Haibatullah Akhundzada: The Taliban Leader No One Can Find
Meanwhile, the Taliban has imposed a system of repression that has stripped Afghan women and girls of fundamental rights, excluded women from public life and suppressed political opposition. The International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants against senior Taliban figures, including Akhundzada, over alleged persecution as a crime against humanity. Yet international engagement with the regime continues. Russia has gone further, formally recognizing the Taliban government in 2025 and deepening its diplomatic contacts. In October 2026, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov praised Taliban rule as successful while declaring a NATO military presence in Afghanistan and neighboring countries unacceptable. The contrast is difficult to ignore: Moscow is prepared to endorse the Taliban's governance while the regime's treatment of Afghans remains at the center of international condemnation.
But Russia is not the only power pursuing interests in Afghanistan. China seeks security and economic opportunities, Pakistan is entangled in a deteriorating relationship with the movement it once supported, and Western governments continue to grapple with the consequences of their withdrawal. Some Afghans go further, suspecting that the Taliban itself is a project of foreign intelligence agencies. These questions cannot be separated from one another. Who actually exercises power within the Taliban? Why is its supreme leader so difficult to access? What do foreign governments gain from dealing with the regime? And could the competition for influence over Afghanistan turn a largely low-intensity conflict into a wider confrontation? The Taliban's return to power did not end Afghanistan's struggle over its future. It changed the actors, the balance of power and the methods through which that struggle is being fought.
1. Haibatullah Akhundzada: The Missing Emir
1.2 A Leader Beyond Public Scrutiny
2. The International Case Against the Taliban
2.1 Beyond the Arrest Warrants
2.2 Diplomacy Without Accountability?
3. Who Really Controls the Taliban?
3.1 Pakistan and the Intelligence Question
3.2 The CIA Connection: Suspicion and Evidence
3.3 The Mystery Behind the Emir
4. Moscow and the Taliban
4.3 What Moscow Gains—and What It Helps Normalize
5. Afghanistan's New Great Game
5.2 Pakistan: A Former Patron Confronts a Dangerous Neighbor
5.3 Iran, Central Asia and the West: Security Without Resolution
5.4 Afghanistan as a Battleground of Competing Interests
6. From a Cold Conflict to a Hot One
6.2 Pakistan, IS-K and the Risk of Regional Escalation
6.3 Foreign Powers, Information Warfare and the Risk of a Wider Conflict
7. Conclusion: Who Is Shaping Afghanistan's Future?
Haibatullah Akhundzada is presented by the Taliban as Afghanistan’s supreme religious and political authority. Yet, more than five years after the movement returned to power, he remains remarkably difficult for the outside world to observe or independently track. Taliban ministers receive foreign delegations, conduct diplomacy and travel abroad. Akhundzada, by contrast, maintains an exceptionally low public profile. Information about his activities comes largely from Taliban announcements or accounts by people who claim to have met him. Publicly verifiable evidence of his direct contact with foreign officials remains scarce.
This is more than a matter of personal secrecy. The Taliban demands recognition of its authority over Afghanistan while keeping its most powerful figure largely out of public view. If Akhundzada is the ultimate decision-maker, how can outsiders establish how he exercises his authority? And if other officials increasingly conduct the movement’s international relations, where does their authority end—and his begin?
Akhundzada became the Taliban’s supreme leader in May 2016, following the death of Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike in Pakistan. Previously known mainly as a religious scholar and senior Taliban judge, he assumed the title Amir al-Mu’minin, or Commander of the Faithful, after the Taliban returned to power in August 2021. This title places him at the top of the Islamic Emirate’s religious and political hierarchy. Unlike Taliban ministers who regularly appear in public, Akhundzada has remained largely out of sight, primarily associated with Kandahar, the movement’s principal religious and political centre.
One of his few widely reported public appearances took place in October 2021, when Taliban officials announced that he had visited the Darul Uloom Hakimah religious school in Kandahar. Presented as his first public appearance since becoming leader, the event produced no publicly released photographs or video. Instead, the Taliban circulated approximately ten minutes of audio featuring a voice identified as Akhundzada addressing the gathering. His absence has fuelled speculation about his whereabouts, including rumours of his death. The Taliban has rejected such reports and continued issuing statements in his name. Nevertheless, official assurances provide limited opportunities for independent verification. The question is not simply whether the Taliban says Akhundzada is in charge, but how much the outside world can establish about a leader whose authority is presented as supreme.
