China, India, and the Taliban: Geopolitics and Resource Rivalries in Afghanistan

Last Updated: October 15, 2025 

The intricate web of alliances and rivalries in Central Asia continues to evolve, with the Taliban at the center of a complex geopolitical game involving Pakistan, India, China, Russia, and the United States. Recent developments reveal a landscape marked by resource exploitation, shifting allegiances, and regional tensions.

Afghanistan’s northern and eastern neighbors—including China, India (with Kashmir lying between the two), and Pakistan—often meddle in the country’s internal affairs.

China’s Strategic Expansion in Afghanistan

China’s rising footprint in Afghanistan is clear from its push to tap into the country’s vast mineral wealth. With rich reserves of natural resources, northern Afghanistan is now seen by Beijing as part of its own backyard.

Northern Afghanistan’s mountainous regions are rich in natural resources.

After the Taliban captured power on August 31, 2021, China reportedly cooperated with the group to track down and neutralize anti-Taliban resistance fighters, ensuring uninterrupted access to Afghanistan’s natural resources.

Evidence indicates that Beijing is systematically extracting Afghanistan’s mineral resources, retaining most of the profits while granting Taliban leaders and officials only limited concessions. Although these sums may appear substantial to the Taliban, they represent only a fraction of the minerals’ true value and fall far short of what Afghanistan could gain under fairer market conditions.

We have examined this issue in several of our previous articles:

Taliban sells off Afghanistan's natural resources to enrich themselves

Can the NRF Defeat the Taliban?

Challenging the Narrative: Afghan Resistance in the Face of the Taliban - Part 1 

The Chinese government is accused of underpaying for mineral rights, purchasing resources at a fraction of their true worth, and effectively stealing Afghanistan’s resources while backing the Taliban regime. The Taliban leadership, largely illiterate and politically naive, fails to grasp that China’s primary interest is economic gain, not genuine partnership or development.

U.S. Engagement and the Battle for Bagram

On September 13, 2025, U.S. envoys Zalmay Khalilzad and Adam Boehler paid yet another visit to the Taliban in Kabul, Afghanistan, ostensibly to negotiate the release of American captives. The Taliban published several pictures of the meeting:

 

Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi greets U.S. Envoy Adam Boehler in Kabul, Afghanistan

 

U.S. delegation (left) negotiating with Taliban officials (right)

 

Khalilzad (left), Boehler (center), Mullah Abdul-Ghani Baradar (right)

This was Khalilzad’s second such visit under the guise of freeing American captives of the Taliban. The first one was in March 2025, just a few weeks after Donald Trump was elected President of the USA. But behind closed doors, the real objective was likely to regain control of Bagram Airfield—a strategic military asset abandoned by the U.S. in 2021.

Following these negotiations, President Donald Trump publicly reiterated his desire to reclaim Bagram, warning the Taliban that “bad things are going to happen,” if the base was not handed back.

 

Bagram is located north of Kabul, Afghanistan.

Trump’s statements, made in a Truth Social post, underscore the ongoing American interest in re-establishing a foothold in Afghanistan, despite the Taliban’s control.

In an October 14, 2025 analysis of the recent Taliban–Pakistan clashes, Indian journalist P. K. Balachandran argued that Pakistan could use its influence in Washington to draw the U.S. into confronting the Taliban. He noted that Trump, already pressuring the Taliban over Bagram, might prove receptive—particularly given his interest in the region’s mineral wealth, valued at an estimated US$7 trillion.

The last passage of Balachandran's article - published on October 14, 2025.

Washington is acutely aware of Afghanistan’s resource wealth after two decades of presence there, as well as the Taliban’s growing trade with China. This has raised alarm among U.S. policymakers. Bill Roggio, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, told Fox News: "The growing Taliban-Chinese relationship is something we should worry about. The Chinese can give the Taliban access to technology — military technology. They (the Taliban) could give them the resources that they need."

Fox News further reported that Roggio cautioned a major mining agreement could channel billions of dollars to the Taliban, bolstering the regime’s financial and military strength.

Despite these concerns, President Trump does not appear intent on pursuing regime change in Afghanistan. As noted earlier, his threats against the Taliban have centered on the return of Bagram Airfield to U.S. control. This approach reflects a strategy of psychological pressure rather than an outright push to depose the regime. In fact, Trump may even be prepared to recognize the Taliban govenment—much like Russia has—if it permits the U.S. to re-establish a military presence at Bagram as an initial step. Subsequent actions would likely involve leveraging further pressure to secure a share of Afghanistan’s resources.

