followed the collapse of the communist government. She argued that the Taliban had restored security and order after years of conflict and repeatedly defended the movement against international criticism. In interviews and public appearances, she argued that reports concerning Taliban restrictions on women and other human rights abuses were often presented without sufficient context, and maintained that the movement's policies should be understood within Afghanistan's cultural and historical circumstances. She also defended the Taliban's handling of Osama bin Laden before 9/11, arguing that Afghan traditions and domestic political realities constrained their ability to surrender him. Critics, particularly Afghan women's rights activists, viewed her advocacy as contributing to the international legitimisation of a movement responsible for severe restrictions on women and political freedoms.
Helms also assisted Taliban representatives during visits to the United States and helped facilitate contacts between Taliban officials, journalists, and American policymakers. Through this role, she became one of the movement's most visible Western intermediaries and advocates during the late 1990s.
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, Helms publicly distanced herself from the Taliban, stating that she no longer supported the movement and that she had privately encouraged its leaders to adopt more moderate policies. After 2001, she largely withdrew from public debate and media appearances.
Zalmay Khalilzad (born 1951) is an Afghan-American diplomat from the Noorzai tribe of the Durrani Pashtuns. He served as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations under President George W. Bush and briefly continued in the role under President Barack Obama.
Earlier in his career, he served as U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan (2004–2005) and to Iraq (2005–2007). In 2017, he was reportedly considered for the position of U.S. Secretary of State under President Donald Trump.
From September 2018 to August 2021, Khalilzad served as U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, leading negotiations with the Taliban and playing a central role in the agreement that paved the way for the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan during both the Trump and Biden administrations.
He is married to Cheryl Benard, an Austrian-American author and political scientist.
Further reading:
- Detailed biography: Zalmay Khalilzad: Navigating U.S. Diplomacy and TalibanRelations
- Related material on his political activities: Unexplained Drone Sightings Over Afghanistan and the Ongoing Geopolitical Intrigue,
Hamid Karzai
Hamid
Karzai served as the President of Afghanistan from 2001 to 2014. He belongs to
the Popalzai Durrani branch of the Pashtun ethnic group. Before assuming the
presidency, Karzai lived in the United States, where his family owned several
Afghan restaurants along the East Coast and in Chicago.
Reports by James Risen of The New York Times and other journalists alleged that Karzai’s half-brother, Ahmed Wali Karzai, was involved in the Afghan drug trade, particularly in the trafficking of opium and heroin[2]. In 2011, Ahmed Wali was shot and killed by one of his security guards at his home in Kandahar, an event that raised serious concerns about instability in a city considered vital to the Afghan conflict[3]. Karzai has referred to the Taliban as his “discontent brothers” in several interviews and has repeatedly called for the release of Taliban prisoners, including some detained for terrorism or murder. Many of those released later returned to fighting against Afghan government forces.
Karzai’s personal wealth is estimated to range from several hundred million to several billion dollars, consisting largely of real estate holdings and land both in Afghanistan and abroad, including in the United States. He also maintains assets in various overseas accounts. The Karzai family owns multiple properties and businesses around the world. Their restaurant chain in the United States was operated by Karzai’s brothers, Mahmood and Qayum Karzai, with locations in Baltimore, Cambridge (Massachusetts), and San Francisco.
The BBC presented the Karzai family tree ...:
...as well as Ahmad Wali Karzai ... :
In addition, the Karzai family holds significant real estate in the United States, the United Arab Emirates, India, Afghanistan, and other countries. Despite his prominence, Hamid Karzai has been described by critics as a “Western stooge.” He and his family have faced numerous accusations of corruption, drug smuggling, misappropriation of state property, and involvement in organized crime.
In recent years, Karzai has remained politically active and engaged in regional and international contacts. In 2025, he reportedly traveled to Germany, where he met with officials in connection with discussions involving representatives of the Taliban. According to a report published on July 10, 2025, by the German newspaper Tagesspiegel, citing Behördenspiegel and Bild, two emissaries of the Taliban government were present in Germany to explore possibilities for cooperation. The report further stated that negotiations were already taking place behind the scenes and that Karzai had recently met with former German intelligence chief August Hanning at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin.
In 2026, Karzai was also reported to have met with Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s interior minister and leader of the Haqqani network, on the occasion of Eid al-Fitr (observed by the Taliban on March 19, 2026).
(Taliban police spokesman Khalid Zardan released photographs indicating
that Karzai met Haqqani alongside several former Afghan Pashtun officials.)
(Meeting between Hamid Karzai and Sirajuddin Haqqani in Kabul, Afghanistan, on March 19, 2026.)This marked Karzai’s second known public meeting with Haqqani in nearly five years; he had previously met him to express condolences following the killing of Khalilur Rahman Haqqani.
The Haqqani network, led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, has been widely accused of carrying out numerous deadly attacks in Afghanistan during and after Karzai’s presidency. Among the most notable was the attack at Zanbak Square in Kabul on May 31, 2017, which resulted in approximately 200 killed and more than 400 injured.
