From Badakhshan to Nuristan: Afghanistan's Anti-Taliban Resistance Gains Momentum
The anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan has entered an important new phase. In recent weeks, fighting has been reported in Badakhshan, Nuristan and neighboring Kunar, while Saleh Mohammad Registani, a veteran commander who fought alongside Ahmad Shah Massoud, has returned to Afghanistan and assumed a senior operational position within the National Resistance Front (NRF).
(A village in the mountainous region of Nuristan.)These developments do not mean that the Taliban is close to losing control of Afghanistan. The armed opposition remains far weaker in resources and territorial control. However, the combination of renewed fighting, the appearance of resistance activity in several areas and the return of experienced commanders makes this an important moment for Afghanistan's anti-Taliban resistance.
It may also be one of its most dangerous moments. If resistance groups begin to gain greater support, coordinate more effectively or expand into additional areas, the Taliban and its allies have a strong incentive to prevent that development before it becomes harder to contain.
Table of Contents
1. Saleh Registani Returns to Afghanistan
2. From Badakhshan to Nuristan
2.1 The Fighting in Nuristan
2.2 The Taliban's Account
3. Why This Moment Matters
3.1 A New Phase or a Temporary Surge?
3.2 Blaming Pakistan Instead of Addressing Grievances
4. The Broader Problem With Taliban Rule: Why Resistance to Taliban Rule Persists
4.1 Poverty, Corruption and the Taliban Elite
4.2 Afghanistan's Natural Resources and Who Controls Them
4.3 Restrictions on Women and the Double Standard of the Taliban Elite
4.4 Religious and Ethnic Minorities Under Taliban Rule
4.5 Torture, Arbitrary Detention and Extrajudicial Killings
4.6 A System of Rule, Not Just a Security Problem
5. What Would a “Taliban-Free Afghanistan” Mean?
5.1 Removing Taliban Rule Is Not the Same as Killing Every Taliban Member
5.2 Accountability and Rehabilitation
6. The Historical Question
7. Conclusion
1.1 Saleh Registani's Return From Exile to the Hindu Kush
On September 21, 2026, the National Resistance Front (NRF) published a video showing Saleh Mohammad Registani in the mountainous Hindu Kush. In the video, Registani said that after a difficult period of absence, he had returned to Afghanistan and was once again serving his people. He declared: “The resistance continues,” and said that other fronts had also emerged across Afghanistan and were raising the banner of resistance against the Taliban. The NRF confirmed that the video was recent and that Registani had returned to Afghanistan.
The following day, September 22, Ahmad Massoud formally appointed Registani as Commander General of Operations of the Military Headquarters of the National Resistance Front. The appointment order cited his experience and previous responsibilities and called on NRF officials and commanders to coordinate with him.
Registani is not a new figure in Afghanistan's armed resistance. He joined Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces in 1980 and fought against the Soviet Union and the communist government. He later served as Afghanistan's military attaché in Dushanbe and Moscow and represented Panjshir in parliament until the fall of the Islamic Republic in 2021. After the Taliban takeover, he initially went to Panjshir before leaving for Tajikistan.
Following his return, Ahmad Massoud appointed Registani as General Operational Commander of the Military Headquarters of the National Resistance Front, citing his military experience and previous responsibilities.
His return therefore has significance beyond the appearance of one individual. A veteran of Massoud's resistance has returned to Afghanistan at the same time that armed opposition has become more visible in several parts of the country.
1.2 Registani's Three Disagreements With the Taliban
Registani's return was followed by a more extensive political and ideological statement. In a video published on September 22, he spoke from the Hindu Kush about what he described as the three fundamental disagreements between his movement and the Taliban: religious, political and cultural differences.
His argument went considerably beyond a call for continued armed resistance. Registani presented the conflict as a fundamental dispute over how Islam should be interpreted, how political authority should be established and how Afghanistan's cultural identity should be understood.
On religion, Registani accused the Taliban of permitting practices that he considers forbidden under Islam, including attacks on civilians, suicide attacks in places of worship and attacks on educational institutions. He also accused the Taliban's intelligence authorities of torture and referred to people whom he said had died under torture and been buried anonymously. These are allegations made by Registani and should not be treated as independently established facts solely on the basis of his speech.