Russia's and China’s Shared Interests: Opposing U.S. Presence

While the United States seeks to reassert influence, Russia and China are determined to keep it out. Russia fears destabilization of its post-Soviet allies, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which could become destabilized by U.S. military activity. Meanwhile, China is fixated on Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, aiming to dominate resource extraction without sharing. The Taliban and their Pashtun allies provide China with unfettered access to these resources, often without any conditions or regional restrictions.

Khalilzad’s Double Game and Regional Alliances

Khalilzad’s strategy appears to be a delicate balancing act. While presenting himself as a defender of U.S. interests, he is also seen as discreetly encouraging the Taliban to sustain regional alliances that secure their hold on power. His goal seems to be fostering a Taliban proxy that aligns with Washington’s broader regional goals, even as the Taliban’s actual loyalties remain uncertain.

India’s Evolving Role and Increased Engagement

India’s regional position has shifted dramatically. After losing a military confrontation with Pakistan, in May 2025, which saw missile strikes and escalating violence, India has moved to recalibrate its strategy. Pakistan allegedly fought with Chinese military help.

In October 2025, India took part in the 7th Moscow Format Talks on Afghanistan. Founded by Russia in 2017, the forum aims to foster dialogue among Afghanistan’s regional neighbors. The original members were Russia, India, Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Pakistan, with Central Asian countries like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan joining later to expand its diplomatic scope.

 

The Times of India reported on the Moscow Format on October 8, 2025. 

During this meeting, India joined the statement of the members, which “called unacceptable the attempts by countries to deploy their military infrastructure in Afghanistan and neighbouring states, since this does not serve the interests of regional peace and stability”, as published by the Russian foreign ministry.

This marked a significant shift, indicating India’s desire to counterbalance Pakistani influence and U.S. dominance.

Taliban Diplomacy and Pakistan’s Frustration

In a notable development, Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi visited India shortly after the Moscow talks on October 9, 2025.

 

Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi (left) with Indian counterpart S. Jaishankar (right)

While Muttaqi was still in New Delhi, Pakistan launched a drone attack on Kabul, targeting Pakistani Taliban (TTP) leaders.

This attack suggests growing frustration and suspicion from Pakistan toward the Taliban, which increasingly aligns itself with India and regional powers opposed to Pakistan’s interests.

Pakistan’s anger stems from the Taliban’s perceived disloyalty—alliances with India threaten Pakistan’s strategic aims and regional influence. Pakistan's army even accused India of using Afghanistan as an operational base. Historically, Pakistan was instrumental in supporting the Taliban’s rise, but recent betrayals and shifting allegiances have begun to undermine that relationship. Pakistan now fears that the Taliban’s actions could cause severe harm to its own security and regional stability. Moreover, Taliban's roots are also in Deoband, India, as the Taliban follow the rsdical Deobandi branch of Sunni Hanafi Islam. Therefore, Muttaqi also paid a visit to Deoband, India.

 

India's NDTV reported on Muttaqi's scheduled visit to Deoband, India

A Tense Future in Afghanistan

The situation remains volatile, with the Taliban caught between competing regional and global interests. While China seeks to exploit Afghanistan’s resources and prevent U.S. influence, India aims to counterbalance Pakistan’s regional dominance and is tricked by China to join its anti-American alliance.

Pakistan now appears to regret its earlier support for the Taliban. In an article published on 9 April 2024 by the UK-based platform RUSI, Pakistani military and security analyst Kamal Alam argues that Islamabad is confronting the consequences of policies it once actively pursued: "As Pakistan battles to put out fires that it arguably lit – principally the re-emergence of the Taliban – it seems without allies in Afghanistan once again. From Pashtun nationalists to the Baloch and the recent tensions with Iran, all point to grave errors in Pakistan’s Afghan policy over the last four decades.”

 

The article on Pakistan's biggest mistake in Afghanistan from April 9, 2024.

In conclusion, Alam writes:

“When it comes to Pakistan’s own endgame, ironically, more than 20 years after Massoud’s assassination, its own Frankensteinian monster that is the Taliban is busy waging a war against the Pakistani state by supporting its worst enemies, including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and Islamic State – Khorasan Province. Pashtun and Baloch nationalism also continue to threaten Pakistan as they always have since 1947. Ironically, the north of Afghanistan would have been and remains the best bet for Pakistan to pressure the Taliban. Whilst Pakistan cannot undo the mistakes of the past, they have an opportunity to learn from the warnings of Massoud i.e. that the war would soon overtake Pakistan if it doesn’t correct its Taliban policy. “

Exploitation Over Governance: The Taliban, Geopolitics, and the Afghan People

The Taliban, lacking political sophistication, often fall prey to manipulation from more powerful actors. Many increasingly see them as pawns in a larger geopolitical game. They fail to recognize that once Afghanistan’s natural resources are depleted, the country will face severe economic hardship. Blinded by self-interest, the Taliban prioritize personal gain while allowing the Afghan people to go hungry. To advance their objectives, they have intensified recruitment efforts among the country’s poorest communities, now concentrated in Panjshir.
The humanitarian situation remains dire: In October 2025, the Taliban-run Department of Information and Culture admitted that nearly 6,000 women and children in Panjshir are suffering from malnutrition—even as the region’s valuable resources, such as Panjshiri emeralds, are being sold at discounted prices under Taliban control.