1.1 Limited Contact with Foreign OfficialsSince the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021, no publicly available photograph or video has independently established that Akhundzada met a foreign official. Several encounters have been reported, but publicly accessible evidence remains limited. In May 2023, Al Jazeera and Reuters reported that Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, had met Akhundzada in Kandahar. Qatar had played an important role in facilitating contacts between the Taliban and foreign governments, including during the diplomatic process preceding the US withdrawal. Yet no photograph or video of the reported encounter was publicly released, and detailed information about the meeting remained scarce.
A second encounter was reported in January 2024, when Pakistani politician and religious leader Maulana Fazlur Rehman travelled to Afghanistan. Rehman’s office said that he had met Akhundzada, and the Associated Press described the encounter as the second publicly known meeting between the supreme leader and a foreign figure since the Taliban’s return to power. The Taliban did not publicly confirm the meeting, and its location was not disclosed. The absence of images does not prove that either meeting failed to take place. It does, however, highlight how difficult it is to independently verify contact with Akhundzada—even when the reported encounters involve prominent figures from countries with close ties to the Taliban.
Meanwhile, Pakistani, Qatari, Chinese, Russian and other officials regularly engage with Taliban ministers and senior representatives. Diplomatic contacts are announced and delegations are received, yet direct access to the supreme leader remains exceptionally difficult to document publicly. Who can reach the man at the top of the Taliban hierarchy? Who conveys foreign governments’ messages to him, and who communicates his decisions to ministries and provincial authorities? These questions go to the heart of how power operates within the Islamic Emirate. A government cannot be understood solely through the officials who appear at diplomatic meetings; it must also be understood through the people who make decisions and the channels through which those decisions are transmitted.
1.2 A Leader Beyond Public ScrutinyThe limited public record of Akhundzada’s movements raises another question: why has his absence attracted less sustained international attention than that of some other political leaders? In 2026, the whereabouts and status of Iran’s Mojtaba Khamenei generated considerable international reporting. Akhundzada’s continued absence from public view has received comparatively less scrutiny. The situations are not identical, but the contrast is worth examining. Why does so little independently verifiable information emerge about the movements and foreign contacts of the man presented as Afghanistan’s supreme authority?
Security concerns may explain part of his isolation. The Taliban may also prefer to shield him from routine diplomatic activity, allowing other officials to manage foreign relations while preserving his religious authority. But these possibilities do not resolve the central problem: the less accessible Akhundzada is, the harder it becomes to determine how decisions are made and who genuinely influences them. The distinction between Kandahar and Kabul is particularly relevant. Kabul houses much of the government’s formal administration and international diplomatic activity, while Akhundzada is closely associated with Kandahar, from where major religious and political directives have been issued. This arrangement does not prove that he is controlled by another figure or that a power struggle exists. It does, however, raise questions about the relationship between the supreme leader and the officials who run the government day to day.
Nor can it simply be assumed that ministers meeting foreign delegations possess full authority to negotiate on every issue. They may represent the regime internationally while remaining subject to decisions made elsewhere. Equally, Akhundzada’s formal position does not by itself establish that he personally directs every government action. The relationship between formal authority and practical decision-making requires evidence. The contradiction remains stark: the Taliban seeks international engagement while its supreme leader remains largely inaccessible to independent public scrutiny. The reported meetings with foreign figures may have occurred, but the lack of publicly available documentation makes it difficult to assess the extent of his direct diplomatic contact.
The missing emir is therefore more than an elusive individual. His absence raises fundamental questions about transparency, accountability and the distribution of power within the Taliban. As foreign governments expand their dealings with the movement, understanding who actually makes its decisions becomes increasingly important—particularly when the regime’s leadership faces serious allegations of human-rights abuses.
2. The International Case Against the TalibanThe question of Akhundzada’s authority becomes even more serious when considered alongside the allegations against the regime he leads. The Taliban has imposed sweeping restrictions on women and girls, suppressed dissent and faced repeated accusations of arbitrary detention, torture and other abuses. These are not merely criticisms of its political system. They have become the subject of international investigations and criminal proceedings.
On 8 July 2025, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued an arrest warrant for Akhundzada and Abdul Hakim Haqqani, the Taliban’s chief justice. On 5 October 2026, the Court unsealed warrants against two further senior figures, Habibullah Agha and Neda Mohammad Nadim. The proceedings concern the alleged crime against humanity of persecution on gender and political grounds. The ICC alleges that the persecution targeted women and girls, people who did not conform to the Taliban’s gender policies, and those perceived as allies of women and girls. The Court’s findings describe conduct connected with imprisonment, torture, rape, murder and enforced disappearance.
