Afghanistan’s Wealth, China’s Ambitions and America’s Costly Retreat
Afghanistan is a country of immense natural wealth and widespread human hardship. Beneath its mountains lie deposits of copper, iron ore, gold and other valuable resources that could contribute to long-term economic development. Yet millions of Afghans continue to struggle with poverty, while the country’s political future remains in the hands of an unelected Taliban regime.
(Panjshir Valley. Photo by Mohammad Rahmani/Unsplash. Afghanistan possesses valuable natural resources worth billions of dollars, yet much of its population continues to face poverty and hardship.Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Afghanistan’s mineral wealth has become an increasingly important source of potential revenue and foreign interest. China, with its industrial capacity, financial resources and demand for raw materials, is particularly well positioned to benefit. But Beijing is not entering Afghanistan out of charity. It is pursuing its own economic and strategic interests, and there is little reason to assume that the prosperity of ordinary Afghans will be its priority.
The situation raises an uncomfortable question for Washington, too. After twenty years of military involvement, enormous expenditure and extensive efforts to support Afghanistan’s development, the United States withdrew, leaving the country’s future increasingly shaped by the Taliban and competing regional powers. Donald Trump and Joe Biden made different decisions, but both administrations deserve scrutiny for the consequences of America’s departure.
Table of Contents
1. China’s Opportunity and Afghanistan’s Vulnerability
2. The Fight for Afghanistan's Wealth
3. Obama, Trump, Biden and America’s Strategic Failure
Conclusion: A Wealthy Country, but for Whom?
1. China’s Opportunity and Afghanistan’s Vulnerability
China knows how to pursue long-term economic and strategic advantages. Its companies have pursued major projects in Afghanistan, including the Mes Aynak copper deposit and oil extraction in the north. Beijing can use its financial resources, industrial expertise and negotiating experience to seek favourable terms in a country desperate for investment and revenue. The Taliban, by contrast, have failed to demonstrate the competence, transparency and long-term economic vision required to manage Afghanistan’s natural resources in the public interest. Their government needs money and international partners, while its lack of public accountability leaves Afghans with little ability to scrutinise the agreements made in their name.
This imbalance creates an opportunity for China. Beijing can pursue its interests patiently while the Taliban seek immediate revenue and political advantage. If the Afghan authorities negotiate poorly or accept inadequate safeguards, the long-term costs could fall on Afghanistan while foreign companies secure valuable commercial opportunities. This does not mean every Chinese investment is automatically exploitative, or that China has already extracted all the wealth it seeks. Major projects have faced delays and practical obstacles. But the danger is clear: China is positioned to pursue its own interests with far greater expertise and strategic patience than the Taliban have demonstrated in protecting Afghanistan’s national interests. China should therefore be judged by the actual terms of its agreements, the revenues Afghanistan receives and the benefits delivered to local communities—not simply by promises of investment.
2. The Fight for Afghanistan’s Wealth
The Taliban present mining as a way to generate revenue and develop the economy. But revenue for the authorities does not necessarily mean prosperity for the population. Who owns the companies receiving mining licences? What royalties and taxes must they pay? Are contracts published and independently audited? How much money reaches public accounts, and how much benefits powerful interests? What protections exist for workers, local communities, water supplies and the environment?
Without transparency, Afghanistan risks seeing its resources extracted while ordinary people remain poor. The Taliban’s lack of accountability makes this danger particularly serious. China, meanwhile, has little incentive to accept less favourable terms out of concern for Afghanistan’s long-term development if the authorities are willing to grant concessions that serve Beijing’s interests. Afghanistan’s natural wealth belongs to its people—not to the Taliban leadership, Chinese companies or any other foreign power. Transparent contracts, fair taxation, independent oversight and enforceable environmental standards are essential if mining is to contribute to national development rather than deepen the country’s dependence.
3. Obama, Trump, Biden and America’s Strategic Failure
The story of America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan did not begin with Donald Trump or Joe Biden. Its roots go back to Barack Obama, whose administration began a major drawdown of American forces in 2011 and set a timetable for transferring security responsibility to Afghan forces. After the killing of Osama bin Laden in May 2011, Obama presented the operation as a major achievement in the fight against al-Qaeda and argued that the United States could begin bringing its troops home. Yet the broader challenge was never limited to bin Laden. It included preventing terrorist groups from using Afghanistan as a safe haven, containing the Taliban insurgency and building Afghan security forces capable of defending their own country. Whether the strategy of progressively reducing America’s military commitment gave sufficient weight to these wider objectives remains an important question.