It seems that Karzai’s backing of the Taliban behind closed doors never fully stopped, with shared Pashtun identity sometimes cited as a possible factor.
Ashraf Ghani
Ashraf Ghani served as the President of Afghanistan from 2014 to 2021. He belongs to the Ahmadzai tribe, a Pashtun subgroup within the Ghilzai confederacy [4]. When the Taliban seized control of Kabul in August 2021, Ghani and his national security advisor, Hamdullah Mohib, fled the country, departing from Kabul airport to the United Arab Emirates. Reports soon emerged alleging that they had carried suitcases filled with millions of U.S. dollars during their escape.
(Photographs of Ashraf Ghani boarding the aircraft during his departure from Afghanistan. Claims that the aircraft carried large amounts of cash became a subject of controversy after his departure.)
In an interview with CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, Ghani denied these accusations. When asked whether he had taken any money with him, he stated:“I was wearing Afghan clothes with a waistcoat and a pair of shoes, and that was it. I didn't even have a book. I've lived an honorable life. I have been a self-made man and did not need... I declared all my assets in SIGAR [the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] now, and its detailed report has shown that there was no money on the helicopter.”
However, Forbes magazine reported on August 10, 2022: "SIGAR said that while fleeing, government officials took as much cash as they could carry, they were limited by the 'payload and performance limitations of the helicopters.'"
Forbes further commented that SIGAR’s findings were inconclusive:“The SIGAR report doesn’t inspire much confidence and its conclusions are admittedly best guesses, often based on second-hand hearsay. “Since undeclared cash leaves no paper trail,” the report said, investigators had to rely on eyewitnesses instead of documentary evidence. Some key witnesses were “well-known Afghan officials,” all allies of Ghani. It’s impossible to judge their credibility or motivations since SIGAR agreed to their requests for anonymity.”
Even if Ghani did not take money during his departure—which remains doubtful—many Afghans and observers claim that he accumulated vast personal wealth during his presidency. Like his predecessor Hamid Karzai, Ghani’s fortune is estimated to range from several hundred million to several billion U.S. dollars. His assets are believed to be primarily held abroad, particularly in offshore accounts, rather than in property or land within Afghanistan.
Many ordinary Afghans saw him as a psychopath and a Western stooge, installed by foreign powers to bring chaos and massacres to Afghanistan and pave the way for the Taliban regime. They felt deeply betrayed when he fled, allegedly taking suitcases filled with millions of dollars from the country.
Accusations of Ethnic Bias and Misconduct Against Ghani
Ghani has also been accused of ethnic discrimination against non-Pashtun Afghans. During his tenure, terrorist attacks targeting anti-Taliban officials and non-Pashtun communities reportedly increased sharply.
In May 2017, Ghani controversially reinstated Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—a notorious Pashtun warlord and war criminal—into political life.
(Photograph caption: From left to right – Hamid Karzai, Ashraf Ghani, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Sayyaf, Abdullah Abdullah, 4 May 2017.)Additionally, on May 12, 2016, Ghani’s Pashtun bodyguards were allegedly involved in physically assaulting a Hazara protester in London who had condemned the violence perpetrated by Ghani’s security forces in Afghanistan.
Overall, Ashraf Ghani is widely viewed as one of the key figures whose actions and policies facilitated the Taliban’s return to power and the eventual collapse of the Afghan Republic.
Hamdullah Mohib
Former deputy chief of staff to former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani. He is a Pashtun and according to his interview in the Washington Post, he is married to Lael Adams (born 1987), an American expert on Afghanistan, in 2011 [5]. But his wife is also said to be a Western agent, either of the American CIA or the British MI6. Furthermore, after his fleeing the Taliban several Western institutions, among others the British Oxford Union, invited him to enable him to justify his incompetence. Choosing him as Afghanistan's national security advisors gave the Western intelligence the power and opportunity to control Afghanistan's politics.
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Few figures in modern Afghan history are as controversial as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Born in Kunduz Province and educated at Kabul University, he rose to prominence during the 1970s as the leader of Hezb-e Islami, one of the most powerful Islamist movements in Afghanistan. During the anti-Soviet jihad of the 1980s, he became one of the principal recipients of military and financial assistance channelled through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), receiving substantial support from both Pakistan and the United States.
(Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (centre) with future Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (second from right) during the anti-Soviet jihad, 1986.)Despite his later anti-Western rhetoric, Hekmatyar was among the principal beneficiaries of Western-backed support during the anti-Soviet jihad. Through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), his Hezb-e Islami movement received a substantial share of the weapons and financial assistance supplied by the United States, Saudi Arabia, and their allies to the Afghan mujahideen.
This is well documented in several academic and journalistic accounts, including Steve Coll’s Ghost Wars, which describes Hezb-e Islami under Hekmatyar as one of the principal recipients of CIA-funded weapons distributed through Pakistan’s ISI and notes the ISI’s strong preference for his faction during much of the conflict.