An arrest warrant is not a conviction. It means that judges found reasonable grounds to believe that the legal requirements for issuing the warrant had been met. Akhundzada and the other individuals remain at large, and the warrants depend on cooperation from states for their execution. Nevertheless, the proceedings represent a serious international legal challenge to the Taliban’s leadership. The man presented as Afghanistan’s supreme authority is not merely an elusive figure: he is accused by an international court of responsibility for persecution as a crime against humanity.
2.1 Beyond the Arrest WarrantsThe case against the Taliban extends beyond the four individuals named in these proceedings. Since returning to power in August 2021, the movement has systematically restricted women’s and girls’ access to education, employment and public life. It has also curtailed freedom of expression and political opposition. Journalists, former government personnel, activists and members of ethnic and religious minorities have faced threats and abuses. These restrictions are not isolated incidents; they form part of the system through which the Taliban governs.
A further question concerns individual accountability. The number of senior figures currently subject to ICC arrest warrants is small compared with the much larger number of Taliban members and commanders accused of abuses. The Court’s Afghanistan investigation has covered alleged crimes by multiple parties to the conflict, including the Taliban and Islamic State-Khorasan Province. Establishing individual criminal responsibility requires evidence linking specific people to particular crimes, but that requirement should not become an excuse for overlooking allegations against those who exercised authority on the ground.
Videos, photographs and social-media posts may help document abuses, including the mistreatment of detainees or the display of bodies after attacks. Some material may provide valuable evidence; other content may be misleading, manipulated or circulated as propaganda. Each item must therefore be authenticated and placed in context. The answer to propaganda is not to dismiss all online evidence, but to investigate it rigorously and preserve material that can establish what happened and who was responsible.
2.2 Diplomacy Without Accountability?The international response presents an uncomfortable contradiction. The Taliban’s leaders face serious allegations, yet foreign governments continue to meet its representatives, negotiate with its authorities and expand diplomatic contacts. Some engagement may be necessary to address humanitarian needs, security threats or practical matters affecting Afghans. But engagement can also bring political benefits to a regime seeking acceptance without fundamental changes to its conduct. The distinction matters. Communicating with Taliban officials is not the same as endorsing their rule. Nor should humanitarian assistance to Afghans be confused with political support for the Taliban. Governments must nevertheless explain what their engagement is intended to achieve and whether it produces meaningful improvements in the lives and rights of ordinary people.
If diplomatic recognition and access are offered while repression continues, what leverage remains to press for change? And if the international legal process identifies alleged responsibility among senior leaders, how should governments reconcile those proceedings with increasingly normal relations with the regime? The Taliban seeks to be treated as Afghanistan’s legitimate government. Yet legitimacy cannot be reduced to control of territory or the ability to send officials to international meetings. It must also involve accountability for abuses and respect for the rights of the population. The ICC proceedings have placed the conduct of senior Taliban figures under an international legal spotlight. The challenge now is whether the wider international response will take that scrutiny seriously—or allow strategic interests to outweigh the demand for accountability.
3. Who Really Controls the Taliban?
The Taliban presents itself as a unified government under the supreme authority of Haibatullah Akhundzada. In practice, however, the movement is made up of religious leaders, former insurgent commanders, political representatives and networks with different interests and sources of influence. Understanding who controls Afghanistan requires looking beyond official titles and examining how decisions are made—and whether the Taliban is as independent of foreign influence as it claims to be.
Akhundzada holds the title Amir al-Mu’minin, giving him supreme religious and political authority within the Islamic Emirate. Yet much of the government’s day-to-day administration and international diplomacy is conducted by officials based in Kabul, while Akhundzada is closely associated with Kandahar. His decrees have shaped major areas of policy, including the restrictions imposed on women and girls. His limited public presence, however, makes it difficult for outsiders to assess precisely how he directs the government, how other senior figures influence his decisions and how disagreements within the movement are resolved.
This division between formal authority and practical government is important. Taliban ministers may negotiate with foreign governments, but their room for manoeuvre may depend on decisions made by the supreme leader or other influential figures. Conversely, the fact that Akhundzada holds the highest position does not prove that he personally controls every operation or administrative decision. The internal balance of power remains difficult to establish from outside the movement.
3.1 Pakistan and the Intelligence Question
Pakistan’s historical relationship with the Taliban is central to any serious examination of foreign influence over the movement. During the 1990s and the insurgency that followed the US-led intervention in 2001, Pakistan provided political support and maintained links with Taliban networks. Pakistani intelligence services, particularly the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), have repeatedly been accused by Afghan officials and Western observers of supporting the movement. Islamabad has denied controlling the Taliban.