Obama did not withdraw all American forces, and his administration continued military and financial support for Afghanistan. Nevertheless, his drawdown established an important precedent: America’s military presence would not be open-ended, and Afghan forces would increasingly be expected to take responsibility for the country’s security. The underlying assumption was that the Afghan state could eventually stand on its own. The collapse of that state in 2021 exposed how fragile that assumption had proved to be. Donald Trump took the next decisive step. His administration negotiated the February 2020 Doha Agreement with the Taliban, committing the United States to withdraw its forces and setting the process in motion. The agreement was negotiated without the Afghan government as a party to the deal. Joe Biden subsequently decided to proceed with the withdrawal and completed it in August 2021, amid the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and the Taliban’s return to power.
The decisions leading to America’s withdrawal were also shaped by influential political figures and regional actors whose interests did not necessarily align with those of the United States or the Afghan Republic. Zalmay Khalilzad, the Afghan-born American diplomat who negotiated the Doha Agreement, had advocated renewed U.S. engagement with the Taliban as early as 1996. His role in negotiating the 2020 agreement deserves scrutiny, particularly because the Afghan government was not a party to the deal. Hamid Karzai, too, had long advocated negotiations with the Taliban. Although peace talks are not the same as supporting a Taliban takeover, these approaches raise an important question: did Washington adequately consider whether negotiations centred on the Taliban would undermine the Afghan government and weaken those Afghans who had fought alongside the United States?
Pakistan’s role is equally important. For decades, Pakistan’s security establishment has supported the Taliban while seeking strategic influence over Afghanistan and limiting India’s influence there. The unresolved Durand Line dispute and Islamabad’s concerns about Pashtun nationalism have also shaped its policy: Pakistan has had reasons to favour a government in Kabul that is friendly to Islamabad and less likely to challenge its border claims. Meanwhile, some Afghan Pashtun nationalists have pursued their own visions of political power, which should not be confused with the views of all Pashtuns or assumed to be identical to Pakistan’s objectives. Gulf states have also pursued relationships with the Taliban, but their policies differ; Qatar has played a diplomatic role, while the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have followed distinct approaches shaped by their own security and economic interests. These overlapping interests complicated the conflict and the peace process. Washington needed to assess them carefully rather than assume that every actor involved in negotiations shared its objectives of a stable, secure and representative Afghanistan.
Responsibility therefore cannot be placed on one president alone. Obama initiated the major drawdown; Trump negotiated the agreement that set the timetable for full withdrawal; and Biden carried out the final departure. Each administration made decisions that shaped the eventual outcome, and each deserves scrutiny over whether it adequately considered the consequences for Afghanistan’s institutions, its people and America’s long-term interests. The United States had spent twenty years in Afghanistan at enormous financial and human cost. American funding and international assistance supported schools, hospitals, roads, infrastructure, public institutions and development programmes. The United States also provided educational opportunities and resettled many Afghans who had worked with American forces and organisations or faced serious risks. These efforts were imperfect, and much of the investment failed to produce a durable political outcome, but they represented a substantial commitment to Afghanistan and its people. Then America left, and the Afghan government collapsed.
In an opinion article published in The Washington Post on 22 October 2026, retired U.S. Army Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg warns that China is expanding its influence in Afghanistan while the United States risks treating the country as a closed chapter. His concern goes beyond the loss of American influence following the 2021 withdrawal. Afghanistan possesses substantial deposits of copper, lithium, iron ore and other minerals that are important to modern industry and national defence. As the United States seeks to reduce its dependence on China for critical minerals, the question of who gains access to Afghanistan’s largely undeveloped resources has direct implications for American economic and strategic interests. Chinese companies are pursuing commercial relationships and mining opportunities under Taliban rule, potentially positioning themselves to benefit for decades. Kellogg also highlights Afghanistan’s geographical importance: its location connects Central and South Asia and places it near China, Iran and other influential regional powers. In his assessment, Beijing understands the long-term value of this position, while Washington risks overlooking it.