The prominence of Hekmatyar within the CIA-backed resistance is illustrated in an account cited by Coll. Referring to the CIA's backing of Hekmatyar, a CIA officer reportedly told a French counterpart: "Gulbuddin is not as bad as you fear, and Massoud is not as good as you hope." [Coll, Steve. Ghost Wars, Chapter 8, "Inshallah, You Will Know My Plans", p. 138.]
The comment reflects how some Western officials continued to view Hekmatyar as a useful partner while remaining sceptical of Ahmad Shah Massoud, despite growing concerns about Hekmatyar's ideology and conduct. Such accounts highlight the often contradictory and short-term nature of Western intelligence relationships with Afghan mujahideen leaders during the Cold War.
In retrospect, Hekmatyar's political and military legacy had consequences that extended far beyond the anti-Soviet jihad. His prolonged conflict with the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud after the collapse of the communist regime contributed significantly to the instability that engulfed Afghanistan during the 1990s. The destruction of Kabul, factional warfare, and widespread public disillusionment with the mujahideen leadership created conditions that later facilitated the Taliban's rise to power. Although the Taliban emerged from a distinct political and ideological background, they were able to exploit the chaos and loss of public confidence produced by the civil war, in which Hekmatyar was one of the principal participants.
While Ahmad Shah Massoud and other mujahideen commanders also received foreign assistance, Hezb-e Islami under Hekmatyar was widely regarded as one of the largest beneficiaries of U.S.- and Pakistani-backed support.
After the collapse of the communist government, Hekmatyar refused to accept the political order that emerged under President Burhanuddin Rabbani and Defence Minister Ahmad Shah Massoud. During the Afghan civil war of the 1990s, his forces repeatedly shelled Kabul, contributing to the destruction of large parts of the city and causing thousands of civilian casualties, which led to him being widely referred to as the ‘Butcher of Kabul’. For many Afghans, especially Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks, Hekmatyar became one of the principal symbols of the violence that devastated the country after the Soviet withdrawal.
Although Hekmatyar consistently presented himself as an Islamist leader, many critics viewed him as representing a broader current of Pashtun political nationalism. His opponents frequently accused him of combining Islamist ideology with efforts to preserve the dominance of traditional Pashtun political elites within the Afghan state. Because his political career was closely linked to Pakistan's regional strategy and because he repeatedly clashed with non-Pashtun political factions, many non-Pashtun Afghans came to see him not merely as an Islamist politician but also as a representative of a wider system of Pashtun political dominance.
These perceptions resurfaced during the presidency of Ashraf Ghani. Both men belonged to the broader Ghilzai Pashtun milieu, and many critics interpreted Hekmatyar's political rehabilitation in 2016–2017 as an attempt to consolidate support among influential Pashtun power networks at a time of growing ethnic tensions. Opponents argued that the move strengthened political forces associated with Pashtun nationalism while further alienating non-Pashtun communities.
Following the Taliban's return to power in August 2021, Hekmatyar neither joined the armed anti-Taliban resistance nor mounted any sustained political challenge to Taliban rule. Although he occasionally criticised specific Taliban policies, he stopped short of questioning the legitimacy of the regime itself. As a result, many opponents of the Taliban came to regard him as a de facto facilitator of Taliban consolidation rather than a genuine opposition figure.
The political flexibility displayed by Hekmatyar and members of his family has reinforced long-standing accusations of opportunism. On June 13, 2026, for example, his son Habibur Rahman Hekmatyar publicly distanced himself from aspects of Taliban policy at a time when criticism of the regime was becoming increasingly visible. Critics interpreted such moves not as a principled break with the Taliban but as an attempt to preserve the family's political relevance in anticipation of possible future changes in Afghanistan's political landscape.
(Habibur Rahman Hekmatyar, son of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Some Afghan commentators view the younger Hekmatyar as part of a new generation of Pashtun political figures seeking influence in a post-Taliban Afghanistan.)The renewed visibility of the Hekmatyar family has also fuelled speculation about its potential role in a future post-Taliban political order. Historically, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was one of Pakistan's closest Afghan allies and among the principal beneficiaries of Pakistani support during the anti-Soviet jihad. While Pakistan was also one of the main backers of the Taliban during the 1990s and later during the US and Nato presence between 2001 until 2021, relations between Islamabad and the Taliban government have deteriorated significantly since the movement's return to power in 2021.
Against this backdrop, some analysts have suggested that Pakistan may seek to maintain alternative channels of influence through figures such as Hekmatyar and his political network. In September 2025, the Afghan newspaper 8AM argued that Islamabad appeared increasingly willing to engage figures outside the Taliban and noted that Hekmatyar remained one of the Afghan politicians whom Pakistan continued to trust.
Such assessments have led some observers to speculate that the Hekmatyar family could seek to position itself as a future Pashtun political alternative should Taliban rule face serious internal or external challenges. Whether these ambitions can be translated into meaningful political influence remains uncertain, but the debate itself illustrates how Hekmatyar's political network continues to be viewed as a potentially relevant actor in Afghanistan's future.