These historical connections raise an unavoidable question: how independent is the Taliban from a state that supported its networks for decades? Pakistan’s influence cannot simply be dismissed, but neither can historical assistance be treated as proof of present-day command. The Taliban has its own leadership, ideological objectives and domestic power base. Its relationship with Pakistan has also deteriorated, particularly over the activities of Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of allowing to operate from Afghan territory. The Taliban denies that it permits Afghan soil to be used to threaten other countries.
This deterioration complicates the idea that the Taliban is merely an instrument of Pakistani policy. A movement can emerge from an environment shaped by foreign support and still pursue objectives that conflict with those of its former patrons. Pakistan’s experience since 2021 illustrates precisely this problem: a government that once regarded the Taliban’s return as a strategic advantage now faces serious security disputes with its neighbour.
3.2 The CIA Connection: Suspicion and Evidence
Some Afghans go further, arguing that the Taliban may be a project of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or that Western intelligence agencies have played a hidden role in the movement’s return to power. Such suspicions should not be ignored simply because they are politically controversial. They reflect the deep distrust created by decades of foreign intervention, covert operations and shifting alliances in Afghanistan. But suspicion is not proof. The historical record of foreign involvement in Afghanistan is extensive, and different states have supported armed groups when doing so served their strategic interests. That history makes it reasonable to investigate questions about covert assistance, intelligence contacts and the circumstances surrounding the Taliban’s return to power. It does not, by itself, establish that the CIA created or controls the Taliban.
The same distinction applies to Pakistan and other external actors. Evidence of past support, contact or cooperation must be separated from evidence of current operational control. To establish that an intelligence service directs the Taliban, one would need credible evidence of command relationships, orders, financing or other forms of control—not merely an apparent political benefit to a foreign government. The central question, therefore, is not simply whether the Taliban is a foreign creation. It is whether its leadership can act independently of the states whose policies and support helped shape the Afghan conflict, and whether particular factions remain vulnerable to external pressure. That question deserves investigation rather than an automatic dismissal of every suspicion or the uncritical acceptance of any conspiracy theory.
3.3 The Mystery Behind the Emir
Akhundzada’s continued absence from public view makes these questions harder to answer. If foreign governments can establish contact with Taliban ministers and senior representatives, why is direct access to the supreme leader so limited? Is this primarily a security measure, a deliberate effort to preserve his religious authority, or a feature of the Taliban’s internal decision-making system? The available public evidence does not establish that Akhundzada is controlled by a foreign intelligence service. Nor does it establish that he personally directs every action taken in the Taliban’s name. What it does reveal is a political system in which the supreme leader holds exceptional formal authority while remaining unusually inaccessible to outside scrutiny. This opacity benefits no one seeking a clear understanding of who governs Afghanistan. It makes it harder to determine which officials can make binding commitments, where responsibility for controversial policies lies and how foreign governments can hold Taliban representatives to their promises.
The question of control is therefore inseparable from the question of accountability. If Akhundzada is the ultimate authority, his role in the regime’s policies deserves scrutiny. If other figures exercise substantial independent power, their influence and responsibilities must also be examined. And if foreign governments exert pressure over particular Taliban networks, that influence should be documented rather than assumed. Afghanistan’s future will depend partly on the internal balance of power within the Taliban, but also on the external relationships that help sustain it. Understanding those relationships is essential to understanding why foreign governments continue to engage with a regime whose policies have brought widespread repression. Russia’s increasingly open partnership with the Taliban provides a particularly revealing case.
4. Moscow and the Taliban
Russia has moved beyond cautious contact with the Taliban to open political endorsement. In July 2025, Moscow became the first country to formally recognize the Taliban government. By October 2026, Russian officials were praising the regime’s performance and expanding military contacts. This is not merely a practical relationship between neighboring powers. It is a deliberate choice to give diplomatic standing to a regime that has stripped Afghan women and girls of fundamental rights and continues to rule without meaningful democratic accountability.
Moscow’s motives are strategic. Afghanistan occupies a crucial position between Central and South Asia, and Russia wants influence over its future, cooperation against Islamic State–Khorasan (IS-K), and leverage over competing foreign powers. But these interests do not require Russia to portray Taliban rule as a success. That is Moscow’s political choice, with consequences for Afghanistan and the international response to Taliban repression.
4.1 Recognition and Political Legitimacy
Russia’s recognition of the Taliban in 2025 was a major diplomatic breakthrough for the movement. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Moscow gave the Taliban an important symbol of international acceptance. The transfer of the Afghan embassy in Russia to Taliban representatives reinforced the practical consequences of that decision. Recognition allows the regime to present itself as an accepted government despite its repression, political exclusion and lack of representative legitimacy. It also signals that strategic interests can outweigh concerns about the treatment of the Afghan population.