He also invoked the deaths of prominent Afghan figures, including Abdul Rahman Niazi, Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Massoud, arguing that killing such figures was religiously impermissible. His discussion of Massoud was particularly personal: Registani recalled serving alongside him for 21 years and described Massoud as deeply religious, committed to prayer and the Quran, courageous and devoted to Afghanistan.
The second part of his argument concerned political legitimacy. Registani questioned the Taliban's use of the title “Amir al-Mu'minin” for Hibatullah Akhundzada and challenged the legitimacy of the process through which he was appointed. He argued that political leadership should not be established by a limited group without broader public participation.
Registani further argued that no contemporary political leader should be regarded as God's representative. In his view, political leaders should instead be chosen by the people, serve for a defined period and remain accountable to them. He also criticized the Taliban's interpretation of Quranic verses concerning obedience to political authority, arguing that the phrase “those in authority among you” should not be used to establish unconditional obedience to an unelected ruler.
His third disagreement was cultural. Registani criticized what he described as Taliban policies toward the Persian language and argued that Persian is not the language of one ethnic group but an important shared language of Afghan society. He also criticized attempts to impose uniform forms of dress and appearance, arguing that cultural conformity should not be treated as a measure of religious devotion.
The significance of this speech is that Registani was presenting resistance not merely as a military struggle against the Taliban's security forces. He was framing it as a dispute over religious interpretation, political legitimacy and Afghanistan's cultural identity. Whether this argument resonates beyond the NRF's existing support base is a separate question, but the speech provides a clearer picture of the political ideas Registani associates with the resistance.
2. From Badakhshan to Nuristan2.1 The Fighting in Nuristan
The latest major confrontation took place in Kamdesh district of Nuristan, following earlier fighting in Badakhshan. The developments in Badakhshan and Nuristan can be described as evidence of an expansion and intensification of attacks by armed resistance fronts.
The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) said that Taliban forces attacked its positions with infantry and drones. According to the AFF, its fighters resisted the attack and then launched planned counterattacks from several directions. It claimed that several Taliban checkpoints were captured and that Taliban forces were pushed back from parts of Kamdesh in Nuristan and Nari in neighboring Kunar.
In a later statement, the AFF claimed that 37 Taliban members had been killed and 24 wounded, while also rejecting the Taliban's claim that its fighters had been captured. It said that several villages and Taliban checkpoints had come under its control and described its eastern fighters as largely local young men familiar with the terrain.
These figures remain claims by the AFF and cannot be treated as independently verified battlefield figures.
2.2 The Taliban's Account
The Taliban's Ministry of Defense confirmed the fighting but presented an entirely different account. It said that 28 opposing fighters had been killed and 32 captured alive. It described the opposing force as ISIS elements and other “elements of evil and corruption” allegedly sent from Pakistan with support from the Pakistani military.
The Taliban further claimed that most of the fighters were former members of Afghanistan's previous security forces who had been recruited by Pakistan's intelligence services, taken to training camps and subsequently sent to Nuristan. It also alleged that Pakistani militias and ISIS fighters were involved.
Pakistan rejected these accusations. Reuters reported through Al Jazeera that Pakistan's Ministry of Information called the allegations “frivolous, baseless and devoid of any truth” and denied recruiting or training former Afghan security personnel or supporting ISIS or other armed groups in Afghanistan.
The significance of the reporting is therefore not that the Taliban's version has been proven. It is that the fighting was substantial enough to be acknowledged by the Taliban itself and reported internationally, including by Reuters through Al Jazeera. Both sides nevertheless give sharply different accounts of who fought, who suffered casualties and what happened on the battlefield.
3. Why This Moment Matters3.1 A New Phase or a Temporary Surge?
The evidence does not establish that the resistance has become a nationwide military force or that the Taliban's territorial control is close to collapse. The United Nations has continued to assess that armed opposition groups have not seriously challenged Taliban territorial control.
At the same time, the recent developments are difficult to dismiss as a single isolated incident. Fighting in Badakhshan was followed by serious clashes in Nuristan and Kunar, while the NRF announced the return of Registani to Afghanistan. The fighting in Badakhshan and Nuristan is one of the most serious security challenges the Taliban has faced in the five years since returning to power.