To his supporters, Hekmatyar remains an experienced Islamist politician and veteran of the anti-Soviet jihad. To his critics, however, he represents one of the most enduring examples of how Islamist militancy, ethnic politics, foreign sponsorship, and political opportunism have combined to shape Afghanistan's modern history.
Jamil Qaderi
(Qaderi's YouTube channel is called "King of YouTube", and the above is a screenshot of his channel. [6])
Jamil Qaderi is a Pashtun YouTuber and social media activist who most likely resided in Belgium as of 2022. He is part of a broader group of young Afghan diaspora voices in Western countries who express support for the Taliban through social media channels and are sometimes referred to as “Taliban with neckties.”
His YouTube content criticises anti-Taliban groups and opposition figures while expressing support for senior Taliban members.
Sayed Bilal Ahmed Fatimi
Sayed Bilal Ahmed Fatimi is a Pashtun Afghan political commentator and former member of Hezb-e Islami, currently based in London. According to his public LinkedIn profile, he attended the University of Westminster between 2002 and 2004 and later served as director of the Afghan Reconstruction and Development Organisation (ARDO). His profile identifies him as a speaker of English, Pashto, and Dari, enabling him to communicate with different segments of the Afghan diaspora.
Fatimi has established a significant presence across several social media platforms, including LinkedIn, YouTube, X/Twitter, Facebook, and other online channels, where he publishes political commentary in both Pashto and Dari. His online activity is primarily directed toward Afghan audiences inside Afghanistan and diaspora communities in Western countries.
(Sayed Bilal Ahmed Fatimi’s LinkedIn profile preview, accessed via Google Search on 11 July 2026.)Fatimi's commentary reflects a broader phenomenon among certain Western-based Pashtun political commentators who advocate the international normalisation of Taliban rule through social media platforms. Their commentary frequently presents the Taliban-led political order, dominated by Pashtun leadership, as the legitimate representation of Afghanistan while opposing alternative political movements led by prominent non-Pashtun figures such as Ahmad Massoud (Tajik), Abdul Rashid Dostum (Uzbek), and Mohammad Mohaqiq (Hazara).
Like many Taliban-aligned diaspora commentators, Fatimi's public commentary focuses on defending the Taliban's political legitimacy and international recognition while giving little attention to documented allegations of Taliban human rights abuses. These include restrictions on women and girls, persecution of religious minorities such as Afghan Shiites, extrajudicial killings of former government officials and security personnel, and the broader suppression of political dissent. Critics argue that emphasising the Taliban's legitimacy while overlooking these issues contributes to the international normalisation of Taliban rule.
This debate also forms part of a wider discussion about ethnic representation and nationalism in Afghanistan. Some Taliban-aligned Pashtun nationalist narratives have been criticised for presenting Pashtun political dominance as the natural foundation of state power while marginalising the political aspirations of Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other communities. Although such views are not always openly articulated by political actors, exclusionary slogans that have circulated in Afghan political discourse — including "Tajiks to Tajikistan, Uzbeks to Uzbekistan, and Hazaras to Goristan (graveyard)" — have been condemned by many Afghans as expressions of ethnic hostility and exclusion.
His reaction to Iran's reception of anti-Taliban figures in Tehran illustrates this position. Following the participation of Mohammad Mohaqiq and Ahmad Massoud at the funeral of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Fatimi published several videos in both Pashto and Dari under titles including "Iran Broke the Hearts of Afghans – Why Did It Invite Ahmad Massoud and Mohaqiq?", "Iran Must Apologise to the Afghan Nation", and "Iran Is Playing with Blood in Afghanistan."
(Fatimi's Dari-language YouTube commentary criticising Iran's invitation of Ahmad Massoud and Mohammad Mohaqiq. Screenshot captured on 11 July 2026.)
In these videos, Fatimi argued that Iran had insulted Afghanistan by receiving Ahmad Massoud and Mohammad Mohaqiq alongside the official Taliban delegation. He described the Taliban authorities as the legitimate representatives of Afghanistan and portrayed Massoud and Mohaqiq as unrecognised figures lacking political legitimacy. He also accused Iran of supporting opponents of the Taliban and questioned why Tehran would provide recognition and visibility to anti-Taliban actors.
Iranian officials rejected the argument that the Taliban represented the entirety of Afghanistan. Hassan Kazemi Qomi, Iran's former representative for Afghanistan, stated that "the Taliban represents a part of the Afghan people, not all of the people of this country." He explained that Iran's relationship with Afghanistan was based on historical, cultural, and civilisational ties rather than limited to one political movement, and that Tehran maintained contact with different Afghan political actors. Regarding the presence of Ahmad Massoud and other figures at the ceremony, Kazemi Qomi stated that their participation was intended to pay respects and offer condolences rather than represent a political alliance. These remarks directly contrasted with Fatimi's interpretation that Iran's invitation of non-Taliban Afghan figures constituted a betrayal. The statement was significant because it challenged the Taliban's claim to represent Afghanistan as a whole, a position frequently promoted by Taliban supporters and aligned commentators.
(Ahmad Massoud and Mohammad Mohaqiq at the casket ceremony for Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran, 3 July 2026.)