At the Moscow Format consultations on 5 October 2026, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov congratulated Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi on what he called Afghanistan’s “liberation” from NATO forces, praised the government’s achievements and described its governance as successful. He also credited military-technical cooperation with the Taliban with contributing to efforts against terrorism and narcotics. Yet territorial control and cooperation on security do not, by themselves, constitute successful or legitimate government. By praising the regime while its restrictions on women and girls remain in force, Moscow helps the Taliban portray international condemnation as hostility from foreign powers rather than a response to its own policies.
4.2 Russia’s Red Line: NATO's Return to Afghanistan
Moscow’s approach combines diplomatic rewards with a clear strategic warning. On 5 October 2026, Lavrov described a renewed NATO military presence in Afghanistan or neighboring countries as “absolutely unacceptable.” The message is clear: Russia is willing to deepen relations with Kabul, but it opposes arrangements that could restore Western military influence in the region. Moscow has not publicly threatened to destroy the Taliban if it crosses this red line, and Lavrov’s statement alone does not establish that Russia would use military force. It does, however, reveal the limits Moscow seeks to place on Afghanistan’s strategic choices.
The relationship has also acquired a more explicit military dimension. In late September and early October 2026, a Taliban defence delegation attended Russia’s Center-2026 strategic military exercises as observers, visited an exhibition of weapons and military equipment, and met representatives from other countries. Reports also described contact with North Korean military representatives. These encounters raise questions about the international networks the Taliban is accessing, but they do not establish a weapons agreement, an operational alliance or Taliban participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine. The documented developments are significant enough without such speculation: Moscow has recognized the Taliban government, praised its rule and opened additional channels for military contact.
4.3 What Moscow Gains—and What It Helps Normalize
Russia gains a partner through which to pursue regional security interests, oppose renewed Western military influence and strengthen its position in Afghanistan. The Taliban, in turn, gains diplomatic recognition, access to military contacts and an opportunity to portray itself as an accepted international actor. Both sides benefit from a relationship that prioritizes strategic cooperation over political reform.
Russia is not solely responsible for the Taliban’s survival, and engagement does not make Moscow responsible for every action taken by the regime. Nevertheless, recognition and public praise are deliberate political choices. When a major power celebrates Taliban governance without making accountability and fundamental rights central to its policy, it weakens pressure for change and reinforces the message that control of territory and usefulness to powerful states can matter more than the rights of the people being governed.
The contradiction is particularly stark when Moscow invokes Afghan sovereignty to oppose Western military influence while declaring which foreign military arrangements it will not tolerate. The Taliban gains room to manoeuvre, while the interests of Afghan women, girls and political opponents remain marginal to the relationship. Russia’s policy illustrates a broader danger: the Taliban can remain repressive at home while gaining acceptance abroad, provided it offers powerful states strategic advantages. The question is how this approach fits into the wider competition involving China, Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia and Western governments—and whether Afghans themselves will continue to have the least influence over their country’s future.
5. Afghanistan’s New Great Game
Afghanistan has once again become an arena in which powerful states pursue strategic advantage while Afghans bear the consequences. Since the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Russia has sought to limit Western influence, China has pursued security and economic opportunities, Pakistan has faced growing threats from militants operating across the border, and Iran and Central Asian states have tried to contain regional instability. Western governments, meanwhile, continue to grapple with the consequences of their withdrawal and the Taliban’s refusal to respect fundamental rights or establish inclusive government.
The central danger is that Afghanistan’s future will be negotiated between foreign capitals and an unelected regime, while Afghans themselves remain largely excluded. Governments speak of security, stability and development, but these objectives can become justifications for cooperation with the Taliban without meaningful demands for political change.
5.1 Russia and China: Influence Without Political Reform
Russia and China have different priorities, but both see opportunities in dealing with the Taliban. Moscow wants to expand its regional influence, prevent a renewed NATO military presence and cooperate against militant threats. Beijing prioritizes security along its western frontier, protection against militant activity and access to regional economic opportunities. Afghanistan’s substantial mineral resources—including copper, iron ore, lithium-bearing deposits and rare-earth elements—add to its strategic importance. Yet projects such as the Chinese-backed Aynak copper development have faced prolonged delays, illustrating how mineral wealth alone cannot guarantee prosperity without investment, infrastructure and stable institutions.
The question is who will benefit if these projects advance. Under Taliban rule, the absence of representative institutions and independent civic oversight raises serious concerns about transparency and public accountability. Foreign governments and companies may secure access to resources while ordinary Afghans have little influence over how the proceeds are distributed. Neither Russian nor Chinese engagement proves that either country controls the Taliban. Their relationships are transactional: both pursue their interests, while the Taliban seeks investment, recognition and partners less inclined to condition cooperation on political reform. The result is a contest for influence in which human rights risk becoming secondary to strategic advantage.
