The Fall of Afghanistan in 2021 – Part 1: General Sami Sadat and the Afghanistan United Front
Last Updated: August 21, 2026
General Sami Sadat
The final months of the Republic
Sadat's criticism of the U.S. withdrawal
From military commander to political opposition leader
The AUF's position in 2024
The AUF's political roadmap
Women and political participation
Civilian protection and the conduct of war
Can the anti-Taliban forces unite?
The AUF and the question of U.S. support
From political organization to armed resistance
The central question: can Sadat deliver what he promises?
Conclusion
The first part focuses on Lt. Gen. Sayed Sami Sadat, one of the most prominent Afghan military commanders during the final months of the Republic, and on his subsequent role in the Afghanistan United Front (AUF), an organization established in exile with the stated aim of opposing the Taliban and restoring a constitutional political order.
The account below combines Sadat's own statements, reporting by Military Times and Hasht-e Subh, official U.S. congressional material, and other available sources. Statements attributed to Sadat should be understood as his own assessment unless independently corroborated.
Lt. Gen. Sayed Sami Sadat is a former senior commander of the Afghan National Army. During his career, he commanded the Afghan National Army's 215th Maiwand Corps in southwestern Afghanistan and served as commander of the Afghan government's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). In August 2021, he became the final commanding general of the Afghan National Special Operations Corps.
Sadat became particularly prominent during the final months of the Afghan Republic. Before the collapse of the government, he had commanded forces in Helmand, one of the Taliban's most important areas of operation. His experiences during the final phase of the war were later documented in the 2022 documentary Retrograde, which followed him and Afghan forces during the final stages of the Republic.
In August 2024, Sadat published his memoir, The Last Commander: The Once and Future Battle for Afghanistan. The book presents his personal account of the final years of the Afghan war, his disagreements with Afghan political leaders and U.S. military officials, and his interpretation of the decisions that ultimately led to the collapse of the Republic.
His account is highly critical of the U.S. withdrawal and of the political decisions preceding it. It should therefore be read primarily as the testimony and interpretation of a senior participant in the events, rather than as a complete independent reconstruction of the war.
The final months of the Republic
Sadat's career placed him in a particularly important position during the final phase of the war. On 11 August 2021, Afghan authorities announced that he had been appointed commander of the Special Operations Corps, replacing Maj. Gen. Haibatullah Alizai. At that point, the Taliban offensive was rapidly advancing and several provincial capitals had already fallen.
Only four days later, on 15 August, Kabul fell to the Taliban and the Afghan government effectively collapsed.
The speed of the collapse remains one of the central questions surrounding the events of 2021. Sadat's interpretation is that Afghan forces were increasingly weakened by the withdrawal of U.S. support, shortages of ammunition and maintenance capabilities, the loss of key enablers such as contractors, and political decisions that undermined Afghan military operations.
In his memoir, Sadat is particularly critical of the Doha Agreement, signed between the United States and the Taliban in February 2020. He argues that the agreement restricted the Afghan government's military position while negotiations were taking place and contributed to a perception among Afghan soldiers that the United States was preparing to leave regardless of conditions on the ground.
These arguments are central to Sadat's interpretation of the collapse, but they should not be treated as the sole explanation. The fall of the Republic resulted from a combination of factors, including political fragmentation, problems within the Afghan security forces, corruption and institutional weaknesses, Taliban military pressure, the loss of U.S. air and logistical support, and the decisions taken by both Afghan and foreign political leaders.
Sadat's criticism of the U.S. withdrawal
A major theme in Sadat's account is the feeling among Afghan soldiers that they had been abandoned by their international partners.
In his memoir, he describes the withdrawal of contractors responsible for maintaining Afghan Black Hawk helicopters and argues that the loss of this technical support severely reduced the Afghan military's ability to operate its air fleet. He also describes the psychological impact of seeing U.S. forces destroy remaining ammunition stocks while Afghan forces were struggling with shortages. Military Times reported these claims when it profiled Sadat in September 2024.
(Military Times, “Meet the Afghan general who wants to take on the Taliban,” 25 September 2024. Lt. Gen. Sami Sadat surveys a formation of Afghan troops in 2021 during his service as a senior commander of the Afghan National Army.)Sadat also describes himself as having had a difficult relationship with some senior Afghan and American officials. His blunt and confrontational style reportedly created enemies within the Afghan political leadership and sometimes caused friction with U.S. military officers.
This is one reason why Sadat is a controversial figure. His supporters view him as a commander who openly challenged political decisions that he believed were damaging Afghanistan. Critics, meanwhile, can point to the fact that he was himself a senior member of the military establishment that ultimately failed to prevent the Republic's collapse.
Both aspects are important when assessing his role.
After the fall of Kabul, Sadat initially attempted to cooperate with other anti-Taliban forces. According to Military Times, he contacted Ahmad Massoud and expressed an interest in joining the National Resistance Front (NRF). However, differences over political symbolism and the future constitutional order prevented a lasting alliance.
