From Badakhshan to Nuristan: Afghanistan's Anti-Taliban Resistance Gains Momentum
Last Updated: 14 November 2026
The anti-Taliban resistance in Afghanistan has entered an important new phase. In recent weeks, fighting has been reported in Badakhshan, Nuristan and neighboring Kunar, while attacks targeting Taliban positions and personnel have continued. On September 28, the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) claimed responsibility for an attack on a Taliban vehicle in Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan, saying that three Taliban members were killed and two wounded. At the same time, Saleh Mohammad Registani, a veteran commander who fought alongside Ahmad Shah Massoud, has returned to Afghanistan and assumed a senior operational position within the National Resistance Front (NRF).
(A village in the mountainous region of Nuristan.)These developments do not mean that the Taliban is close to losing control of Afghanistan. The armed opposition remains far weaker in resources and territorial control. However, the combination of renewed fighting, the appearance of resistance activity in several areas and the return of experienced commanders makes this an important moment for Afghanistan's anti-Taliban resistance.
It may also be one of its most dangerous moments. If resistance groups begin to gain greater support, coordinate more effectively or expand into additional areas, the Taliban and its allies have a strong incentive to prevent that development before it becomes harder to contain.
Table of Contents
1. Saleh Registani Returns to Afghanistan
1.1 Registani's Return From Exile to the Hindu Kush
1.2 Registani's Long History in the Resistance
1.3 Registani's First Video: "The Resistance Continues"
1.4 Registani's Three Disagreements With the Taliban
2. From Badakhshan to Nuristan
2.1 From Badakhshan to Nuristan
2.2 The Taliban's Account
2.3 A Wider Pattern of a Growing Armed Resistance
3. Why This Moment Matters
3.1 A New Phase or a Temporary Surge?
3.2 Blaming Pakistan Instead of Addressing Grievances
4. The Broader Problem With Taliban Rule: Why Resistance to Taliban Rule Persists
4.1 Poverty, Corruption and the Taliban Elite
4.2 Afghanistan's Natural Resources and Who Controls Them
4.3 Restrictions on Women and the Double Standard of the Taliban Elite
4.4 Religious and Ethnic Minorities Under Taliban Rule
4.5 Torture, Arbitrary Detention and Extrajudicial Killings
4.6 A System of Rule, Not Just a Security Problem
5. What Would a “Taliban-Free Afghanistan” Mean?
5.1 Removing Taliban Rule Is Not the Same as Killing Every Taliban Member
5.2 Accountability and Rehabilitation
6. The Historical Question
7. Conclusion
1.1 Saleh Registani's Return From Exile to the Hindu Kush
On September 21, 2026, the National Resistance Front (NRF) published a video showing Saleh Mohammad Registani in the mountainous Hindu Kush. According to the video, Registani recorded the message on September 20, 2026, before the NRF published it the following day. In the video, he said that after a difficult period of absence, he had returned to Afghanistan and was once again serving his people. He described the Hindu Kush as a symbol of strength, pride and resistance and declared that “the resistance continues.” The NRF confirmed that Registani had returned to Afghanistan.
Registani is not a new figure in Afghanistan's armed resistance. He joined Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces in 1980 and fought against the Soviet Union and the communist government.
(Saleh Mohammad Registani (right) sits beside late resistance commander Ahmad Shah Massoud (1953–2001).)He later served as Afghanistan's military attaché and special representative in Tajikistan and Russia before returning to Afghanistan and entering parliament as a representative of Panjshir. He remained involved in Afghan political and military affairs until the fall of the Islamic Republic in 2021. After the Taliban takeover, Registani initially went to Panjshir before leaving Afghanistan for Tajikistan.
His return was followed by a formal appointment within the NRF. On September 22, Ahmad Massoud appointed Registani as Commander General of Operations of the Military Headquarters of the National Resistance Front. The appointment order cited his experience and previous responsibilities and called on NRF officials and commanders to coordinate with him. Registani's return therefore has significance beyond the appearance of one individual. A veteran of Massoud's resistance has returned to Afghanistan at the same time that armed opposition has become more visible in several parts of the country.
1.2 Registani's Long History in the Resistance
Registani's importance within the NRF is rooted in a military career that stretches back more than four decades. He joined Ahmad Shah Massoud's forces in 1980 after completing school in Kabul and later became head of the Operations Department of Shura-e Nazar, the military-political alliance associated with Massoud. Registani said he also worked as a military, political and ideological instructor and described guerrilla warfare as one of his areas of military expertise.
After the fall of the communist government in 1992, Registani studied law and political science at Kabul University. Massoud sent him to Tajikistan in 1997 as a military attaché and special representative, after which he served in Russia from 2000 to 2003. He later returned to Afghanistan and continued his political and military activities. Registani subsequently entered Afghan politics and represented Panjshir in the Wolesi Jirga. He remained involved in political affairs until the fall of the Islamic Republic in 2021.