This makes the present period both important and dangerous for the resistance. If armed opposition expands, the Taliban has an obvious interest in containing it before additional fronts emerge or local grievances turn into broader support for resistance.
3.2 Blaming Pakistan Instead of Addressing Grievances
One recurring feature of the Taliban's response is its emphasis on Pakistan. In the Nuristan fighting, the Taliban blamed Pakistan for recruiting and training opponents. Pakistan rejected the accusation.
Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan's security environment is a legitimate subject of investigation, particularly given the long history of relations between the Taliban, Pakistan and armed groups operating in the region. But attributing every armed challenge to foreign interference does not answer a different question: why are Afghans willing to fight against Taliban rule in the first place?
A striking example emerged on September 27, when Qari Asil, the Taliban district governor of Tagab in Badakhshan, reportedly resigned after waiting three and a half hours to meet the Taliban's provincial governor and being refused a hearing. In an audio recording obtained by Hasht-e Subh, he complained that the people of Badakhshan should “cry tears of blood” because their problems were being ignored. He also said he did not want to be humiliated.
Whether or not such grievances directly translate into armed resistance, they demonstrate that dissatisfaction cannot simply be explained by pointing toward Pakistan. Governance, exclusion and the treatment of local populations are also part of the political environment in which resistance develops.
4. The Broader Problem With Taliban Rule4.1 Poverty, Corruption and the Taliban Elite
Economic hardship is another important part of the environment in which opposition to Taliban rule develops. Afghanistan remains one of the world's poorest countries, while millions of Afghans continue to depend on humanitarian assistance and face severe economic constraints.
For many Afghans, the problem is not simply poverty itself but the perception that political power and economic opportunity are distributed unequally. Allegations of corruption, favoritism and the accumulation of wealth by politically connected figures can become particularly damaging when ordinary families struggle to afford food, housing, healthcare and education.
The contrast between the economic circumstances of ordinary Afghans and the lifestyles of some Taliban officials has therefore become a politically sensitive issue. Reports and investigations have documented disputes among Taliban factions over control of lucrative economic resources, including mining. In Badakhshan, for example, reporting in 2026 described a struggle within the Taliban over control of gold and precious-stone mines, with the central leadership attempting to bring lucrative mining areas under its control.
Such disputes do not by themselves prove that Taliban officials are personally enriching themselves through corruption. They do, however, illustrate the importance of control over Afghanistan's natural resources within the Taliban's governing system.
The broader problem is one of legitimacy. When a population is living under severe economic pressure, visible privilege among political and military elites can deepen perceptions that the system serves those who control it rather than society as a whole.
4.2 Afghanistan's Natural Resources and Who Controls ThemAfghanistan possesses significant deposits of minerals, precious stones and other natural resources. Control over these resources has long been connected to political power and armed conflict, and the Taliban is now in a position to determine who can access and exploit many of them.
The issue is particularly visible in Badakhshan, where gold and precious-stone mining has become the subject of competition between Taliban factions. Recent reporting described efforts by the Taliban leadership in Kandahar to bring lucrative mines under the authority of the central leadership and to weaken the influence of local commanders.
For ordinary Afghans, the important question is not simply how much Afghanistan possesses underground. It is who benefits from its extraction, how revenues are managed and whether local communities receive any meaningful economic benefit.
Natural-resource wealth can therefore become another source of political grievance when communities believe that valuable resources are being controlled by powerful officials or commanders without sufficient transparency or public benefit.
For the resistance, such grievances can matter because local opposition is rarely created by ideology alone. Economic interests, disputes over land and resources, political exclusion and resentment toward local authorities can all contribute to an environment in which armed opposition becomes easier to sustain.
4.3 Restrictions on Women and the Double Standard of the Taliban ElitePerhaps the most internationally visible aspect of Taliban rule is its treatment of women and girls. Since returning to power in 2021, the Taliban has imposed extensive restrictions on female education, employment, movement and participation in public life. Afghanistan remains the only country in the world where girls and women are formally barred from secondary and higher education. UNESCO and other international organisations have repeatedly documented the scale of the exclusion.