Fatimi's statements went further by attacking Ahmad Massoud and the National Resistance Front, portraying them as politically insignificant and allegedly connected to foreign interests. He also rejected accusations that the Taliban were responsible for the 1998 killing of Iranian diplomats in Mazar-i-Sharif, instead attributing responsibility to forces loyal to Ahmad Shah Massoud.
(Fatimi advances a strongly pro-Taliban narrative while portraying Ahmad Massoud and anti-Taliban opposition figures as illegitimate in his YouTube commentary. Screenshot captured on 11 July 2026.) Following the controversy, Sayed Bilal Fatimi called on Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar to leave Tehran in protest. He described Iran's decision to host Ahmad Massoud and Mohammad Mohaqiq alongside the Taliban delegation as a "betrayal of the Taliban."
This reaction also highlights a selective approach toward Iran's engagement with Afghan political actors. Fatimi had previously supported or defended Iran's diplomatic engagement with Taliban representatives. His criticism intensified when Tehran extended political visibility to figures outside the Taliban framework, particularly Ahmad Massoud, a Tajik political figure, and Mohammad Mohaqiq, a Hazara leader. This suggests that his objection was not necessarily Iran's involvement in Afghan affairs itself, but rather Iran's engagement with political forces outside the Taliban-led order.
Fatimi's position is particularly notable given Iran's longstanding religious, cultural, and linguistic connections with several non-Pashtun Afghan communities. Iran shares religious ties with Afghanistan's Shi'a communities—including most Hazaras, many Sayeds, and the Qizilbash—while the Persian (Dari) language and centuries of shared cultural and historical ties have traditionally connected Iran with Afghanistan's Tajik population. Despite these longstanding relationships, Fatimi argued that Iran should prioritise its relationship with the Taliban authorities, whose senior leadership in Kabul is exclusively Pashtun, and criticised Tehran for extending political recognition to Afghan actors outside the Taliban-led political order.
The positions advanced in Fatimi's videos are consistent with a wider political narrative promoted by some Taliban-aligned Pashtun diaspora commentators. Within this narrative, the Taliban-led political order and Pashtun-dominated state structures are presented as the natural representatives of Afghanistan, while alternative political movements are portrayed as foreign-backed or lacking national legitimacy. This perspective is strongly contested by many Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and other Afghans who reject Taliban rule and advocate a more inclusive political system.
From this perspective, Fatimi represents a broader phenomenon of Western-based Afghan political influencers who use diaspora networks, education, and digital platforms to shape Afghan and international perceptions while advocating greater acceptance of Taliban rule.
Diva Patang
A notable
example is Diva Patang, a Pashtun woman living in the United Kingdom who
gained attention after August 2021 for publicly defending the Taliban’s return
to power. She often highlights her family’s financial security, noting that her
husband is a businessman. Her prominence reflects a broader pattern seen among
some well-connected Afghan elites who settled in the West.
For much of
modern Afghan history, Afghanistan’s central political institutions were
dominated by Pashtun-led ruling circles — from the monarchies of Nadir
Shah and Zahir Shah to early republics and later governments supported by
foreign powers. These political elites, drawn largely from influential Pashtun
families and networks, were frequently accused of favouring their own circles
and sidelining communities such as Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks in matters of
power, development, and access to state resources.
Over
decades, certain elite factions within these ruling structures accumulated
considerable wealth. Various politically linked networks — including
some rooted in Pashtun power circles — were repeatedly accused of profiting
from Afghanistan’s natural resources through illegal mining, timber smuggling,
unlicensed gemstone extraction, and other unregulated activities. These
practices were tied not to ethnicity as a whole, but to specific politically
connected groups that had access to patronage, armed protection, or
influence within state institutions.
This concentration of power and privilege allowed some elite families to maintain financial stability abroad, for instance through businesses or property ownership, while many ordinary Afghans, especially those from historically marginalised communities, remained economically disadvantaged. Such disparities deepened public resentment, highlighting the long-standing grievances caused by unequal access to wealth and political influence.
This historical concentration of power and privilege may help explain why some members of these elite networks continue to support either Pashtun-dominated Taliban rule or governments led by Pashtun technocrats. At times, some have even expressed the view that Afghanistan should be dominated by Pashtuns, reflecting their preference for political arrangements that concentrate power within familiar networks.
Roshan M. Salih and other non-Afghan Sunni Islamists
(Screenshot of Salih's twitter account - 13. Nov. 2022 [7].)
Although it may seem unusual, there are actually many non-Afghans from Wahhabi or Muslim Brotherhood backgrounds living outside of Afghanistan who support and promote the Taliban primarily through their YouTube channels. One such individual is Roshan Muhammed Salih, based in the UK, who, according to his Twitter profile, is the editor of the British Muslim news website 5Pillars (5pillarsuk.com). He was invited by the Taliban and has reported from Afghanistan positively, claiming that people there are not oppressed.