Registani later returned to Ahmad Massoud's political circle. After Massoud began political activities in Afghanistan in 2018, Registani served as his deputy in his Kabul political office. When the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, Registani became one of the senior figures associated with the renewed resistance led by Ahmad Massoud.
This background helps explain why Registani's return to the Hindu Kush in September 2026 was accompanied by a new senior military appointment. On September 22, Ahmad Massoud appointed him Commander General of Operations of the NRF's Military Headquarters, saying the appointment was intended to improve the organisation of military affairs and strengthen coordination within the military structure.
1.3 Registani's First Video in September 2026: “The Resistance Continues”
Registani's first public message after returning to Afghanistan was strongly political. Speaking from the Hindu Kush, he described the Taliban takeover as the result of what he called an “illegitimate agreement” and a political conspiracy. He characterized the Taliban as a backward and extremist movement and said that the NRF had raised the banner of armed resistance against it.
(Saleh Mohammad Registani speaks from the Hindu Kush in his September 2026 announcement of his return to Afghanistan.)He presented the past five years of Taliban rule as evidence of what he described as systematic abuses. Among the issues he cited were unlawful entries into people's homes, arbitrary arrests, killings without trial, alleged torture by Taliban intelligence authorities, the exploitation of Afghanistan's mineral resources and the alleged presence of terrorist groups in the country. These statements were allegations made by Registani in the video and should not be treated as independently established facts solely on the basis of his speech.
Registani also affirmed that the NRF was not the only resistance movement operating against the Taliban. He said that other fronts had emerged across Afghanistan and that resistance flags had been raised “from east to west and from north to south.” This was Registani's characterization of the situation and does not independently establish the scale or geographic reach of those groups.
A central part of his message was that resistance had continued despite attempts to resolve the conflict through political and peaceful means. Registani argued that efforts to persuade the Taliban to return political authority to the Afghan people had failed. He therefore presented armed resistance as one of the means through which, in his view, Afghanistan could be liberated from Taliban rule.
Registani also claimed that the NRF and other resistance fronts had suffered significant losses, saying that hundreds of people had been killed, thousands imprisoned and some detainees subjected to severe torture. He further alleged that the bodies of some victims had not been returned to their families. These figures and allegations were presented by Registani and were not independently substantiated in the video.
He concluded by saying that the NRF would continue its armed resistance in coordination with other fronts and expressed confidence that the struggle would eventually succeed. He then addressed Afghan girls, mothers and resistance fighters, saying that their role in the struggle for freedom would be recorded in Afghanistan's history.
The message was therefore more than an announcement of Registani's return. It was a declaration that he intended to participate actively in the continuing resistance and an attempt to place that resistance within a broader political narrative about Taliban rule, political legitimacy and the future of Afghanistan.
1.4 Registani's Three Disagreements With the Taliban
Registani's September 20 return video was followed by a more extensive political and ideological statement. In a video published on September 22, 2026, he spoke from the Hindu Kush about what he described as the three fundamental disagreements between his movement and the Taliban: religious, political and cultural differences.
His argument went considerably beyond a call for continued armed resistance. Registani presented the conflict as a fundamental dispute over how Islam should be interpreted, how political authority should be established and how Afghanistan's cultural identity should be understood.
On religion, Registani accused the Taliban of permitting practices that he considers forbidden under Islam, including attacks on civilians, suicide attacks in places of worship and attacks on educational institutions. He also accused the Taliban's intelligence authorities of torture and referred to people whom he said had died under torture and been buried anonymously. These were allegations made by Registani and should not be treated as independently established facts solely on the basis of his speech.
He also invoked the deaths of prominent Afghan figures, including Ayaz Niazi (1964 - 2 June 2020), Burhanuddin Rabbani (1940 – 20 September 2011) and Ahmad Shah Massoud, arguing that killing such figures was religiously impermissible. His discussion of Massoud was particularly personal: Registani recalled serving alongside him for 21 years and described Massoud as deeply religious, committed to prayer and the Quran, courageous and devoted to Afghanistan.
The second part of his argument concerned political legitimacy. Registani questioned the Taliban's use of the title “Amir al-Mu'minin” for Hibatullah Akhundzada and challenged the legitimacy of the process through which he was appointed. He argued that political leadership should not be established by a limited group without broader public participation.
Registani further argued that no contemporary political leader should be regarded as God's representative. In his view, political leaders should instead be chosen by the people, serve for a defined period and remain accountable to them. He also criticized the Taliban's interpretation of Quranic verses concerning obedience to political authority, arguing that the phrase “those in authority among you” should not be used to establish unconditional obedience to an unelected ruler.