 

Emerald Crystals in a Panjshiri Mine

Fierce Fighting on Afghan-Pakistan Border Leaves Dozens Dead

The long-simmering geopolitical rivalry reached a flashpoint on the night of October 11–12, 2025, when fierce clashes erupted between the Taliban and the Pakistani Army along the Afghan–Pakistan border. Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid claimed that 58 Pakistani soldiers were killed. Pakistan, however, reported that “dozens of Afghan fighters and Khawarij” were killed in the fighting, insisting that Taliban forces eventually retreated after abandoning several positions.

Taliban patrol with U.S. military vehicles in Shorabak district

near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border on 12 October.

Islamabad frequently uses the term Khawarij to describe the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), and in this case extended it to the Afghan Taliban as well. By contrast, it labels the Balochistan Liberation Front—a separatist group fighting for independence, which Pakistan alleges is supported by India (Hindustan)—as Fitna al-Hindustan. What is striking, however, is the contradiction in Pakistan’s stance: while it backs Taliban rule in Afghanistan, it strongly rejects the possibility of the group wielding power within its own borders.

The clashes abruptly ended on October 12 after Saudi Arabia and Qatar stepped in to de-escalate tensions, with appeals from Qatar and Saudi Arabia prompting the Taliban to halt attacks against Pakistan.

The BBC reported on October 12, 2025, with an in-depth article

covering the clashes between Pakistan and the Taliban and their context

Still, regional analysts argue that the Gulf states are less concerned with the fate of either Pakistan or the Taliban, and more focused on advancing their own strategic agendas. Riyadh appears intent on drawing Pakistan into its new security arrangements, while Doha is seen as cultivating ties with the Taliban to strengthen its influence and promote Sunni interests across the region.

Conclusion

Afghanistan’s future remains uncertain, and the stability of the broader region will largely hinge on how major powers manage their competing interests through a combination of diplomacy, conflict, and resource competition. Positioned at the crossroads of Asia, Afghanistan has long been of strategic significance—a fact even acknowledged by the renowned poet Mohammad Iqbal in his writings. The country’s current decline can be attributed to multiple factors: the Taliban’s narrow pursuit of self-interest, the nationalist and exclusivist agendas of Pashtun elites, and the intersecting geopolitical rivalries of the United States, Russia, and China.

 

The Taliban are growing increasingly uneasy as drones continue to hover over Kabul.

Anyone who regards the Taliban as an ally is making a mistake—whether it be Russia, India, Pakistan, or the United States. As Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib (600–661 CE) is often quoted: “A wise enemy is better than a foolish friend.” In the current situation, the Taliban and Khalilzad are simply buying time, while China emerges as the biggest beneficiary by drawing India closer and positioning itself to exploit Afghanistan’s natural resources. Meanwhile, the United States, Pakistan, and once again the Afghan people, end up as the losers in this new game of China and Taliban.

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Notes

-Bagram Airfield, formerly the largest U.S. military base in Afghanistan, is now under Taliban control. The facility is believed to benefit from strategic guidance provided either by China or by former Pashtun engineers linked to the Karzai and Ghani governments, reflecting the broader shift in regional power dynamics.

-India is home to a significant Pashtun, or Pathan, population, with communities primarily concentrated in states such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. Many of these families have lived in the subcontinent for centuries, gradually blending into local cultures through a long process of indigenization. While the surname "Khan" is commonly associated with them, the community is diverse and often indistinguishable from other Indian Muslim groups. Today, Pashtuns are predominantly Urdu-speaking and represent the fourth-largest Muslim community in India.
The historical presence of Pashtuns in India is deeply rooted, stretching back several centuries. One of the most notable figures in this history is Ahmad Shah Durrani, also known as Ahmad Shah Abdali, the founder of the Durrani Empire. Between 1748 and 1767, he launched several invasions into Punjab and northern India. His most renowned triumph was at the Third Battle of Panipat in 1761, where his forces decisively defeated the Marathas, dealing a significant blow to their expanding power. However, despite these military victories, Durrani was unable to establish lasting control over India. Resistance from the Sikhs, coupled with the sheer vastness of the territory, limited his ability to consolidate his conquests.