B) Political Lobbyists and Advocates of the Taliban Outside the West
Although this article primarily focuses on Taliban lobbyists and advocates living in Western countries, support for the Taliban is by no means limited to the West. Some of the most influential supporters of Taliban normalisation operate outside the Western world. One notable example is Zamir Kabulov, Russia's long-time special representative for Afghanistan and one of the key architects of Moscow's rapprochement with the Taliban.
Zamir Kabulov
(Zamir Kabulov, Russia's special envoy for Afghanistan and a key promoter of Taliban normalisation)Born in Soviet Uzbekistan in 1954, Zamir Kabulov has spent decades building a reputation as one of Russia's foremost Afghanistan experts. Today, however, he is better known as one of the most influential advocates of Taliban normalisation outside the West.
Yet his record raises serious questions about his judgement and his credibility. For years, Kabulov has promoted engagement with the Taliban as a pragmatic necessity, portraying them as a force capable of bringing stability to Afghanistan and acting as a partner against terrorism. Despite the Taliban's continued repression of women, restrictions imposed on Shia Muslims, persecution of political opponents, and lack of meaningful political inclusiveness, Kabulov has consistently advocated deeper cooperation with the movement.
Kabulov has become one of the most important international voices defending engagement with the Taliban. Few officials have done more to advance the Taliban's international legitimacy outside the Islamic world. Kabulov was one of the leading voices behind Moscow's rapprochement with the movement, a process that culminated in Russia's suspension of the Taliban's terrorist designation on 17 April 2025, formal recognition of the Taliban government on 3 July 2025, and expanded political, economic, and security cooperation.
The agreement also raises questions about how much leverage Moscow can realistically gain through military cooperation. After the collapse of the Afghan Republic in 2021, the Taliban captured vast quantities of U.S.-supplied military equipment worth billions of dollars. At the same time, Russia’s own military reputation has been damaged by the poor battlefield performance of some of its weapons in recent conflicts. While Moscow may help maintain older Soviet- and Russian-made systems, it is doubtful that this gives Russia decisive influence over the Taliban’s security policy.
Kabulov is not simply a diplomat dealing with an unpleasant reality. He has emerged as one of the most influential proponents of Taliban normalisation. Instead of warning Moscow about the dangers of legitimising the Taliban, he repeatedly presents cooperation with them as reasonable, necessary, and strategically useful. In practice, this turns diplomacy into advocacy.
Kabulov's affinity for engagement with the Taliban did not emerge after their return to power in 2021. According to several accounts, he was involved in negotiations with Taliban authorities during the 1990s and developed contacts with the movement's leadership during that period. Throughout his diplomatic career, Kabulov consistently favoured dialogue and accommodation with the movement, making his later advocacy of normalisation less a sudden policy shift than the continuation of a long-established approach.
In fact, Kabulov's contacts with the Taliban can be traced back to one of the most controversial episodes of the 1990s Afghan conflict. According to a detailed investigation by the Los Angeles Times, the Russian government sent Kabulov to negotiate the release of a Russian aircrew captured by the Taliban after a Bout-linked cargo aircraft was forced down near Kandahar in August 1995.
Victor Bout, a former Soviet military officer born in what is now Tajikistan, built a vast post-Soviet air-transport empire using surplus Antonov and Ilyushin aircraft after the collapse of the USSR. Rather than manufacturing weapons himself, Bout acted primarily as a broker and transporter, moving arms and military supplies between suppliers and clients across conflict zones in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. His activities later inspired the 2005 film Lord of War, whose protagonist, played by Nicolas Cage, was loosely based on Bout.
The Los Angeles Times reported that in 1995 "a Taliban MIG fighter forced down a Bout-leased Ilyushin carrying 3.4 million Kalashnikov rounds as it neared the Taliban stronghold of Kandahar. Taliban soldiers seized the munitions and took the seven-member crew hostage." The newspaper further reported that "the Russian government sent Kabulov, who at times was accompanied by Bout or his brother Sergei, to negotiate for the crew's release." The negotiations reportedly lasted for months before the crew eventually escaped.
The episode is noteworthy for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that Kabulov was already directly involved in dealings with Taliban authorities during the movement's rise to power in the mid-1990s. Second, it highlights the complex political environment in which Russian officials, arms brokers, and Afghan factions interacted. Bout's companies were reportedly linked to aircraft sales and transport operations that benefited multiple Afghan actors over time, including anti-Taliban forces and, later, the Taliban itself. His role appears to have been driven less by ideology than by commercial opportunity; as one observer remarked, he worked with whoever controlled territory and could pay for his services.
While there is no evidence that Kabulov himself was involved in Bout's commercial activities, the affair illustrates how long-standing Russia's channels of communication with the Taliban actually are. Kabulov's present-day advocacy of engagement with the Taliban therefore cannot be understood solely as a response to developments after 2021. It reflects relationships, assumptions, and diplomatic habits that were already taking shape nearly three decades earlier.