5.2 Pakistan: A Former Patron Confronts a Dangerous Neighbor
Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban exposes the limits of its regional influence. For decades, Pakistani military and intelligence networks were widely reported to have supported the Afghan Taliban, hoping a Taliban-led Afghanistan would provide strategic depth and limit Indian influence. Yet the Taliban’s return has not delivered the security Islamabad expected. The central dispute concerns Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a separate militant organization responsible for attacks inside Pakistan. Islamabad accuses the Afghan Taliban of allowing TTP militants to operate from Afghan territory, while the Taliban denies permitting Afghanistan to be used to threaten other countries.
This deterioration demonstrates that historical support does not guarantee control. The Taliban has its own leadership, ideological commitments and regional calculations. Its historical connections with militant networks do not mean that every group follows its orders, nor that Islamabad can dictate Kabul’s decisions. Meanwhile, border clashes, military operations, restrictions on movement and forced returns impose serious costs on civilians. A former patron and its former ally now face a dangerous confrontation that could widen if cross-border violence intensifies.
5.3 Iran, Central Asia and the West: Security Without Resolution
Iran and the Central Asian states seek to contain militant threats, protect their borders and prevent instability from spreading. Iran must navigate a difficult relationship with a Sunni Islamist movement whose ideology differs sharply from its own, while Tajikistan and other Central Asian governments remain concerned about militant activity and the security of the Afghan border. These pressures encourage continued communication with Kabul. Such contact may be necessary, but it also allows the Taliban to present itself as an indispensable regional partner without resolving the repression and political exclusion that fuel domestic grievances.
Western governments face a different set of problems following their 2021 withdrawal. Counterterrorism, sanctions, humanitarian assistance, migration and the rights of Afghan women and girls remain central concerns. Communication with the Taliban may be necessary to deliver aid, address security threats or negotiate the release of detained citizens. But practical engagement should not be confused with political legitimacy. The withdrawal also left many Afghans who had worked with international forces and institutions exposed to severe risks. Western influence is now more limited, making coherent diplomacy and sustained humanitarian support essential.
5.4 Afghanistan as a Battleground of Competing Interests
The new Great Game is not a simple contest between two unified blocs. Russia and China may share opposition to renewed Western military influence while pursuing different regional priorities. Pakistan wants militant threats contained but cannot assume obedience from the Taliban. Iran and Central Asian states seek stability, while Western governments try to address security and humanitarian concerns with fewer direct levers than before 2021.
The Taliban benefits from these competing agendas. By offering security cooperation, access to resources and diplomatic contact, it can reduce its isolation without fundamentally changing its system of rule. Each foreign power may believe it is gaining leverage, while the regime gains room to manoeuvre between them. Afghanistan can therefore become more diplomatically connected without becoming more accountable, and more economically contested without ensuring that its people share in the benefits.
This is the central danger: foreign governments may compete for influence, minerals and security arrangements while Afghan women, girls and political opponents remain excluded from decisions shaping their future. Afghanistan should not be reduced to a contest over which power gains the strongest foothold. The real test is whether international engagement improves the security and freedom of Afghans—or merely strengthens a regime that has learned to turn geopolitical rivalry to its advantage.
6. From a Cold Conflict to a Hot One
Afghanistan may appear quieter than during decades of foreign intervention and civil war, but the absence of large-scale conventional warfare does not mean the country is at peace. The Taliban controls state institutions and security forces, yet armed opposition persists, militant organizations remain active, and relations with neighboring countries are strained. Beneath the surface lies a volatile combination of repression, resistance and regional competition.
A wider war is not inevitable. The danger is that several conflicts could reinforce one another: resistance groups may seek outside support, Pakistan’s confrontation with the Taliban could intensify, and foreign powers could exploit Afghanistan’s insecurity to expand their influence. A fragmented conflict could become more dangerous if these pressures converge.
6.1 Armed Resistance and the Limits of Taliban Control
The Taliban continues to face armed opposition from groups including the National Resistance Front (NRF) and the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF). Their attacks demonstrate that the return of Taliban rule has not eliminated resistance. However, these groups face substantial military disadvantages, limited resources and difficulties organizing across a country where the Taliban controls the principal institutions of coercion. Publicly available assessments have not established that they control significant territory on a sustained basis or possess the capacity to replace the regime nationally.
Reports of attacks, territorial gains or destroyed military equipment require independent verification. Yet the limited military strength of opposition groups does not mean the grievances behind them have disappeared. The exclusion of women and girls, suppression of dissent and concentration of power leave little room for peaceful political opposition. When political participation is systematically obstructed, some opponents may conclude that armed resistance is their only remaining option. Taliban control should therefore not be confused with national reconciliation.