His third disagreement was cultural. Registani criticized what he described as Taliban policies toward the Persian language and argued that Persian is not the language of one ethnic group but an important shared language of Afghan society. He also criticized attempts to impose uniform forms of dress and appearance, arguing that cultural conformity should not be treated as a measure of religious devotion.
The significance of this speech is that Registani was presenting resistance not merely as a military struggle against the Taliban's security forces. He was framing it as a dispute over religious interpretation, political legitimacy and Afghanistan's cultural identity. Whether this argument resonates beyond the NRF's existing support base is a separate question, but the speech provides a clearer picture of the political ideas Registani associates with the resistance.
2. Strong Anti-Taliban Resistance in 20262.1 Fighting from Badakhshan to Nuristan
The recent fighting has not been limited to a single confrontation. After reports of fighting in Badakhshan, serious clashes were reported in Kamdesh district of Nuristan and Nari district of neighboring Kunar. On September 28, an additional attack was reported in Faizabad, the capital of Badakhshan.
(Like Nuristan, Badakhshan in northeastern Afghanistan is also a mountainous region.)The Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) said that its forces attacked a vehicle carrying Taliban members near the Taliban's provincial Mines Directorate in Faizabad. According to the AFF, three Taliban members were killed and two others wounded. Local sources told Afghanistan International that the explosion occurred in the Jalghar area of Faizabad and that a vehicle had been targeted. Sources also claimed that Mullah Abdul Mansour, the Taliban commander of Faizabad's seventh police district, may have been the intended target, but that he survived the attack. The AFF did not identify the target.
The Taliban had not commented on the Faizabad explosion at the time of the Afghanistan International report. The casualty figures therefore remain claims by the AFF and have not been independently verified. The Faizabad attack is significant because it occurred in the same province where armed opposition activity had already increased. It suggests that the recent violence in Badakhshan was not limited to isolated clashes in remote areas and that Taliban personnel in the provincial capital could also be targeted.
The latest major confrontation, however, took place in Kamdesh district of Nuristan. The AFF said that Taliban forces attacked its positions with infantry and drones. According to the AFF, its fighters resisted the attack and then launched planned counterattacks from several directions. It claimed that several Taliban checkpoints were captured and that Taliban forces were pushed back from parts of Kamdesh in Nuristan and Nari in neighboring Kunar.
In a later statement, the AFF claimed that 37 Taliban members had been killed and 24 wounded. It also rejected the Taliban's claim that opposition fighters had been captured and said that several villages and Taliban checkpoints had come under its control. The group described its eastern fighters as largely local young men familiar with the terrain. These figures and territorial claims remain statements by the AFF and cannot be treated as independently verified battlefield figures.
Taken together, the reports from Badakhshan, Nuristan and Kunar indicate a broader pattern of armed activity than a single isolated clash. They nevertheless do not establish that the resistance has achieved sustained territorial control or developed into a nationwide military force.
2.2 The Taliban's Account of the Fighting
The Taliban's Ministry of Defense confirmed the fighting but presented a very different account. According to Reuters, the ministry said that 28 opposing fighters had been killed in Nuristan and claimed that most were former members of Afghanistan's previous security forces who had been recruited by Pakistan's intelligence services. The Taliban further alleged that the fighters had received training in Pakistan and had been sent into Nuristan to create insecurity. It also claimed that the group included ISIS fighters supported by Pakistani militias.
Pakistan rejected these accusations. Pakistan's Ministry of Information and Broadcasting called them “frivolous, baseless and devoid of any truth” and denied that Pakistani security forces or intelligence agencies had been involved in the fighting or had recruited, trained or supported the alleged fighters. Reuters also noted that it could not independently verify the Taliban's account or its casualty figures.
The Taliban later gave a higher figure. On September 29, its Ministry of Defense said that the operation in Kamdesh had ended with 41 fighters killed and 62 detained, again claiming that the fighters had entered from Pakistan with Pakistani military support. The Afghanistan Freedom Front, however, rejected the Taliban's account and claimed that 37 Taliban fighters had been killed and 24 wounded. Neither side's battlefield claims have been independently verified.
The conflicting casualty figures underline how difficult it is to establish what actually happened on the battlefield. What is clear is that the fighting was publicly acknowledged by the Taliban and became part of the rapidly escalating dispute between Kabul and Islamabad.
2.3 A Wider Pattern of a Growing Armed Resistance
A separate explosion was also reported in Herat on September 28. The Taliban's police command in Herat confirmed that an explosion had occurred at one of its security posts. Taliban spokesman Sayed Masoud Hosseini said preliminary investigations indicated that the incident was accidental and related to ammunition stored at the site. He said the security post was damaged and that no civilians were injured.