Sadat subsequently developed his own organization, the Afghanistan United Front (AUF). The organization was publicly announced in the United States in October 2023. Its stated objective has been to oppose the Taliban and ultimately establish a political order based on constitutional principles.
The AUF differs from some other anti-Taliban movements in its insistence on the symbols and constitutional framework of the former Islamic Republic, particularly the national flag and the 2004 Constitution.
Sadat has argued that these symbols provide a legal and political basis for the opposition until the Afghan people themselves can decide on the country's future system.
He has also emphasized that he does not necessarily regard the 2004 Constitution as permanently unchangeable. Instead, he describes it as the framework from which a future political process can begin.
The AUF's position in 2024In a September 2024 interview with Military Times, Sadat described the AUF as an organization seeking to unite Afghans and restore constitutional order. He claimed that the organization could potentially mobilize tens of thousands of former Afghan soldiers and attract new recruits who had become dissatisfied with Taliban rule.
These numbers are Sadat's estimates, not independently verified figures.
At that time, it was still unclear how extensive the AUF's operational network inside Afghanistan actually was. The organization was headquartered in the United States, while Sadat himself was living in Virginia. Military Times described his Virginia home as the headquarters of an organization he largely financed himself.
Sadat nevertheless argued that a significant pool of former Afghan security personnel remained available for a future resistance campaign.
He also warned that the Taliban should not be viewed solely as an Afghan problem. In his view, the continued presence and strengthening of extremist groups in Afghanistan could eventually create a threat to the United States, Europe and the wider international community.
The AUF's political roadmapThe most significant development since the 2024 reporting is that Sadat has now provided a much clearer description of the AUF's political objectives.
In an exclusive written interview published by Hasht-e Subh on 16 August 2026, Sadat described an AUF roadmap called “The Path to Freedom.” According to Sadat, the roadmap consists of several stages.
The first stage is the military defeat of the Taliban.
The second is a transitional phase during which a Loya Jirga would be convened in Kabul. According to Sadat, the Loya Jirga would determine the structure and political priorities of a transitional government and could review or amend the Constitution if the Afghan people considered this necessary.
Sadat said the AUF would accept whatever decision emerged from such a process.
This represents an important clarification compared with the earlier public descriptions of the organization. Rather than presenting the AUF simply as a military movement seeking to take power, Sadat now describes a process in which the military campaign would be followed by a transitional political mechanism and, ultimately, a decision by Afghans themselves about the country's political system.
Whether the AUF would actually be able to implement such a roadmap is, of course, a separate question.
Women and political participation
The 2026 interview also addresses an issue that is central to the future of Afghanistan: the political and social position of women.
Sadat stated that the AUF does not distinguish between men and women in political, economic or social life. He said women are already represented in the organization's leadership and claimed that a woman leads its humanitarian assistance program.
He also stated that another part of the organization has established online schools for Afghan girls, although he said details could not be disclosed for security reasons.
When asked what measures a future government would take to restore education, Sadat identified the reopening of schools and universities as a priority. He also called for the development of a modern educational curriculum.
These statements are significant because they provide a more concrete picture of the AUF's intended political program. At the same time, they remain statements of the organization's leadership, and the extent of its actual activities inside Afghanistan cannot be independently established from the interview alone.
Civilian protection and the conduct of warAnother important point in the 2026 interview concerns the AUF's stated rules for military operations.
Sadat said the organization operates under a document he calls the “Combat Operations Directive.” According to him, the directive contains rules intended to protect civilians and was developed with reference to Islamic jurisprudence concerning warfare, international law, and the Geneva Conventions.
This is an important claim because any future armed opposition to the Taliban would face not only the military problem of fighting the Taliban but also the political and humanitarian problem of protecting civilians.
Sadat placed responsibility for Taliban reprisals on the Taliban themselves. Nevertheless, an armed opposition movement would also have a responsibility to minimize foreseeable harm to civilians and to ensure that its own forces comply with applicable international humanitarian law.
The existence, content and practical enforcement of the AUF's reported directive would therefore be important subjects for future independent scrutiny.
Can the anti-Taliban forces unite?The fragmentation of the anti-Taliban opposition has been one of its greatest weaknesses.
The National Resistance Front (NRF), associated with Ahmad Massoud, the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) and the AUF have overlapping objectives, but they have different leadership structures, political traditions and strategic approaches.
Sadat has not argued that every opposition group must be absorbed into the AUF. In the 2026 interview, he said the organization accepts political pluralism but wants coordination with individuals and groups that accept what he describes as Afghanistan's national values, including the national flag, individual freedoms and justice.
This position is notable because it acknowledges that a single centralized opposition organization may not be realistic.
Recent developments also demonstrate that the anti-Taliban resistance is becoming more diverse rather than less. In August 2026, Hasht-e Subh reported simultaneous activity by several anti-Taliban military fronts, including the NRF, AFF, AUF and the newly established Sepahiyan-e Mihan. The newspaper reported that the AUF had launched its first military operation from Kandahar.
These reports mark a significant change from the situation described in earlier assessments, when the AUF had largely existed as a political organization operating from abroad.