6.2 Pakistan, IS-K and the Risk of Regional Escalation
One of the most immediate dangers lies along the Afghanistan–Pakistan border. Islamabad accuses the Taliban of allowing the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate from Afghan territory. The Taliban rejects claims that it permits Afghanistan to be used to threaten other countries, while attacks, border clashes and disputes over militant activity have deepened tensions.
Escalation could involve intensified Pakistani strikes inside Afghanistan, Taliban retaliation and diplomatic or material support from outside powers. Neither side necessarily benefits from a prolonged war, but civilian casualties, public pressure and competing claims of sovereignty could make restraint increasingly difficult. The Taliban’s historical connections with militant networks also complicate the situation, although these connections do not prove that every group operates under its command.
The Islamic State–Khorasan Province (IS-K) presents a separate threat. Hostile to the Taliban, it has carried out deadly attacks in Afghanistan and the wider region. Its continued activity undermines the Taliban’s claim to have restored security and creates incentives for foreign governments to cooperate with the regime on counterterrorism. Yet cooperation against IS-K does not resolve questions about Taliban repression or establish that its security institutions are fully effective. Nor should claims that IS-K is controlled by foreign intelligence services be treated as fact without specific evidence.
6.3 Foreign Powers, Information Warfare and the Risk of a Wider Conflict
Afghanistan’s insecurity offers outside powers opportunities to pursue strategic goals through diplomacy, intelligence cooperation, funding or other forms of assistance. Russia seeks closer ties with the Taliban and opposes a renewed NATO military presence. China prioritizes border security and economic interests; Pakistan wants militant threats contained; Iran and Central Asian states seek to prevent instability from spreading across their borders. Western governments remain concerned about terrorism, humanitarian conditions and the consequences of their withdrawal.
These interests do not constitute a single coordinated strategy, and there is no basis for assuming that every foreign government is secretly directing an Afghan faction. Nevertheless, competing assistance and political backing could prolong conflicts by strengthening local actors and reducing incentives for compromise. If foreign governments begin treating Afghan groups primarily as instruments against their rivals, Afghanistan risks becoming a proxy battleground once again.
Information warfare compounds this danger. Taliban supporters have incentives to portray the country as stable, while opposition channels may emphasize Taliban losses or exaggerate their own advances. Foreign actors can amplify narratives that serve their interests, and manipulated imagery or AI-generated content makes verification harder. Unconfirmed claims about attacks or foreign intervention can spread rapidly and influence political decisions. The answer is neither to accept Taliban statements at face value nor to treat opposition claims as established facts, but to distinguish verified events from allegations and seek independent corroboration.
A wider conflict might emerge not through a formal declaration of war but through a chain of retaliatory actions: a major cross-border attack, civilian casualties, expanded foreign assistance to armed groups or a breakdown in communication between regional governments. Three developments would be particularly dangerous: sustained fighting between Pakistan and the Taliban, credible evidence of a substantial expansion in foreign support for Afghan armed opposition, or a major IS-K attack that triggers broader military action. None would automatically cause a regional war, but together they could draw more actors into the conflict and make containment harder.
The Taliban’s policies remain central to this risk. Political exclusion and coercion may suppress visible opposition without creating durable stability. Meanwhile, foreign powers that prioritize strategic competition or short-term security cooperation may strengthen the regime without addressing the grievances that continue to destabilize Afghanistan. The country is not destined to return to the large-scale wars of its past, but neither can its present condition be considered settled. The danger is not that a new war is certain; it is that authoritarian rule, armed resistance, militant violence and competing foreign interests continue to create the conditions for one.
7. Conclusion: Who Is Shaping Afghanistan’s Future?
Afghanistan’s future is being shaped by a struggle between a regime determined to preserve its power and foreign governments seeking to advance their own interests. Since returning to power in August 2021, the Taliban has consolidated control over the state while systematically restricting the rights of women and girls, suppressing dissent and excluding broad sections of society from political life. Its leaders demand recognition as Afghanistan’s legitimate rulers, yet the people they govern have little meaningful opportunity to hold them accountable. At the center of this system stands Haibatullah Akhundzada, the supreme leader whose authority extends across the Taliban’s political and religious structure. His limited public visibility raises legitimate questions about transparency, decision-making and the concentration of power. But the issue is larger than one elusive figure. The essential question is how decisions are made, who can influence them and whether any institution can hold the leadership responsible for its actions.