Earlier reports had circulated different information about the incident, including claims of casualties, but these figures were not confirmed by the Taliban. The available reporting therefore does not establish a connection between the Herat explosion and anti-Taliban resistance activity. The incident is nevertheless relevant to the broader security picture in Afghanistan, but it should be distinguished from the attacks claimed by the Afghanistan Freedom Front in Badakhshan and the fighting reported in Nuristan and Kunar.
Taken together, the developments reported in Badakhshan, Nuristan and Kunar, along with the return of Saleh Mohammad Registani and his stated coordination with other resistance fronts, point to a more visible armed opposition in several parts of Afghanistan. The Herat explosion, however, should not be included as evidence of this resistance because the available reporting attributes it to an accidental ammunition explosion.
3. Why This Moment Matters3.1 A New Phase or a Temporary Surge?
The evidence does not establish that the resistance has become a nationwide military force or that the Taliban's territorial control is close to collapse. The armed opposition remains severely constrained by its resources, manpower, logistics and lack of territorial depth. This is important when assessing both claims that the resistance is too weak to matter and claims that the Taliban is somehow undefeatable.
The resistance is unquestionably the weaker side in conventional terms. The Taliban controls Afghanistan's state institutions, security apparatus and national territory. It also has access to the country's domestic revenue system and natural-resource income. The World Bank's Afghanistan Economic Monitor reported in September 2026 that security expenditure accounted for 45.2 percent of the Taliban administration's total expenditure so far in the 2026 fiscal year. Security spending had reached 51.3 billion Afghanis, equivalent to approximately $787 million. By comparison, education accounted for 16.1 percent of expenditure, while health accounted for only 2.1 percent.
(Police cadets at a Taliban police training academy. Photo: Taliban Ministry of Interior Affairs.)This does not mean that 45.2 percent of Afghanistan's revenue is spent on the military. The World Bank figure refers to the share of total public expenditure allocated to security. Domestic revenue during the same period was approximately 111.5 billion Afghanis, while total expenditure was higher and the fiscal position remained under pressure. The distinction matters, but the underlying point is still significant: the Taliban administration is devoting an exceptionally large share of its available public expenditure to maintaining its security apparatus.
The scale of that imbalance helps explain why attacks by relatively small resistance groups should not be dismissed simply because they have not produced major territorial gains. A movement that controls no province, has no conventional air force, possesses limited heavy equipment and lacks a comparable revenue base faces an enormous structural disadvantage against an authority controlling the entire state. The fact that resistance groups can still organize attacks, gather intelligence, move through difficult terrain and strike Taliban personnel under these conditions is therefore significant even when individual attacks have limited military effects.
The historical experience of Ahmad Shah Massoud illustrates the difficulty of sustaining an armed resistance even under considerably more favorable circumstances. Massoud's forces were able to resist the Taliban and maintain territory in northern Afghanistan, but they suffered repeated territorial losses and remained dependent on external assistance and access to limited areas along Afghanistan's northern frontier. Human Rights Watch documented how the United Front's loss of territory progressively restricted its access to supply routes and international borders. By 2001, Massoud's forces were largely confined to northeastern Afghanistan, while their ability to obtain weapons and other supplies depended heavily on external support.
The comparison is not intended to suggest that today's resistance is identical to Massoud's movement. The political and military circumstances are very different. It does, however, demonstrate how difficult it is for an Afghan resistance movement to maintain territory against a much larger opponent without reliable external supply routes and substantial financial and military resources.
The Taliban's present position is also different from that of the movement during the 1990s. It now controls the institutions through which customs duties, taxes and other forms of domestic revenue are collected. The World Bank reported that domestic revenue collection reached 19.8 percent of GDP in 2025, while external grants were declining. Natural resources have also become an increasingly important source of income for the authorities.
This creates a fundamental asymmetry. To kill or capture large numbers of Taliban fighters on a sustained basis, resistance groups need far more than determination and local support. They need weapons, ammunition, communications equipment, intelligence, safe locations, medical facilities, transport, recruitment networks and reliable financing. The Taliban, by contrast, can draw upon the resources of the state it controls. That does not make the Taliban militarily invulnerable, but it makes the task facing the resistance exceptionally difficult.
This is why the existence of resistance should not be measured only by whether it can defeat the Taliban in open battle. A small armed group can remain strategically relevant without controlling large areas, particularly if it can survive, recruit, gather intelligence and repeatedly impose costs on a government that controls the entire country. At the same time, isolated attacks should not be exaggerated into evidence of an imminent Taliban collapse.
The recent developments therefore fit somewhere between two opposing claims. The resistance is not currently strong enough to threaten the Taliban's nationwide territorial control, but the Taliban's ability to maintain control does not mean that armed opposition has become irrelevant or impossible. The more difficult question is whether resistance groups can convert isolated attacks into a sustainable insurgency while overcoming their enormous resource disadvantage.ances
One recurring feature of the Taliban's response is its emphasis on Pakistan. In the Nuristan fighting, the Taliban blamed Pakistan for recruiting and training opponents. Pakistan rejected the accusation. The Taliban's Ministry of Defense alleged that former Afghan security personnel had been recruited by Pakistani intelligence services and sent to Nuristan, while Pakistan denied involvement and said the Taliban had provided no evidence substantiating the claims.
Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan's security environment is a legitimate subject of investigation, particularly given the long history of relations between the Taliban, Pakistan and armed groups operating in the region.
(Suhail Shaheen, a prominent Taliban spokesman and representative at the Taliban's political office in Doha, speaks with journalists and participants during an intra-Afghan dialogue in Qatar, circa 2021.)The Taliban has also maintained an active diplomatic presence in Doha, where its representatives have continued to engage with foreign governments and international organisations. Suhail Shaheen, who has served as a senior Taliban representative in Qatar, has remained involved in this diplomatic activity. In September 2026, for example, the Taliban administration's embassy in Qatar reported that Shaheen met Tanzania's ambassador to Qatar to discuss bilateral relations, trade and economic cooperation.
(Suhail Shaheen, a senior Taliban representative in Doha, attends an Uzbek cultural event in Qatar in September 2026.)The continuation of this diplomatic engagement is significant because it shows that the Taliban is simultaneously seeking political and economic relations abroad while confronting armed opposition and internal grievances at home. Qatar has also continued to participate in international diplomatic efforts concerning Afghanistan, including the OIC Ministerial Contact Group on Afghanistan. But attributing every armed challenge to foreign interference does not answer a different question: why does opposition to Taliban rule continue to emerge inside Afghanistan?
A striking example emerged on September 27, when Qari Asil, the Taliban district governor of Tagab in Badakhshan, reportedly resigned after waiting three and a half hours to meet the Taliban's provincial governor and being refused a hearing. In an audio recording obtained by Hasht-e Subh, he complained that the people of Badakhshan should “cry tears of blood” because their problems were being ignored. He also said he did not want to be humiliated. Whether or not such grievances directly translate into armed resistance, they demonstrate that dissatisfaction cannot simply be explained by pointing toward Pakistan. Governance, exclusion and the treatment of local populations are also part of the political environment in which resistance develops.
4. The Broader Problem With Taliban Rule4.1 Poverty, Corruption and the Taliban Elite
Economic hardship is another important part of the environment in which opposition to Taliban rule develops. Afghanistan remains one of the world's poorest countries, while millions of Afghans continue to depend on humanitarian assistance and face severe economic constraints. For many Afghans, the problem is not simply poverty itself but the perception that political power and economic opportunity are distributed unequally. Allegations of corruption, favoritism and the accumulation of wealth by politically connected figures can become particularly damaging when ordinary families struggle to afford food, housing, healthcare and education.
The contrast between the economic circumstances of ordinary Afghans and the lifestyles of some Taliban officials has therefore become a politically sensitive issue. Reports and investigations have documented disputes among Taliban factions over control of lucrative economic resources, including mining. In Badakhshan, for example, reporting in 2026 described a struggle within the Taliban over control of gold and precious-stone mines, with the central leadership attempting to bring lucrative mining areas under its control.
The Taliban's control of Afghanistan's revenue system also gives it an important advantage over armed opposition groups. The World Bank reported in September 2026 that domestic revenue had reached approximately 111.5 billion Afghanis during the fiscal year to date, while security expenditure had reached 51.3 billion Afghanis, or 45.2 percent of total expenditure. The figures illustrate the scale of the resources available to the Taliban's security apparatus compared with the extremely limited financial base of the armed resistance.
This financial advantage should not be confused with the claim that the Taliban has unlimited resources. Afghanistan remains a poor country, external assistance has declined and the government's fiscal position remains under pressure. Nevertheless, the Taliban has something its armed opponents largely lack: control over the state's mechanisms for collecting taxes, customs duties and other revenues. This gives the authorities a continuing source of income with which to maintain salaries, security institutions, equipment, transportation and other forms of state capacity.
The imbalance is therefore not simply a question of how many fighters each side has. It is also a question of institutional capacity. The Taliban can draw resources from a nationwide administrative system, while resistance groups must operate through clandestine networks and limited local sources of support. This helps explain why maintaining an armed campaign against Taliban rule is considerably more difficult than carrying out individual attacks.
Such disputes do not by themselves prove that Taliban officials are personally enriching themselves through corruption. They do, however, illustrate the importance of control over Afghanistan's natural resources within the Taliban's governing system. The broader problem is one of legitimacy. When a population is living under severe economic pressure, visible privilege among political and military elites can deepen perceptions that the system serves those who control it rather than society as a whole.