This is especially striking given Russia's historical relationship with Ahmad Shah Massoud and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance during the 1990s. While Russia once supported forces resisting Taliban rule, Moscow now moves closer to the very movement Massoud fought against. Ahmad Massoud, the son of Russia's former ally, has repeatedly warned against the international normalisation of the Taliban and called upon foreign governments not to legitimise the regime. Yet Moscow has largely ignored these warnings, while officials such as Kabulov continued advocating closer ties with the Taliban leadership.
This shift was not always so pronounced. In 2023, Russian officials still maintained contacts with Ahmad Massoud and other anti-Taliban figures. On 29 August 2023, Massoud met Sergei Mironov in Moscow, where developments in Afghanistan and regional security issues were reportedly discussed. On 23 November 2023, he again appeared in Moscow at a conference on Afghanistan alongside several anti-Taliban political figures. These contacts suggested that parts of the Russian political establishment still viewed the anti-Taliban resistance as a relevant actor.
The subsequent turn toward formal recognition of the Taliban therefore represented more than a tactical adjustment. It reflected a broader reorientation of Moscow's Afghanistan policy. The timing is noteworthy: Massoud's visits to Moscow took place only months before the Crocus City Hall terrorist attack of 22 March 2024. The attack, which killed 145 people and injured hundreds more, profoundly shocked Russian society and intensified concerns about jihadist terrorism. Following the attack, Kabulov's argument that the Taliban should be treated as a counterterrorism partner appears to have gained significantly greater influence within Russian policymaking circles. This process ultimately culminated in Russia's formal recognition of the Taliban government on 3 July 2025, making it the first country to extend such recognition to the Taliban authorities. Even China, despite extensive economic interests in Afghanistan and significant involvement in its natural-resource sector, had not taken that step nearly five years after the Taliban's return to power. Yet this argument overlooks the fact that numerous international militant groups continue to operate from Afghanistan under Taliban rule. Some of these networks have long-standing links to the Taliban or benefit from the permissive environment created by Taliban control, raising the question of whether the Taliban should be viewed as a solution to the terrorist threat or as part of the broader security environment in which such groups continue to operate.
This contrast became even clearer over time. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, senior Russian leaders, including Vladimir Putin, maintained close contacts with prominent Northern Alliance figures such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, viewing them as important partners against the Taliban. Kabulov became one of the principal advocates of Russia's gradual shift away from anti-Taliban resistance groups and toward direct engagement with the Taliban. As a result, figures such as Ahmad Massoud have found themselves largely sidelined in Moscow's Afghanistan policy despite their historical ties to Russia.
Kabulov's approach to Afghanistan also reflects a broader tendency within Russian foreign policy. Moscow often prefers to work with whoever controls power on the ground rather than with those it previously supported. During the Syrian civil war, Russia backed Bashar al-Assad, an Alawite ruler and long-time Moscow ally, while he remained in power. After Assad's fall, however, Russia established contacts with Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former Sunni jihadist commander previously linked to al-Qaeda. The move illustrated Moscow's willingness to engage with a figure who had long been a bitter enemy of the Assad regime. In Afghanistan, Russia followed a similar pattern: it supported the Northern Alliance during the late 1990s and early 2000s, maintained close relations with figures such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Marshal Mohammad Qasim Fahim, and classified the Taliban as a terrorist organisation. Moscow has since moved in the opposite direction, culminating in the Taliban's removal from Russia's terrorist list and formal recognition of the regime.
A similar pattern can be observed elsewhere. During the U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran in 2026, Moscow condemned the attacks and maintained diplomatic contact with Tehran, yet avoided direct military involvement. Such cases reinforce the impression that Russian foreign policy is driven less by loyalty, ideology, or long-term commitments than by a pragmatic calculation of who is most likely to prevail politically.
Seen in this light, Moscow's embrace of the Taliban appears not as an exception, but as another example of a broader geopolitical habit: adapting to political realities rather than remaining loyal to former partners. Kabulov's Afghanistan policy has become one of the clearest examples of this approach in practice.
Kabulov routinely justifies his policy through arguments about regional security and counterterrorism. His most effective argument is fear. He presents the Taliban as a necessary barrier against ISIS-K and repeatedly suggests that without cooperation with the Taliban, Afghanistan could become a base for attacks against Russia and Central Asia. In doing so, he plays directly on one of Moscow's deepest security anxieties: the fear of jihadist violence reaching Russian territory.
But this argument is highly selective. It assumes that the Taliban are a reliable counterterrorism partner while ignoring the fact that Taliban-linked, Taliban-tolerated, or Taliban-protected militant networks have also posed serious threats beyond Afghanistan. Kabulov therefore frames the Taliban as the solution to terrorism while downplaying the possibility that the Taliban ecosystem itself remains part of the problem.
Taliban rule has not produced the stable and inclusive Afghanistan that Kabulov’s argument implies. Instead, reports continue to emerge of repression against women, restrictions on Shia religious life, abuses by Taliban intelligence networks, and the exclusion of political opponents from public life. Rather than holding the Taliban accountable for these developments, Kabulov has continued presenting them as a legitimate partner.