The restrictions have also created a particularly powerful source of resentment because they affect the everyday lives and futures of millions of Afghan families. A girl who is prevented from attending secondary school is not only losing access to education; she is also losing opportunities for university, professional employment and economic independence.
The issue has become even more politically sensitive because some senior Taliban figures have reportedly educated their own daughters outside Afghanistan. Research by the Afghanistan Analysts Network found that a number of Taliban leaders living in Qatar enrolled their daughters in schools there, while the daughter of a Taliban minister was reported to be studying medicine at a Qatari university.
This does not establish that every Taliban official applies the restrictions differently to his own family. But documented cases of Taliban leaders educating daughters abroad create an obvious contrast with the restrictions imposed on Afghan girls inside Afghanistan.
For families affected by the education ban, that contrast can be understood as a question of privilege: rules imposed on the wider population do not necessarily prevent members of the ruling elite from finding alternatives for their own families.
4.4 Religious and Ethnic Minorities Under Taliban RuleAnother source of opposition concerns Afghanistan's religious and ethnic minorities. The Taliban's governing system is based on a particular interpretation of Sunni Islam, and members of religious communities whose beliefs differ from the Taliban's interpretation have faced restrictions and discrimination.
Shia Muslims, including many members of Afghanistan's Hazara population, have been particularly affected. Recent reporting has documented restrictions on Shia religious practices, including limitations on religious ceremonies and the removal or weakening of protections associated with Shia personal-status law. The European Union Agency for Asylum has also documented the continuing vulnerability of Hazaras and other Shia communities.
The situation is complicated by the presence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has repeatedly targeted Shia and Hazara civilians. Taliban authorities cannot therefore be held responsible for every attack against these communities. At the same time, international and Afghan sources have documented allegations of discrimination, forced displacement, land seizures and other abuses involving Taliban authorities or local officials.
The issue extends beyond religious identity. Reports in 2026 have also raised concerns about discrimination against ethnic communities including Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tajiks, including allegations involving land appropriation, forced displacement and exclusion from public life.
For minority communities, therefore, opposition to Taliban rule can involve both questions of religious freedom and questions of political inclusion. A political system in which important communities believe that they have limited influence over government institutions can create grievances even where those communities do not support armed resistance.
4.5 Torture, Arbitrary Detention and Extrajudicial KillingsThe treatment of detainees and former members of Afghanistan's previous government and security forces is another major source of concern. The United Nations has documented arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings by Taliban authorities since the takeover.
UNAMA reported in 2023 that it had documented at least 800 instances of extrajudicial killing, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, and enforced disappearance involving former government officials and members of the former security forces between August 2021 and June 2023.
The problem has not disappeared. Human Rights Watch's 2026 reporting cited further UNAMA documentation of arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of former government officials and security-force members, as well as killings of former security personnel. It also documented public executions and large numbers of corporal punishments carried out by Taliban authorities.
These abuses are particularly significant in the context of armed resistance. Former soldiers, police officers and government employees may have reasons to fear the Taliban even when they are no longer participating in armed activity. When people believe that surrender or cooperation does not guarantee their safety, the possibility of reconciliation becomes more difficult.
The issue also extends beyond former security personnel. Human-rights organisations have reported arbitrary detention and mistreatment of journalists, activists, women and members of minority communities. Such practices contribute to a wider perception that Taliban security institutions operate with limited accountability.
This does not mean that every Taliban fighter or official participates in torture or extrajudicial violence. Responsibility is individual and should be established through evidence. The documented pattern of abuses, however, is relevant to understanding why some Afghans continue to view Taliban rule as a threat rather than simply as an alternative government.
4.6 A System of Rule, Not Just a Security Problem
Taken together, these issues show why armed resistance cannot be understood solely as a contest between Taliban forces and opposition fighters. Economic grievances, disputes over resources, restrictions on women, discrimination against minorities and documented abuses by security institutions all form part of the political environment in which opposition can develop.
None of these grievances automatically produces support for an armed group. Afghans may oppose Taliban policies without supporting violence, and different communities have different experiences of Taliban rule. But the persistence of these grievances helps explain why territorial control alone does not necessarily eliminate opposition.