4.2 Afghanistan's Natural Resources and Who Controls ThemAfghanistan possesses significant deposits of minerals, precious stones and other natural resources. Control over these resources has long been connected to political power and armed conflict, and the Taliban is now in a position to determine who can access and exploit many of them.
The issue is particularly visible in Badakhshan, where gold and precious-stone mining has become the subject of competition between Taliban factions. Recent reporting described efforts by the Taliban leadership in Kandahar to bring lucrative mines under the authority of the central leadership and to weaken the influence of local commanders.
For ordinary Afghans, the important question is not simply how much Afghanistan possesses underground. It is who benefits from its extraction, how revenues are managed and whether local communities receive any meaningful economic benefit.
Natural-resource wealth can therefore become another source of political grievance when communities believe that valuable resources are being controlled by powerful officials or commanders without sufficient transparency or public benefit.
For the resistance, such grievances can matter because local opposition is rarely created by ideology alone. Economic interests, disputes over land and resources, political exclusion and resentment toward local authorities can all contribute to an environment in which armed opposition becomes easier to sustain.
4.3 Restrictions on Women and the Double Standard of the Taliban ElitePerhaps the most internationally visible aspect of Taliban rule is its treatment of women and girls. Since returning to power in 2021, the Taliban has imposed extensive restrictions on female education, employment, movement and participation in public life. Afghanistan remains the only country in the world where girls and women are formally barred from secondary and higher education. UNESCO and other international organisations have repeatedly documented the scale of the exclusion.
(Afghan women protest against Taliban restrictions and demand their rights.)
The restrictions have also created a particularly powerful source of resentment because they affect the everyday lives and futures of millions of Afghan families. A girl who is prevented from attending secondary school is not only losing access to education; she is also losing opportunities for university, professional employment and economic independence.
(Two Afghan women are pushed into a Taliban police pickup during an arrest.)
(A group of Afghan women wearing burqas stand in a line while a Taliban fighter stands guard nearby.)
The issue has become particularly sensitive because some senior Taliban figures have reportedly sent their daughters to schools outside Afghanistan. Research by the Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), an independent research organisation that publishes analysis and reporting on Afghanistan, found that a number of Taliban leaders based in Qatar enrolled their daughters in schools there, while the daughter of a Taliban minister was reported to be studying medicine at a Qatari university. The findings are particularly notable because girls inside Afghanistan have been excluded from secondary and higher education under Taliban restrictions. These cases therefore provide documented examples of the different educational opportunities available to some members of the Taliban elite and those available to girls living under Taliban rule in Afghanistan. The contrast has contributed to criticism that restrictions imposed on the wider population do not necessarily prevent members of the ruling elite from finding educational alternatives for their own families.
The restrictions on Afghan women become even more striking when contrasted with the treatment of foreign female visitors. Some foreign women visiting Afghanistan have been photographed entering tourist sites, taking boat rides at Band-e-Amir and interacting with Taliban personnel, while Afghan women have faced restrictions on entering public spaces and recreational sites. In August 2023, the Taliban banned Afghan women from entering Band-e-Amir National Park in Bamiyan. Reports have also documented broader restrictions on women's access to parks and recreational facilities, including cases in which women were denied access even when accompanied by a mahram, or close male relative.
(A Taliban member poses for a photograph with a Chinese female visitor, standing back-to-back while both hold firearms and point them in different directions.)
The contrast is difficult to miss. Some foreign female visitors have been photographed entering tourist sites, taking photographs, enjoying recreational activities and interacting openly with Taliban personnel, while Afghan women have been excluded from some of the same public and recreational spaces. The difference is particularly striking at Band-e-Amir, where foreign women have been photographed enjoying the park after Afghan women were banned from entering it. Taken together, these examples illustrate the sharply different treatment of foreign female visitors and Afghan women under Taliban rule.
This disparity has prompted sarcastic speculation among Afghans that some of these Chinese visitors might have connections to Chinese intelligence services. There is no evidence to substantiate such suspicions, but they do not emerge in a vacuum. China's expanding influence in Afghanistan and wider concerns about Beijing's intelligence activities must be viewed against the broader geopolitical context. On 29 October 2026, The New York Times reported that US intelligence suspected Alice Huang, a Chinese businesswoman, of having been recruited by Chinese intelligence to gather information on NVIDIA CEO Jensen Huang, with whom she was reportedly having an affair. The allegations remain unproven, but the case has drawn attention to concerns about Beijing's use of personal and business networks for intelligence purposes.
On 8 November 2026, Jensen Huang acknowledged the affair in a letter to NVIDIA employees. The allegations of espionage have since attracted considerable international attention, although they have not been conclusively established and the Chinese government has rejected them. The case has nevertheless brought renewed attention to the potential use of personal relationships and business networks for intelligence-gathering purposes.