If Kabulov's influence within the Russian state were limited, his views would be of little significance. However, because Russian policymakers regard him as a leading authority on Afghanistan, his personal assessments have had a disproportionate impact on Moscow's approach. As a result, Russian policy has become closely associated with one man's highly subjective interpretation of Afghan realities.
Whether motivated by ideological conviction, bureaucratic self-interest, or a desire to defend years of failed assumptions, Kabulov has become one of the most prominent foreign defenders of Taliban normalisation. His legacy may ultimately be remembered not as that of an Afghanistan expert, but as one of the key architects of Russia's embrace of the Taliban.
China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi and the Taliban
China’s policy toward the Taliban is more opaque than Russia’s. Unlike the Russian case, where Zamir Kabulov is publicly visible as one of the main advocates of normalisation, it is less clear which specific Chinese politicians, intelligence officials, business networks, or policy experts are driving Beijing’s approach. What is clear, however, is that China has chosen engagement with the Taliban over support for Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban opposition.
Carnegie describes China's Taliban policy as an adaptive strategy. Beijing maintains formal flexibility while gradually normalising relations through diplomacy, security cooperation, economic engagement, and participation in regional forums.
(Carnegie Endowment published an in-depth analysis of China's policy toward the Taliban, 7 November 2025.)China has kept its embassy open in Kabul, exchanged ambassadors with the Taliban authorities, hosted Taliban delegations, and expanded economic ties while avoiding direct political responsibility for the consequences of Taliban rule. This approach allows Beijing to treat the Taliban as the de facto authority in Afghanistan without formally endorsing every aspect of the regime.
According to publicly available reporting, China has prioritised regional stability, counterterrorism, the security of its Belt and Road projects, mediation between Pakistan and the Taliban, and access to Afghanistan’s mineral resources. In practice, this means that Beijing treats the Taliban as a political partner, even though the Taliban regime remains internationally contested and lacks democratic legitimacy.
This policy has been strongly criticised by Ahmad Massoud and other anti-Taliban figures. Massoud has argued that the Taliban have no legitimacy in Afghanistan and that foreign powers should not treat them as lawful representatives of the Afghan people. From this perspective, the Taliban have no legitimate authority to sell Afghanistan's natural resources to foreign governments or companies. Critics therefore argue that countries purchasing minerals, oil, or other resources from the Taliban are not merely conducting business; they are helping an unelected regime profit from Afghanistan's national wealth and, in effect, helping to rob the Afghan people of resources that belong to the nation as a whole.
A 2025 report by Intelligence Online claimed that Afghan opposition efforts to win Chinese political or logistical support failed, despite months of contacts and secret meetings in Beijing.
Publicly available sources point in the same direction: China appears far more interested in cultivating relations with the Taliban than in supporting resistance forces against them.
The talks demonstrated that Beijing's relationship with the Taliban extends beyond diplomacy and includes long-term economic interests, particularly in Afghanistan's mineral sector. Critics argue that such cooperation strengthens the Taliban economically while providing them with additional international legitimacy.
China’s policy therefore represents a colder and more transactional version of Taliban normalisation. Beijing may not openly praise the Taliban in ideological terms, but by engaging with them diplomatically, economically, and strategically, it helps strengthen the regime’s international position while ignoring the question of whether the Taliban have any legitimate right to rule Afghanistan or sell its resources.
Conclusion
The individuals discussed above differ greatly in background, ideology, and motivation. Yet a common pattern emerges: each, in different ways, contributes to the normalisation of Taliban rule and the Pashtun-dominated political order built around it. Afghanistan’s future is repeatedly discussed, negotiated, and influenced by networks that do not necessarily represent the will of its people.
Some advocates present their position as pragmatism. Others call it diplomacy, stability, counterterrorism, or regional necessity. But behind these words lies the same old pattern: the Afghan people are asked to accept a political order designed without their consent. The Taliban are treated as a reality that must be managed, while their victims are expected to remain silent.
This is the real danger of Taliban normalisation. It does not merely give diplomatic space to an unelected regime. It teaches the world to accept domination as stability, repression as order, and foreign deals as legitimacy. Afghanistan has already paid a heavy price for political arrangements imposed from above and supported from abroad. If this pattern continues, the voices of ordinary Afghans will remain secondary to the interests of political elites, foreign governments, and those who seek to normalise Taliban rule.
Sources
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/27/world/a-nation-challenged-the-liaison-she-spoke-for-taliban-and-now-pays-a-price.html?scp=1&sq=Laili+Helms&st=cse&pagewanted=all
[2] https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/05/world/asia/05afghan.html
[3] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/12/ahmed-wali-karzai-killing-sparks-fears
[4] https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/asraf-gilzay-the-afghan-chief-who-ruled-as-shah-over-part-of-iran-from-1137-1725-to-1142-1729
[5] https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/what-does-afghanistan-need-some-major-rebranding-says-its-32-year-old-ambassador/2016/04/21/2adb3a66-06e3-11e6-a12f-ea5aed7958dc_story.html
[6] https://twitter.com/DivaPatang.
[7] https://twitter.com/RmSalih. Accessed 13. Nov. 2022.
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