The Taliban’s survival cannot be understood solely through its domestic strength. Its foreign relationships matter. Russia has formally recognized the government and publicly praised its rule, while pursuing its own regional security objectives and opposing a renewed NATO military presence. China seeks security and economic opportunities. Pakistan faces an increasingly strained relationship with the movement it once supported, particularly over the activities of the TTP. Iran and Central Asian states are focused on containing instability, while Western governments continue to grapple with the consequences of their withdrawal. These relationships are not proof that a single foreign power controls the Taliban. Nor do they establish that the movement was created or directed by a particular intelligence agency. Such claims require evidence. What is demonstrable is that the Taliban has found ways to exploit competing international interests, securing diplomatic openings without making fundamental political reform a condition of its rule. The more foreign governments compete for access and influence, the more room the regime has to resist pressure over its domestic conduct.
Russia’s role is particularly revealing. Recognition, diplomatic access and security cooperation offer the Taliban international standing, while Moscow makes clear that a renewed NATO military presence in the region would cross a strategic red line. This combination of incentives and pressure shows how great-power competition can shape Afghanistan’s choices. Yet the strategic calculations of Moscow and other capitals do not necessarily align with the interests of Afghan citizens. A regime can become more accepted abroad while remaining repressive at home. The International Criminal Court’s arrest warrants against senior Taliban figures have also made the question of accountability more concrete. The allegations of crimes against humanity involving persecution underscore the gravity of the international legal case against the leadership. The warrants are not convictions, but they demonstrate that engagement with the Taliban takes place alongside serious legal scrutiny. Governments that deepen their relations with the regime must confront the consequences of treating strategic convenience as more important than accountability.
Nor is the country’s future settled simply because the Taliban controls the principal institutions of the state. Armed opposition continues, IS-K remains a security threat, and the dispute between the Taliban and Pakistan could generate further escalation. Afghanistan’s mineral resources and strategic location will continue to attract foreign interest, but neither investment nor diplomatic recognition can guarantee stability. If the country is treated primarily as a source of resources, a buffer against rival powers or a platform for regional security, the needs of its population will remain secondary. The danger is that Afghanistan becomes internationally connected without becoming politically accountable. Foreign governments may secure access, negotiate security arrangements and pursue economic opportunities, while the Taliban presents each diplomatic encounter as evidence that its rule is accepted. Meanwhile, women and girls remain excluded from fundamental areas of public life, political opponents face repression, and ordinary Afghans have little influence over the country’s direction.
Behind this contradiction lies a geopolitical cat-and-mouse game. Russia seeks to prevent the return of Western military influence while expanding its own foothold through recognition, security cooperation and diplomatic support for the Taliban. Western governments, meanwhile, must contend with the consequences of their withdrawal and the possibility that Moscow will use Afghanistan to undermine Western influence in the region. China pursues its own security and economic objectives; Pakistan struggles to contain threats from a movement it once supported; and Iran and the Central Asian states seek to prevent instability from crossing their borders. These powers are not acting as a single bloc, nor are all their interests aligned. Each is manoeuvring to protect its position, limit its rivals and extract advantages from Afghanistan’s strategic location.
The Taliban is not simply a passive object in this contest. It can play one external power against another, accept diplomatic openings from Russia, pursue economic relations with China, maintain contact with regional governments and exploit Western concerns over terrorism and humanitarian emergencies. The more divided the outside powers are, the easier it becomes for the Taliban to resist pressure for political reform. Each government may believe it is gaining influence, while the regime itself gains room to manoeuvre. This is the central paradox: international rivalry can strengthen the Taliban even when the powers involved disagree sharply about the future of Afghanistan.
Yet this game carries risks for everyone. A confrontation between Pakistan and the Taliban could intensify; support for competing Afghan factions could turn local resistance into a proxy conflict; and disputes over NATO’s regional presence could deepen the rivalry between Moscow and Western capitals. None of these outcomes is inevitable, but the combination of strategic mistrust, armed groups and competing foreign interests creates opportunities for miscalculation. Afghanistan could once again become the place where larger powers pursue their rivalries through local actors, while Afghan civilians pay the price.
Ultimately, the question is not simply which power will gain the upper hand. It is whether Afghanistan will remain a chessboard on which Russia, the West and regional governments compete for leverage—or whether Afghans themselves will have a meaningful role in determining their country’s future. No foreign government can substitute for Afghan political agency, and no diplomatic bargain should be mistaken for genuine legitimacy. Until the rights, security and political aspirations of Afghans become central to international policy, the geopolitical game may continue to change its players and tactics while leaving the country trapped in the same cycle: foreign competition, authoritarian rule and an unresolved struggle over who has the right to shape Afghanistan’s future.
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