Although the case provides no evidence of espionage involving the Chinese visitors in Afghanistan, it offers a wider context for understanding why some Afghans question the nature of their unusually unrestricted access to Taliban officials and facilities, particularly when Afghan women themselves are denied comparable freedoms. For Afghan families affected by the education ban, the issue is therefore not only the loss of access to schooling, employment and public life. It is also the documented fact that some members of the ruling elite have found educational alternatives for their own families that are unavailable to ordinary Afghans. The combination of these restrictions and the contrasting treatment of some elite families and foreign visitors has become an important part of the broader debate over equality, privilege and the enforcement of Taliban policies.
4.4 Religious and Ethnic Minorities Under Taliban Rule
Another source of opposition concerns Afghanistan's religious and ethnic minorities. The Taliban's governing system is based on a particular interpretation of Sunni Islam, and members of religious communities whose beliefs differ from the Taliban's interpretation have faced restrictions and discrimination.
Shia Muslims, including many members of Afghanistan's Hazara population, have been particularly affected. Recent developments in Kabul provide a concrete example of the pressure facing Shia religious and community institutions. On September 28, 2026, Taliban authorities closed three institutions serving the Shia community in western Kabul: the Hazrat Fatima al-Zahra Cooperative Hospital, the Tebyan Center and the Resalat religious school. Local sources said that the authorities did not provide a clear reason for the latest closures.
(Taliban authorities closed the Hazrat Fatima al-Zahra Cooperative Hospital in Dasht-e Barchi, a predominantly Hazara neighborhood in western Kabul, in September 2026.)Earlier in September, Taliban authorities had also closed the Khatam al-Anbia religious school and scientific-cultural complex, while the Higher Education Ministry revoked the operating license of Khatam al-Nabieen University in Kabul and Ghazni. Taliban authorities cited alleged violations of administrative, academic or Islamic regulations, while representatives of the affected institutions disputed the allegations and questioned their legal basis.
The pressure has also extended to Shia community organizations. Earlier in September, Taliban Justice Ministry personnel detained the head and several members of Afghanistan's High Shiite Commission. According to sources within the commission, the detainees were released after nine days on conditions that included ending the commission's activities. These developments do not by themselves establish the Taliban's broader intentions toward every Shia community or institution in Afghanistan, but they provide recent documented examples of restrictions and institutional pressure affecting Shia religious, educational and community organizations.
The situation is complicated by the presence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), which has repeatedly targeted Shia and Hazara civilians. Taliban authorities cannot therefore be held responsible for every attack against these communities. At the same time, international and Afghan sources have documented allegations of discrimination, forced displacement, land seizures and other abuses involving Taliban authorities or local officials.
The issue extends beyond religious identity. Reports in 2026 have also raised concerns about discrimination against ethnic communities including Hazaras, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tajiks, including allegations involving land appropriation, forced displacement and exclusion from public life.
For minority communities, therefore, opposition to Taliban rule can involve both questions of religious freedom and questions of political inclusion. A political system in which important communities believe that they have limited influence over government institutions can create grievances even where those communities do not support armed resistance.
4.5 Torture, Arbitrary Detention and Extrajudicial KillingsThe treatment of detainees and former members of Afghanistan's previous government and security forces is another major source of concern. The United Nations has documented arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, ill-treatment, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings by Taliban authorities since the takeover.
UNAMA reported in 2023 that it had documented at least 800 instances of extrajudicial killing, arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and ill-treatment, and enforced disappearance involving former government officials and members of the former security forces between August 2021 and June 2023.
The problem has not disappeared. Human Rights Watch's 2026 reporting cited further UNAMA documentation of arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment of former government officials and security-force members, as well as killings of former security personnel. It also documented public executions and large numbers of corporal punishments carried out by Taliban authorities.
These abuses are particularly significant in the context of armed resistance. Former soldiers, police officers and government employees may have reasons to fear the Taliban even when they are no longer participating in armed activity. When people believe that surrender or cooperation does not guarantee their safety, the possibility of reconciliation becomes more difficult.
The issue also extends beyond former security personnel. Human-rights organisations have reported arbitrary detention and mistreatment of journalists, activists, women and members of minority communities. Such practices contribute to a wider perception that Taliban security institutions operate with limited accountability.
This does not mean that every Taliban fighter or official participates in torture or extrajudicial violence. Responsibility is individual and should be established through evidence. The documented pattern of abuses, however, is relevant to understanding why some Afghans continue to view Taliban rule as a threat rather than simply as an alternative government.
4.6 A System of Rule, Not Just a Security Problem
Taken together, these issues show why armed resistance cannot be understood solely as a contest between Taliban forces and opposition fighters. Economic grievances, disputes over resources, restrictions on women, discrimination against minorities and documented abuses by security institutions all form part of the political environment in which opposition can develop.