A further nuance concerns the author’s framing. Beijing is not simply maintaining a presence in Afghanistan; it has continued to expand its economic and strategic engagement under Taliban rule since 2021, and this expansion is ongoing. The long-term consequences could prove more damaging to American interests if Beijing gains lasting economic leverage and strengthens its regional position while Washington remains disengaged. The issue is therefore not merely that China is “still there,” but that America’s departure created new opportunities for Beijing to strengthen its position at the United States’ expense.
Beyond the competition with China, Kellogg raises a broader concern: Afghanistan’s security and political future remain important to American interests. He also questions whether the Taliban can provide the political stability, reliable institutions and international relationships necessary for lasting economic development. He points to continuing security threats, including the presence of al-Qaeda and other extremist organisations, as well as the risks posed by instability in the region. At the same time, he argues that Afghanistan still has experienced public servants, business leaders and political figures who could contribute to an alternative future. He specifically describes the Afghanistan Freedom Movement and its efforts to bring opposition voices together around a common political platform. Kellogg calls on Washington to engage credible Afghan political representatives, assess their ability to build a broad base of support and use diplomatic, economic and financial instruments to maintain pressure on the Taliban. Crucially, he argues that this approach need not involve sending American troops back into Afghanistan or repeating the previous nation-building mission. His central point is that withdrawal from a military conflict should not mean abandoning every diplomatic or strategic interest in the country.
This argument is particularly relevant to the Afghan resistance. Five years after the American withdrawal, opposition to Taliban rule has not disappeared. Afghan resistance groups continue to struggle, demonstrating that some Afghans remain determined to challenge the political order imposed on their country. Yet their continued existence should not be confused with having the resources or support needed to succeed. Resistance fighters face enormous disadvantages, and reports of commanders and fighters being killed raise concerns about whether these groups can maintain their leadership, organisational networks and ability to operate. If they are progressively weakened while the international community remains disengaged, the prospect of an organised political and military challenge to Taliban rule could diminish further.
The contrast is striking. America bore the costs of a long military campaign and supported development efforts, while China now has an opportunity to pursue its own commercial and strategic interests. The United States never owned Afghanistan’s natural resources and had no right to claim them as repayment. But it did have a strategic interest in preventing the country from once again becoming a haven for terrorism and a prize in a regional struggle for influence. America risks damaging its own long-term interests. If China secures favourable access to Afghanistan’s resources while Washington’s influence remains diminished, Beijing may benefit from circumstances shaped in part by successive American decisions. The United States cannot undo its withdrawal, but it can reassess its policy and recognise that Afghanistan has not ceased to matter simply because American troops have left.
Conclusion: A Wealthy Country, but for Whom?
Afghanistan must not become a country whose resources enrich foreign companies and an unaccountable ruling elite while its population remains impoverished. China is pursuing its own interests; the Taliban have failed to demonstrate that they can adequately protect the interests of the Afghan people; and the United States must confront the consequences of its withdrawal. America invested heavily in Afghanistan but failed to secure a lasting political outcome. China, by contrast, can now pursue its interests without having borne the same twenty-year burden. If Beijing secures valuable resources on favourable terms while Afghans see little benefit, the strategic failure will be even more painful for Washington—and the human cost will fall most heavily on Afghans themselves.
The essential question is not simply how much of Afghanistan’s mineral wealth China can secure. It is whether the Afghan people will receive a fair share—or once again pay the price while others reap the rewards. Afghanistan’s wealth should be a foundation for its people’s future, not a prize for foreign powers and those who rule without their consent.
Sources and Further Reading
Keith Kellogg, “The U.S. left Afghanistan. China’s still there.”The Washington Post, 22 October 2026.
North-Afghanistan, “The Plunder of Afghanistan: Resource Extraction Under the Taliban.” Originally published 4 February 2025; updated 8 August 2026.
North-Afghanistan, “China, Russia, India, and the Taliban: Geopolitics and Resource Rivalries in Afghanistan.” October 2025.
North-Afghanistan, “The Taliban's Systematic Destruction of Afghanistan.” 23 September 2023.
North-Afghanistan, “From Badakhshan to Nuristan: Afghanistan’s Anti-Taliban Resistance Gains Momentum.” Published 27 September 2026; updated 30 September 2026.
North-Afghanistan, “Zalmay Khalilzad: Navigating U.S. Diplomacy and Taliban Relations.” Published 10 April 2025; updated 13 August 2025.
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