5. What Would a “Taliban-Free Afghanistan” Mean?5.1 Removing Taliban Rule Is Not the Same as Killing Every Taliban Member
A Taliban-free Afghanistan should not be understood as a demand to kill every person who has ever belonged to the Taliban.
There is an essential distinction between removing the Taliban as a governing system and physically eliminating every individual associated with the movement. Individuals accused of serious crimes should be investigated and, where evidence supports it, prosecuted. Others who are not responsible for serious crimes could potentially be reintegrated into society through lawful processes.
The objective, in this sense, would be the end of Taliban political domination rather than indiscriminate violence against Taliban members.
5.2 Accountability and Rehabilitation
Any future transition would face the difficult question of what to do with former Taliban fighters and officials. Those responsible for killings, torture, persecution or other serious abuses should not simply receive automatic immunity because the political system has changed.
At the same time, not every low-level member has the same responsibility. A distinction between commanders, perpetrators of serious crimes, ordinary fighters and civilians coerced into cooperation would be essential.
For those who are eligible for reintegration, rehabilitation and deradicalization programs could be considered alongside education, employment and participation in a lawful political order. The goal would be to prevent former fighters from reproducing the same ideology and structures that produced years of conflict.
6. The Historical QuestionThe history of the RAF in Germany and the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria shows that armed extremist organizations can eventually lose their ability to operate as political or military systems. But Afghanistan's situation is not identical to either case. The Taliban is simultaneously an armed movement, a governing authority and a deeply established political organization with control over the state.
That difference matters.
The central question for Afghanistan is therefore not simply whether the Taliban can be defeated militarily. It is whether an alternative political order can emerge that provides Afghans with meaningful representation, security, rights and accountability.
7. ConclusionThe developments from Badakhshan to Nuristan represent an important moment for Afghanistan's anti-Taliban resistance.
The return of Saleh Registani, his declaration that “the resistance continues,” the renewed fighting in Badakhshan, Nuristan and Kunar, and the emergence of competing armed fronts all demonstrate that armed opposition to Taliban rule has not disappeared.
But the resistance remains far from defeating the Taliban. The Taliban still controls Afghanistan's territory and state institutions. The present developments should therefore be understood as a possible period of growing resistance, not as evidence that the Taliban is about to fall.
What happens next will depend not only on the resistance groups themselves, but also on whether Afghanistan's unresolved political and social grievances continue to accumulate.
The most important question is ultimately larger than the battlefield: whether Afghanistan will remain under a political system that excludes much of its population, or whether Afghans will eventually be able to establish a different political order through a process that provides representation, rights, accountability and a place for the country's diverse society.
Sources Used
Saleh Registani / NRF
1. Shafaqna — Saleh Registani's return to Afghanistan
Saleh Registani returns to Afghanistan / NRF source
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
2. Shafaqna — Registani's background and appointment
Saleh Registani background and NRF appointment
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
Badakhshan / Nuristan / AFF Fighting
3. Shafaqna — Taliban claims 28 killed and 32 captured in Nuristan
Taliban account of the Nuristan fighting
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
4. Shafaqna — Detailed report on the Nuristan fighting
Detailed Nuristan fighting report
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
5. Shafaqna — AFF's response and casualty claims
AFF response to Taliban claims in Nuristan
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
Taliban Rule / Afghan Grievances
6. 8AM — Taliban district governor in Tagab: “People should cry tears of blood”
Tagab district governor and grievances in Badakhshan
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
7. 8AM — “Taliban red lines: no cost”
Taliban red lines / Richard Bennett report
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
Taliban's Treatment of Afghan Women / Double Standard
8. 8AM — Taliban's double standard toward women
Taliban women and the double standard over parks
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
9. Shafaqna — Taliban ideology, restrictions and the treatment of women
Taliban restrictions and double standards toward Afghan women
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
International Coverage of the Nuristan Fighting
10. Al Jazeera — Afghanistan says 28 fighters killed as Islamabad and Kabul trade accusations
Al Jazeera report on the Nuristan fighting and Pakistan-Taliban accusations
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
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