None of these grievances automatically produces support for an armed group. Afghans may oppose Taliban policies without supporting violence, and different communities have different experiences of Taliban rule. But the persistence of these grievances helps explain why territorial control alone does not necessarily eliminate opposition.
5. What Would a “Taliban-Free Afghanistan” Mean?5.1 Removing Taliban Rule Is Not the Same as Killing Every Taliban Member
A Taliban-free Afghanistan should not be understood as a demand to kill every person who has ever belonged to the Taliban. There is an essential distinction between removing the Taliban as a governing system and physically eliminating every individual associated with the movement. Individuals accused of serious crimes should be investigated and, where evidence supports it, prosecuted. Others who are not responsible for serious crimes could potentially be reintegrated into society through lawful processes. The objective, in this sense, would be the end of Taliban political domination rather than indiscriminate violence against Taliban members.
5.2 Accountability and Rehabilitation
Any future transition would face the difficult question of what to do with former Taliban fighters and officials. Those responsible for killings, torture, persecution or other serious abuses should not simply receive automatic immunity because the political system has changed. At the same time, not every low-level member has the same responsibility. A distinction between commanders, perpetrators of serious crimes, ordinary fighters and civilians coerced into cooperation would be essential.
For those who are eligible for reintegration, rehabilitation and deradicalization programs could be considered alongside education, employment and participation in a lawful political order. The goal would be to prevent former fighters from reproducing the same ideology and structures that produced years of conflict.
6. The Historical QuestionThe history of the RAF in Germany and the defeat of ISIS in Iraq and Syria shows that armed extremist organizations can eventually lose their ability to operate as political or military systems. But Afghanistan's situation is not identical to either case. The Taliban is simultaneously an armed movement, a governing authority and a deeply established political organization with control over the state. That difference matters.
The central question for Afghanistan is therefore not simply whether the Taliban can be defeated militarily. It is whether an alternative political order can emerge that provides Afghans with meaningful representation, security, rights and accountability.
7. ConclusionThe developments from Badakhshan to Nuristan represent an important moment for Afghanistan's anti-Taliban resistance. The return of Saleh Registani, his declaration that “the resistance continues,” the renewed fighting in Badakhshan, Nuristan and Kunar, and the September 28 attack claimed by the Afghanistan Freedom Front in Faizabad all demonstrate that armed opposition to Taliban rule has not disappeared.
But the resistance remains far from possessing the resources necessary to defeat the Taliban militarily. The Taliban controls Afghanistan's territory, state institutions and revenue-collection system, while the armed opposition lacks comparable financial resources, heavy equipment, logistics and secure territorial bases. The persistence of attacks under these conditions is therefore significant, but it should not be confused with evidence that the Taliban is close to losing power.
The most important question is ultimately larger than the battlefield: whether Afghanistan will remain under a political system that excludes much of its population, or whether Afghans will eventually be able to establish a different political order through a process that provides representation, rights, accountability and a place for the country's diverse society.
Sources:
Saleh Registani / NRF
1. Shafaqna — Saleh Registani's return to Afghanistan
Saleh Registani returns to Afghanistan / NRF source
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
2. Shafaqna — Registani's background and appointment
Saleh Registani background and NRF appointment
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
Badakhshan / Nuristan / AFF Fighting
3. Shafaqna — Taliban claims 28 killed and 32 captured in Nuristan
Taliban account of the Nuristan fighting
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
4. Shafaqna — Detailed report on the Nuristan fighting
Detailed Nuristan fighting report
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
5. Shafaqna — AFF's response and casualty claims
AFF response to Taliban claims in Nuristan
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
6. Afghanistan International — Three Taliban Members Killed in Faizabad, Says AFF
Three Taliban Members Killed In Faizabad, Says AFF
Published September 28, 2026
Retrieved September 29, 2026
7. Shafaqna — Explosion Reported in Faizabad, Badakhshan
Explosion in Faizabad / Badakhshan
Published September 28, 2026
Retrieved September 29, 2026
Taliban Rule / Afghan Grievances
8. 8AM — Taliban district governor in Tagab: “People should cry tears of blood”
Tagab district governor and grievances in Badakhshan
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
9. 8AM — “Taliban red lines: no cost”
Taliban red lines / Richard Bennett report
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
Taliban's Treatment of Afghan Women / Double Standard
10. 8AM — Taliban's double standard toward women
Taliban women and the double standard over parks
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
11. Shafaqna — Taliban ideology, restrictions and the treatment of women
Taliban restrictions and double standards toward Afghan women
Retrieved on 27 September 2026
Chinese Visitors / Intelligence Allegations
12. The Washington Post — How Jensen Huang’s Downfall Unfolded, Month by Month
Timeline of the alleged spy drama involving Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang
Published: November 12, 2026
Retrieved: November 14, 2026
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