However, claims about military operations and casualties made by resistance organizations or their opponents should be treated cautiously unless independently verified.
The AUF and the question of U.S. supportAnother major question concerns the relationship between the AUF and the United States.
Sadat has extensive connections to the U.S. military establishment because of his years of cooperation with American forces. He has also appeared before the U.S. Congress. In November 2023, he testified before a House subcommittee examining the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Congressional records identify him as the former commanding general of the Afghan National Special Operations Corps and chairman of the AUF.
However, there is an important distinction between access to U.S. officials and official U.S. government support.
There is public evidence that Sadat has met American politicians, military personnel and veterans and that he has participated in congressional discussions about Afghanistan. This does not, by itself, prove that the U.S. government is providing military or intelligence support to the AUF.
A recent Hasht-e Subh analysis argued that several developments could indicate some degree of American tolerance or support for the AUF. The article pointed to the organization's operation from U.S. territory, Sadat's contacts with American officials and the fact that the AUF has recently begun military operations. However, these are presented as indications and arguments, not as proof of an official U.S. policy.
The evolution of the AUF is therefore significant.
In 2023 and 2024, the organization was primarily presented as a political opposition movement operating from the United States. Its critics questioned whether an organization based outside Afghanistan could develop sufficient support and military capability to challenge the Taliban.
Sadat nevertheless maintained that former Afghan soldiers and younger Afghans dissatisfied with Taliban rule could eventually form the basis of a resistance movement. In 2024 he spoke of potentially mobilizing “tens of thousands” of former soldiers, although this figure was not independently verified.
By August 2026, the situation had changed. Hasht-e Subh reported that the AUF had entered the armed struggle and conducted its first military operation. At the same time, Sadat's August 2026 interview presented a more developed political program covering the transition after a possible Taliban defeat, the role of a Loya Jirga, women's participation, education, constitutional government and prevention of a renewed civil war.
The organization therefore appears to have moved from announcing its political existence toward attempting to establish an actual military and political presence.
Whether this transformation will make the AUF a significant force in Afghanistan remains uncertain.
The central question: can Sadat deliver what he promises?Sami Sadat's position is unusual.
He is not simply a politician who emerged after the fall of the Republic. He was a senior military commander during the final months of that Republic and personally participated in the fighting that preceded its collapse.
This gives him military credibility that many political opposition figures do not possess. At the same time, it creates an obvious question: why should Afghans trust commanders and political leaders from the former government to lead the country again after that government collapsed so rapidly in 2021?
Sadat's answer is essentially that the lessons of 2021 have been learned.
In the 2026 interview, he stated that the AUF had studied Afghanistan's history and the mistakes of previous governments and had developed a comprehensive strategy covering the war, politics, civil resistance and the stabilization period. He also claimed that the organization had a detailed plan for preventing a renewed civil war.
Whether this plan exists in a sufficiently detailed and workable form cannot yet be independently assessed.
The credibility of the AUF will ultimately depend less on declarations than on its ability to demonstrate organization, discipline, popular support, cooperation with other opposition forces, protection of civilians and a credible political transition.
ConclusionSami Sadat represents one of the most interesting and controversial figures to emerge from the collapse of the Afghan Republic.
As a senior military commander, he witnessed the final months of the Afghan security forces from close range. His memoir and subsequent interviews provide an important first-hand perspective on the military and political decisions that preceded the collapse, although his interpretation must be balanced against other evidence and accounts.
After 2021, Sadat attempted to transform his military reputation into a political project through the Afghanistan United Front. Initially, the organization faced the same problems that affected much of the anti-Taliban opposition: fragmentation, limited resources, leadership operating from exile and uncertainty about its ability to build a meaningful presence inside Afghanistan.
The situation described in August 2026 is different.
The AUF now claims to possess a political roadmap, including a transitional process and a Loya Jirga, while also presenting itself as a movement committed to women's participation, education, constitutional government and political pluralism. At the same time, reports indicate that it has begun military operations inside Afghanistan.
The decisive question is therefore no longer simply whether Sami Sadat intends to return to the political and military struggle.
The question is whether the AUF can transform its stated plans into a sustainable movement inside Afghanistan — one capable of gaining public trust, coordinating with other anti-Taliban forces, maintaining discipline and civilian protection, and offering Afghans a credible alternative to Taliban rule.
For the moment, the AUF remains one of several competing anti-Taliban movements rather than an established alternative government. Its future importance will depend on what it can actually accomplish on the ground.
SourcesMilitary Times, “Meet the Afghan general who wants to take on the Taliban,” 25 September 2024. Read the Military Times article
Hasht-e Subh, “Exclusive Interview with Sami Sadat, Leader of the Afghanistan United Front,” 16 August 2026. Read the 2026 interview
U.S. House of Representatives, congressional hearing concerning the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, including testimony from Lt. Gen. Sami Sadat. Congressional record
Hasht-e Subh, “Open Discord, Hidden Unity: On the Multiplicity of Anti-Taliban Military Fronts,” 6 August 2026. Read the analysis
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